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INTRODUCTION
On May 24, 2006, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
(FISC) approved an FBI application for an order, pursuant to 50
U.S.C. § 1861, requiring Verizon to turn over all telephony
metadata to the National Security Agency.1 The Court subsequently approved similar applications for all major U.S. telecommunication service providers. Over the next seven years,
FISC issued orders renewing the bulk collection program thirty-four times.2 Almost all of the information obtained related to
1. In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring
the Prod. of Tangible Things from [Telecommunications Providers] Relating to
[REDACTED], Order, No. BR 0605 (FISA Ct. May 24, 2006), available at
https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/docket_0605_1dec201_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf, [http://perma.cc/MT9D-4W2Y] (released by
court order as part of the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) litigation). Note that the specific telecommunications companies from which such records were sought were redacted, as well as the remaining title; the government, however, also released an NSA report that provided
more detail on the title of the Order. OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., NAT’L SEC.
AGENCY, ST-06-0018, ASSESSMENT OF MANAGEMENT CONTROLS FOR IMPLEMENTING THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT ORDER: TELEPHONY BUSINESS RECORDS, available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%
2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf, [http://perma.cc/YXA7-PTT4]
(see page 94 of 1846 and 1862 Production). For purposes of a more precise citation,
I draw from both sources.
2. ADMINISTRATION WHITE PAPER: BULK COLLECTION OF TELEPHONY METADATA UNDER SECTION 215 OF THE USA PATRIOT ACT 2 (Aug. 9, 2013), available at
https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/750211-administration-white-
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the activities of law-abiding persons who were not the subjects
of any investigation.3
This program remained secret until mid-2013, when a combination of leaks by Edward Snowden, a former National Security
Agency (NSA) employee, and Freedom of Information Act litigation launched by the Electronic Frontier Foundation, forced key
documents into the public domain.4 In response, the Obama Administration issued statements, fact sheets, redacted FISC opinions, and even a White Paper, acknowledging the existence of the
program and arguing that it is both legal and constitutional.5
According to these documents, the purpose of the telephony
metadata program is to collect information related to counterterrorism efforts and foreign intelligence.6 These data include
all communications routing information, including (but not
limited to) session identifying information (for example, originating and terminating telephone number, identity of the
communications device, etc.), trunk identifier, and time and
duration of the call.7 The metadata collected as part of this program does not include the substantive content of communica-

paper-section-215.html, [http://perma.cc/V7VM-5MAU] [hereinafter SECTION
215 WHITE PAPER].
3. In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13, at 12 (FISA
Ct. Mar. 2, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_
March%202%202009%20Order%20from%20FISC.pdf, [http://perma.cc/5LYL-RKAZ].
4. Electronic Frontier Found. v. Dep’t of Justice, No. 4:11-cv-05221-YGR, at 2,
¶ 1(b) (N.D. Cal. Jul. 19, 2013) (order responding to the request for records related to
Section 215, i.e., orders and opinions of the FISC issued from January 1, 2004 to June
6, 2011, containing a significant legal interpretation of the government’s authority or
use of its authority under Section 215; and responsive “significant documents, procedures, or legal analyses incorporated into FISC opinions or orders and treated as
binding by the Department of Justice or the National Security Agency”).
5. See, e.g., In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order
Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things from [Telecommunications Providers]
Relating to [REDACTED], Order, No. BR 0605 (FISA Ct. May 24, 2006), available at
https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/docket_0605_1dec201_redacted.ex_-_ocr_0.pdf, [http://perma.cc/MT9D-4W2Y] (released by
court order as part of the Electronic Frontier Foundation’s Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) litigation); SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 2.
6. See, e.g., SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 3 (“The Government cannot conduct substantive queries of the bulk records for any purpose other than
counterterrorism.”); id. at 4 (“Query results can be further analyzed only for valid
foreign intelligence purposes.”).
7. Id. at 3.
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tions, nor does it include subscribers’ names, addresses, or financial information.8
Although many of the details about the telephony metadata
program remain classified, from what has been made public by
the government, it appears that the NSA takes all information
obtained and feeds it into a bulk data set, which is then queried
with an “identifier,” referred to as a “seed.”9 The NSA uses both
international and domestic identifiers.10 FISC requires that the
NSA establish a “reasonable, articulable suspicion” that a seed
identifier used to query the data is linked to a foreign terrorist
organization before running it against the bulk data. Once obtained, information responsive to the query can be further mined
for information. The NSA can analyze the data to ascertain second- and third-tier contacts, in steps known as “hops.”11
8. Content is defined consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8) (2006). But note that the
same arguments brought by the government in support of the telephony metadata program would support building similar databases of subscribers’ and customers’ financial records. See SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 3. In addition,
the Section 215 White Paper is careful to note that the government does not collect
cell phone locational information “pursuant to these orders.” Id. However, the
same arguments that support the telephony metadata program would support the
collection of precisely this information under other FISC orders.
9. SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 3. Note that although the White Paper uses telephone numbers as an example of an identifier, it is conceivable that
various other identifiers may be used. In a recently-released memorandum, for instance, the government refers to “bins” or “zip codes,” suggesting that the types of
queries can be significantly broad. See Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated Jan. 28, 2009 at 9, In re Prod. of Tangible Things
from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorand
um%20of%20US.pdf, [http://perma.cc/9EYZ-D597]. The Guardian, in turn, reports
that the term “identifiers” includes information such as names, telephone numbers,
e-mail addresses, IP addresses, and usernames. See James Ball & Spencer Ackerman,
NSA loophole allows warrantless search for U.S. Citizens’ emails and phone calls, THE
GUARDIAN, Aug. 9, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/aug/09/nsaloophole-warrantless-searches-email-calls, [http://perma.cc/UVP5-TCJJ] (containing
screen shot of classified document).
10. Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated
Jan. 28, 2009 at 8, 10, In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR
08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/9EYZ-D597].
11. SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 3–4 (“The first ‘hop’ refers to the set
of numbers directly in contact with the seed identifier. The second ‘hop’ refers to the
set of numbers found to be in direct contact with the first ‘hop’ numbers, and the
third ‘hop’ refers to the set of numbers found to be in direct contact with the second
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As a practical matter, the NSA interprets the primary order as
authorizing the agency to retrieve information as many as three
tiers away from the initial identifier.12 The government refers to
this process as “automated chaining.”13 These results can then be
further queried for “foreign intelligence purposes.” 14 In some
cases, this information can then be forwarded to the FBI for further investigation, including using the information for an application for an electronic intercept order under Title I of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.15 On at least three occasions,
the government has obtained authorization to expand the telephone identifiers that the NSA could query.16

‘hop’ numbers.”). Initially, neither FISC nor the NSA limited the number of ‘hops’
that could be undertaken. In March 2009, the government implemented software
changes to its system to limit the number of hops permitted to three. Memorandum
of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated Jan. 28, 2009 at 20, In re
Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009),
available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%
20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf, [http://perma.cc/9EYZ-D597]. In January 2014
the President announced that henceforward the number of hops would be limited to
two. Transcript of President Obama’s Jan. 17 speech on NSA reforms, WASH. POST, Jan. 17,
2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/full-text-of-president-obamas-jan-17speech-on-nsa-reforms/2014/01/17/fa33590a-7f8c-11e3-9556-4a4bf7bcbd84_story.html,
[http://perma.cc/CF5-TVP5] (“Effective immediately, we will only pursue phone
calls that are two steps removed from a number associated with a terrorist organization, instead of the current three.”). Notably, these changes are not statutory; nor are
there statutory provisions requiring that the number of hops, should it be changed,
be made public.
12. SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 4.
13. Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated
Jan. 28, 2009 at 10, In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 0813 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/9EYZ-D597]. But see Transcript of President Obama’s Jan. 17 speech
on NSA reforms, supra note 11 (suggesting that in the future NSA surveillance will
be limited to two hops).
14. SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 4.
15. Id.
16. See generally Memorandum of the United States In Response to the Court’s
Order Dated Jan. 28, 2009 at 4 n.3, In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/9EYZ-D597] (“Authorizations after this matter was initiated in
May 2006 expanded the telephone identifiers that NSA could query to those identifiers associated with [REDACTED] see generally docket number BR 06-05 (motion
to amend granted in August 2006) . . . docket number BR 07-10 (motion to amend
granted in June 2007). The Court’s authorization in docket number BR 08-13 ap-
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Since the advent of the program FISC has acknowledged
“that the vast majority of the call-detail records provided are
expected to concern communications that are (i) between the
United States and abroad; or (ii) wholly within the United
States, including local telephone calls.”17 The rationale behind
collecting this information is that:
International terrorist organizations and their agents use the
international telephone system to communicate with one
another between numerous countries all over the world, including to and from the United States. In addition, when
they are located inside the United States, terrorist operatives
make domestic U.S. telephone calls. The most analytically
significant terrorist-related communications are those with
one end in the United States or those that are purely domestic, because those communications are particularly likely to
identify suspects in the United States—whose activities may
include planning attacks against the homeland.18

The program is thus designed to obtain foreign intelligence and
to protect against international terrorist threats both in the
United States and overseas. Under the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA), which governs the program, the data
obtained is understood as “presumptively relevant to an authorized investigation” where the government can establish
that the information pertains to (a) a foreign power or an agent
of a foreign power, (b) the activities of a suspected agent of a
foreign power who is the subject of such authorized investigation, or (c) an individual in contact with, or known to, a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject of an authorized investigation.19
However important the purpose, the National Security
Agency’s bulk collection of telephony metadata embodies precisely what Congress sought to avoid by enacting the 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act in the first place. In so doing,
the program violates the spirit, as well as the letter, of the law.
It also gives rise to troubling constitutional concerns.
proved querying related to [REDACTED] Primary Order, docket number BR 0813, at 8.”).
17. Id. at 2 n.1.
18. SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 3.
19. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iii) (2006).
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Part I of this Article begins by pointing out that the reason
Congress introduced FISA was to make use of new technologies and to enable the intelligence community to obtain information vital to U.S. national security, while preventing the
NSA and other federal intelligence-gathering entities from engaging in broad domestic surveillance. The legislature sought
to prevent a recurrence of the abuses of the 1960s and 1970s
that accompanied both the Cold War and the rapid expansion
of communications technologies.
Congress accordingly circumscribed the NSA’s authorities
by limiting them to foreign intelligence gathering. It required
that the target be a foreign power or an agent thereof, insisted
that such claims be supported by probable cause, and heightened the protections afforded to the domestic collection of U.S.
citizens’ information. Initially focused on electronic surveillance, FISA expanded over time to incorporate physical searches, pen registers and trap and trace, and searches of business
records and tangible goods. The NSA program reflects neither
the particularization required by Congress prior to acquisition
of information, nor the role Congress anticipated for FISC and
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review (FISCR).
The bulk collection program, moreover, as pointed out in
Part II of this Article, violates the statutory language in three
important ways: (1) it fails to satisfy the requirement that records sought be “relevant to an authorized investigation;” (2) it
fails to satisfy the statutory provision that requires that information sought also could be obtained via subpoena duces tecum; and (3) it bypasses the statutory framing for pen registers
and trap and trace devices.
Part III of this Article suggests that the bulk collection of U.S.
citizens’ metadata also gives rise to serious constitutional concerns. Efforts by the government to save the program on
grounds of third party doctrine are unpersuasive in light of the
unique circumstances of Smith v. Maryland and the significant
privacy invasions resulting from the universal use of pen registers and trap and trace devices, the evolution of social norms,
and the advent of new technologies. In addition, the role of
compulsion with regard to the FISC orders (in contrast to the
consent of the telephone company in 1979) implicates the
Fourth Amendment.
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Further examining the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, Part
III goes on to note that over the past decade, tension has
emerged between the view that new technologies should be
considered from the perspective of trespass doctrine and the
view that Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test should
apply. Cases involving, for instance, GPS chips, thermal scanners, and highly-trained dogs divide along these lines. Regardless of which approach one adopts, however, similar results
mark the application of these doctrines to the telephony
metadata program.
Under trespass doctrine, the primary order for the program
amounts to a general warrant—the elimination of which was
the aim of the Fourth Amendment. In light of social norms, it is
also a digital trespass on individuals’ private spheres.
Under Katz, in turn, Americans do not expect that their telephony metadata will be collected and analyzed.20 Most Americans do not even realize what can be learned from such data,
making invalid any claim that they reasonably expect the government to have access to such information. The courts also
have begun to recognize, in a variety of contexts, the greater
incursions into privacy represented by new technologies.
A variant of the government’s argument suggests that the
mere acquisition of data, absent human intervention, cannot
constitute a search. There are multiple problems with this approach, not least of which are that the Supreme Court has
never carved out an automation exception; that privacy interests are determined from the perspective of the individual,
not the government; and that the decision to collect the information is replete with human interaction. Citations to the
usefulness of such information fail to extract the program
from a constitutional abyss.
Part IV concludes by calling for an end to the telephony
metadata program and the implementation of FISA reforms to
enable the government to take advantage of new technologies,
to empower the intelligence agencies to respond to national
security threats, and to bring surveillance operations within the
bounds of statutory and constitutional law. Inserting adversar20. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360–61 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)
(finding that the Fourth Amendment protects reasonable expectations of privacy).
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ial counsel into the FISA process, creating a repository of technological expertise for FISC and FISCR, restoring prior targeting, heightening protections for U.S. persons, further delimiting relevant data, narrowing the definition of “foreign
intelligence” to exclude “foreign affairs,” and requiring the
government to demonstrate past effectiveness prior to obtaining renewal orders offer some possibilities for the future of foreign intelligence gathering in the United States.
I.

BULK COLLECTION IN THE CONTEXT OF FISA’S
GENERAL APPROACH

In the early 1970s, a series of news stories broke detailing the
existence of covert domestic surveillance programs directed at
U.S. citizens. These revelations led, inter alia, to the creation of
the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Chaired by Senator
Frank Church, the Committee uncovered a range of disconcerting domestic surveillance operations—including some conducted by the NSA—prompting Congress to pass the FISA.
In this legislation, Congress purposefully circumscribed intelligence agencies’ authorities by adopting four key protections.21 First, any information obtained from an electronic intercept had to be tied to a specific person or entity, identified as a
foreign power or an agent thereof, prior to the collection of the
information. 22 Second, the government had to demonstrate
probable cause that the target, about whom information was to
be collected, was a foreign power or an agent thereof.23 For U.S.
persons, probable cause could not be established solely on the
basis of otherwise protected First Amendment activities, thus
providing U.S. citizens with a higher level of protection. 24
Third, Congress adopted minimization procedures to restrict
the types of information that could be obtained and retained.25
Fourth, FISA made provision for the Foreign Intelligence Sur-

21. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811 (1978).
22. Id. § 1802(a).
23. Id. § 1804(a).
24. Id. § 1805(a)(2).
25. See id. § 1801(h).
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veillance Court to oversee the process.26 Designed to introduce
a neutral, disinterested magistrate into the equation, FISC’s role
was, narrowly, to ascertain whether the government had met
the appropriate requirements for targeting prior to the acquisition of information. All of these limits dealt, specifically, with
electronic communications. Over time, the statute expanded to
apply a similar approach to physical searches, the placement of
pen registers and trap and trace, and business records—as well
as tangible goods.
The telephony metadata program runs contrary to the general approach Congress adopted in FISA both with regard to
the particularization otherwise required and the role Congress
envisioned for the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and
the Court of Review.
A.

Prior Domestic Surveillance

One of the first public indications that the executive branch
was engaging in broad domestic intelligence gathering came
in January 1970. Writing in the Washington Monthly, Christopher Pyle charged that the Army was engaged in the surveillance of U.S. citizens. 27 The following year, an organization
calling itself the Citizens’ Commission to Investigate the FBI
broke into a two-person FBI office in Media, Pennsylvania,
stealing 1000 classified documents, all of which WIN Magazine
subsequently published.28 A code word on these documents,
“COINTELPRO”
(for
“counterintelligence
program”),
prompted Carl Stern, a reporter for NBC, to initiate a Freedom of Information Act lawsuit.29 On December 6, 1973, Stern
26. See id. § 1803.
27. Christopher H. Pyle, CONUS Intelligence: The Army Watches Civilian Politics,
WASH. MONTHLY, Jan. 1, 1970, reprinted in 91 CONG. REC. 2227–2231 (1970).
28. The Complete Collection of Political Documents Ripped-off from the FBI Office in
Media, PA, March 8, 1971, WIN MAG., Mar. 1972. Note that the original FBI files
are now located at the Swarthmore College Peace Collection, Swarthmore College,
Swarthmore, Pennsylvania.
29. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOV’T OPERATIONS, S. REP. NO. 94-755, SUPPLEMENTARY DETAILED STAFF REPORTS ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND THE RIGHTS
OF AMERICANS: FINAL REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES 3 (1976) (citing Letter
From FBI Headquarters to All SACs (Apr. 28, 1971), available at
http://archive.org/stream/finalreportofsel03unit#page/n3/mode/2up,
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filed a story that ran on NBC Nightly News, detailing extensive domestic surveillance and disruption undertaken by the
FBI for national security purposes.30
In 1974, Seymour M. Hersh, an investigative reporter, published a detailed report in the New York Times catapulting the
conversation forward. Hersh reported that during the Nixon
Administration the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had conducted a massive intelligence operation “against the antiwar
movement and other dissident groups in the United States.”31
A special unit that reported directly to the Director of Central
Intelligence had maintained intelligence files on more than
10,000 Americans, including members of Congress.32 The CIA
had also engaged in dozens of other illegal operations since the
1950s, such as “break-ins, wiretapping, and the surreptitious
inspection of mail.”33 One official reported that the requirement
to keep files on U.S. citizens stemmed, in part, from the socalled Huston plan.34 Agency officials claimed at the time that,
although directed at U.S. citizens, everything they had done
had been under the auspices of foreign intelligence gathering.35
These new revelations came as quite a surprise, not least because the 1947 National Security Act forbade the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency from having any “police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers or internal-security functions.”36
The report, moreover, came on the heels of a Senate Armed
Services Committee report condemning the Pentagon for spying on the White House National Security Council.
[http://perma.cc/PP98-82PB]; Memorandum from C.D. Brennan to W.C. Sullivan
(Apr. 27, 1971).
30. See Michael Isikoff, NBC reporter recounts breaking FBI spying story, NBC
NEWS, Jan. 8, 2014, http://investigations.nbcnews.com/_news/2014/01/08/22220561nbc-reporter-recounts-breaking-fbi-story?lite, [http://perma.cc/FD5B-3R8K].
31. Seymour M. Hersh, Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar
Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1974, at 1.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 26. Named for Tom Charles Huston, the Presidential aide who conceived the project, the plan called for the use of burglaries and wiretapping to
counter antiwar activities and student turmoil ostensibly “fomented” by black
extremists. President Nixon and senior officials claimed that it had never been
implemented.
35. Id.
36. National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 253, § 102(d)(3), 61 Stat. 495, 498 (1947).
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These public allegations, related to intelligence agencies’ impropriety, illegal activities, and abuses of authority, prompted
both Houses of Congress to create temporary committees to
investigate the accusations: the House Select Committee on Intelligence, and the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities.37
The latter, Chaired by Senator Frank F. Church (D-ID), with
the assistance of Senator John G. Tower (R-TX) as Vice Chairman, was a carefully-constructed, bipartisan initiative. Its membership included eleven Senators, six drawn from the majority
party and five from the minority party.38 The Republican leadership in the Senate chose legislators representing a range of views
within their party, as did the Democratic leadership.39 Further
thought was given to diversity of experience, incorporating both
senior members of the Senate as well as some of the most junior
members—including one Senator who had only begun his service a few weeks prior to the formation of the committee.40 The
Senate overwhelmingly supported the establishment of the Select Committee, endorsing its creation by a vote of 82-4.41
The Senate directed the committee to do two things: first, to
investigate “illegal, improper, or unethical activities” in which
the intelligence agencies engaged; and, second, to determine
the “need for specific legislative authority to govern” the NSA
and other agencies.42 The Church Committee subsequently took
testimony from hundreds of people, inside and outside of government, in public and private hearings. The NSA, FBI, CIA,
Internal Revenue Service, Post Office, and other federal agencies submitted documents. In 1975 and 1976 the Committee is-

37. H.R. Res. 138, 94th Cong. (1975), replaced and expanded by H.R. Res. 591, 94th
Cong. (1975); S. Res. 21, 94th Cong. (1975).
38. Intelligence Activities: Hearing on S. Res. 21 Before the Select Comm. to Study
Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States,
94th Cong. ii (1975) [hereinafter Church Committee Report].
39. Interviews with Senator Walter Mondale and Senator Gary Hart, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 23, 2013).
40. Id.
41. S. Res. 21, 94th Cong., 121 CONG. REC. 1416–34 (1975).
42. Id.
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sued seven reports and six supplemental volumes, classifying
another sixty reports for future release.43
The committee found that broad domestic surveillance programs, conducted under the guise of foreign intelligence collection, had undermined the privacy rights of U.S. citizens.44 The
NSA figured largely in these concerns.
1.

NSA Programs

Although the NSA maintained a definition of foreign intelligence that focused on threats external to the United States, a
key contributor to the agency’s decision to intercept Americans’ communications was the question of whether the definition of foreign communications prevented the acquisition, or
merely the analysis, of information not related to foreign intelligence. The NSA adopted—and the Church Committee rejected—the latter approach.
In October 1952, President Truman issued a classified memo
that laid out the future of U.S. signals intelligence and created
the NSA.45 Truman’s aims were to (a) strengthen U.S. signals
intelligence capabilities, (b) support the country’s ability to wage
war, and (c) generate information central to the conduct of foreign affairs.46 The NSA’s mission, accordingly, was to obtain foreign intelligence from foreign electronic communications.47

43. Interview with Senator Gary Hart, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 24, 2013).
Since 1992, another 50,000 pages of the records have been declassified and made
publicly available at the National Archives. Rockefeller Commission Report, HISTORY
MATTERS,
http://history-matters.com/archive/contents/church/contents_
church_reports_rockcomm.htm, [http://perma.cc/0tjNU58CfXR] (last visited
March 19, 2014); Press Release, Nat’l Sec. Agency Cent. Sec. Serv., The National
Security Agency Releases Over 50,000 Pages of Declassified Documents (June 8,
2011), available at http://www.nsa.gov/public_info/press_room/2011/50000_
declassified_docs.shtml, [http://perma.cc/SR2A-TCGK].
44. See supra note 38.
45. 5 Church Committee Report, supra note 38, at 6 (citing Memorandum from
President Harry Truman (Oct. 29, 1952)).
46. 5 Church Committee Report, supra note 38. For an informative discussion of
MI-8 and the NSA’s predecessor agencies, see House Comm. on Gov’t Operations,
Interception of International Telecommunications by the National Security Agency 1–12 (Draft Report), available at http://www.maryferrell.org/mffweb/archive/
viewer/showDoc.do?docId=145022&relPageId=14, [http://perma.cc/3LK5-CDWR].
47. 5 Church Committee Report, supra note 38, at 6 (statement of Lieutenant General Lew Allen, Jr., Director, National Security Agency).
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From the beginning, the agency understood foreign intelligence to involve the interception of communications wholly or
partly outside the United States and not targeted at U.S. persons. Neither the Presidential directive of 1952, nor the National Security Council Intelligence Directive (NSCID) No. 6, which
authorized the CIA to engage in Foreign Wireless and Radio
Monitoring, defined the term “foreign communications.”48
NSCID No. 9, however, titled “Communications Intelligence,” defined “foreign communications” as “all telecommunications and related materials . . . of the government and/or
their nationals or of any military, air, or naval force, faction,
party, department, agency, or bureau of a foreign country, or of
any person or persons acting or purporting to act therefor.” It
included “all other telecommunications and related material of,
to, and from a foreign country which may contain information
of military, political, scientific or economic value.”49 “Foreign
communications” thus turned upon the nature of the entity engaged in communications: a foreign power, or an individual
acting on behalf of a foreign power.
The NSA did not (indeed, could not) discuss NSCID No. 9
during the Church Committee’s public hearings. The Director
of Central Intelligence, however, had issued a directive that the
NSA did discuss, which employed a definition of foreign
communications that excluded communications between U.S.
citizens or entities.50 In keeping with these understandings, the
NSA ostensibly focused on communications conducted wholly
or partly outside the United States and not targeted at U.S. persons. The distinction was drawn, however, at the point of analysis—not the point of interception.
Testifying in 1975, NSA Director Lieutenant General Lew Allen, Jr. could thus assert that the NSA did not at that time, nor
had it (with one exception—individuals whose names were
48. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 6 (Dec. 12, 1947) (National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State,
Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 66 D 148, Dulles-Jackson-Correa
Report, Annex 12); see also 5 Church Committee Report, supra note 38, at 6.
49. National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 9 (Mar. 10, 1950) (on file
at National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Records of the Department of State, Records of the Executive Secretariat, NSC Files: Lot 66 D 195).
50. 5 Church Committee Report, supra note 38, at 9.
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contained on the NSA’s watch list) “conducted intercept operations for the purpose of obtaining the communications of U.S.
citizens.” 51 Whether such communications were incidentally
intercepted, however, was another matter. As Lieutenant General Allen recognized, “[S]ome circuits which are known to carry foreign communications necessary for foreign intelligence
will also carry personal communications between U.S. citizens,
one of whom is at a foreign location.”52
Central to Allen’s assertion was the understanding that, to
constitute foreign communications, and to legitimate the collection of information on U.S. citizens, the target of the surveillance must be a foreign power, or an agent of a foreign
power, and at least one party to each communication must be
outside the country.
The Senate considered this approach, in light of the broad
swathes of information obtained about U.S. citizens, to run afoul
of the Fourth Amendment. Two NSA programs in particular
generated significant concern. The first, Project MINARET, introduced to collect foreign intelligence information, ended up
intercepting hundreds of U.S. citizens’ communications. The
second, Operation SHAMROCK, involved the large-scale collection of U.S. citizens’ communications from private companies.
a.

Project MINARET

In the late 1960s, the NSA, like the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS), the FBI, and the CIA, constructed a list of U.S. citizens
and non-U.S. citizens subject to surveillance. 53 The program,
which operated from 1967 to 1973 started out by narrowly focusing on the international communications of U.S. citizens
traveling to Cuba. It quickly expanded, however, to include
individuals (a) involved in civil disturbances, (b) suspected of
criminal activity, (c) implicated in drug activity, (d) of concern
to those tasked with Presidential protection, and (e) suspected
of involvement in international terrorism.54

51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 3.
54. Id. at 10–11.
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In 1969 the collection of information on individuals included
on the watch list became known as Project MINARET.55 When
details about the program emerged, senators and members of
the public expressed alarm about the privacy implications.
Central to the legislators’ concern was the potential for such
programs to target communications of a wholly domestic nature. Senator (later Vice President) Walter Mondale articulated
the Committee’s disquiet:
Given another day and another President, another perceived
risk and someone breathing hot down the neck of the military leader then in charge of the NSA: demanding a review
based on another watch list, another wide sweep to determine whether some of the domestic dissent is really foreign
based, my concern is whether that pressure could be resisted
on the basis of the law or not . . . . [W]hat we have to deal
with is whether this incredibly powerful and impressive institution . . . could be used by President ‘A’ in the future to
spy upon the American people . . . . [W]e need to . . . very
carefully define the law, spell it out so that it is clear what
[the Director of the NSA’s] authority is and . . . is not.56

Senator Mondale asked Allen whether he would object to a
new law clarifying that the NSA did not have the authority to
collect domestic information on U.S. citizens. Allen indicated
that he did not object.57 FISA subsequently became the instrument designed to limit the NSA’s collection of information on
U.S. citizens.
b.

Operation SHAMROCK

During the Senate hearings, much concern was expressed
about whether to make public a second, highly classified, largescale surveillance program run by the NSA.58 The committee
decided to discuss the program in open session on the grounds
that it was both illegal and violated the Fourth Amendment.59
55. Id. at 30.
56. Id. at 36.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 48–57, 60–61, 63; see also House Comm. on Gov’t Operations, supra note
46, at 2–6 (discussing pressures on the Church Committee from the House side).
59. 5 Church Committee Report, supra note 38, at 57 (statement of Senator Frank
Church, Chairman, Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States Senate).
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Operation SHAMROCK was the cover name given to a program in which the government had convinced three major telegraph companies (RCA Global, ITT World Communications,
and Western Union International) to forward international telegraphic traffic to the Department of Defense.60 For nearly thirty years, the NSA and its predecessors received copies of most
international telegrams that had originated in, or been forwarded through, the United States.61
Operation SHAMROCK stemmed from wartime measures,
in which companies turned messages related to foreign intelligence targets over to military intelligence. In 1947, the Department of Defense negotiated the continuation of the program in
return for protecting the companies from criminal liability and
public exposure.62
Like Project MINARET, the scope of the program gradually
expanded. Initially, the program focused on foreign targets.
Eventually, however, as new technologies became available,
the NSA began extracting U.S. citizens’ communications. 63 It
selected approximately 150,000 messages per month for further
analysis, distributing some messages to other agencies.64
Senators expressed strong concern at the resulting privacy
violations, inviting the Attorney General before the Select
Committee to discuss “the fourth amendment of the Constitution and its application to 20th century problems of intelligence
and surveillance.”65 Senator Frank Church explained:
In the case of the NSA, which is of particular concern to us
today, the rapid development of technology in the area of
electronic surveillance has seriously aggravated present ambiguities in the law. The broad sweep of communications interception by NSA takes us far beyond the previous fourth
amendment controversies where particular individuals and
specific telephone lines were the target.66

60. Id. at 57–58.
61. Id. at 58.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 58–59.
64. Id. at 60.
65. Id. at 65.
66. Id.
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Lieutenant General Allen sought to reassure the committee that
although some circuits carried personal communications, the interception was “conducted in such a manner as to minimize the
unwanted messages.”67 Nevertheless, the agency could have obtained many unwanted communications, and thus undertook
procedures to process, sort, and analyze the relevant data. “The
analysis and reporting is accomplished only for those messages
which meet specified conditions and requirements for foreign intelligence.”68 Elaborating further, Allen noted, “[t]he use of lists of
words, including individual names, subjects, locations, etc., has
long been one of the methods used to sort out information of foreign intelligence value from that which is not of interest.”69
The question that confronted Congress was how to limit the
NSA’s ability to acquire broad swathes of information up front,
in the process obtaining access to private communications of
individuals with no connection to foreign intelligence concerns.
Congress would have to find a way to control new, sophisticated technologies and to allow intelligence agencies to perform
their legitimate foreign intelligence activities, without also allowing the agencies to invade U.S. citizens’ privacy by allowing them access to information unrelated to national security.70
In the absence of any governing statute, Attorney General
Edward H. Levi’s approach had been to authorize the requested surveillance only where a clear nexus existed between the
target and a foreign power.71 The Attorney General sought to
distinguish the process from the British Crown’s use of writs of
assistance, in the shadow of which James Madison had drafted
the Fourth Amendment.72 The Founders’ objection to such instruments was simple: Were the government to be granted the
67. Id. at 19.
68. Id. Former CIA Director William E. Colby provided similar testimony before
the Pike Committee on August 6, 1975: “On some occasions, [the interception of
U.S. citizens’ communications] cannot be separated from the traffic that is being
monitored. It is technologically impossible to separate them.” U.S. Intelligence
Agencies and Activities: Intelligence Costs and Fiscal Procedures: Hearings Before the H.
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 94th Cong. 241 (1975) (statement of William E. Colby,
Acting Director, CIA).
69. 5 Church Committee Report, supra note 38, at 20.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 71.
72. Id. at 71–72.
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authority to break into and search individuals’ homes without
cause, the private affairs of every person would be subject to
inspection.73 In contrast, Levi argued, the exercise of electronic
wiretaps for foreign intelligence gathering fell subject to Attorney General review. Nevertheless, he recognized the need for
new laws to address the ambiguity that attended the use of
modern technologies. The senators agreed.74
2.

Broader Context

The NSA was not the only federal entity making use of new
technologies to collect significant amounts of information on
U.S. citizens. The FBI, CIA, IRS, U.S. Army, and other federal
entities similarly engaged in broad domestic intelligencegathering operations. Details relating to many of these programs, such as the FBI’s COINTELPRO and the CIA’s Operation
CHAOS, were uncovered by the exhaustive investigations of the
Senate Select Committee and other entities that looked into the
range and extent of programs underway.75 Both statutory violations and constitutional concerns accompanied these inquiries.
In 1970, for instance, Senator Sam Ervin (D-NC) began investigating the public allegations. After a year of making minimal
progress in the face of misleading statements from the Nixon
Administration, claims of inherent executive power, and a refusal to disclose information that might damage national security, Senator Ervin called for public hearings to consider “the
dangers which the Army’s program presents to the principles
of the Constitution.”76
In 1975, President Ford issued an executive order establishing the President’s Commission on CIA Activities Within the
United States (the “Rockefeller Commission”).77 Ford appointed Vice President Nelson Rockefeller as chairman.78 The public
charges to which the Rockefeller Commission responded included large-scale domestic surveillance of U.S. citizens, retain73. Id. at 72.
74. See, e.g., id. at 64–65, 84, 125.
75. See, e.g., id at 3.
76. 116 CONG. REC. 26,329 (1970).
77. See Exec. Order No. 11,828, 3 C.F.R. 933 (1975).
78. Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States: Announcement of Appointment of Chairman and Members, 11 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 25 (Jan. 5, 1975).
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ing dossiers on U.S. citizens, and aiming these activities at individuals who disagreed with government policies. 79 The
Commission’s aim was further supplemented by allegations
that the CIA had intercepted and opened personal mail in the
United States for the past twenty years, infiltrated domestic
dissident groups and intervened in domestic politics, engaged
in illegal wiretaps and break-ins, and improperly assisted other
government agencies.80
Like the Senate Select Committee, the Rockefeller Commission faced the key question of how to define the term “foreign
intelligence”—a crucial step in protecting Americans’ right to
privacy. Accordingly, in its first recommendation, the Rockefeller Commission advised that Section 403 of the 1947 National
Security Act be amended to make it explicit that the CIA’s activities must be solely related to “foreign intelligence.”81 Any
involvement of U.S. citizens could only be incidental to foreign
intelligence collection.82
The Commission reinforced the strict separation between foreign targets and U.S. persons through its second recommendation: that the President, by executive order, “prohibit the CIA
from the collection of information about the domestic activities
of United States citizens (whether by overt or covert means), the
evaluation, correlation, and dissemination of analyses or reports
about such activities, and the storage of such information.”83
The House Select Intelligence Committee, created on February 19, 1975, was replaced five months later by a committee
headed by Representative Otis Pike (D-NY).84 The Pike Committee focused on a range of intelligence gathering programs,
including those of the National Security Agency.85 Public hear79. REPORT TO THE
THE UNITED STATES 9

PRESIDENT BY THE COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN
(1975).

80. Id.
81. Id. at 12.
82. Id. at 12–13.
83. Id. at 13.
84. H.R. Res. 138, 94th Cong. (Feb. 19, 1975) (introduced Jan. 16, 1975 and
passed Feb. 19, 1975 by a vote of 286-120).
85. See, e.g., 1 U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Intelligence Costs and Fiscal
Procedures: Hearings Before the H. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 94th Cong. (1975); 3
U.S. Intelligence Agencies and Activities: Domestic Intelligence Programs: Hearings
Before the H. Select Comm. on Intelligence, 94th Cong. (1975); 4 U.S. Intelligence Agen-
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ings on the agency’s operations were held in October 1975 and
February and March 1976.86 Its draft report complained of the
tension between Congress and the executive branch, noting the
“intense Executive branch efforts” to have the NSA hearings
curtailed or postponed—both in the Senate and the House.87
Like the Church Committee, the Pike Committee expressed
concern about SHAMROCK and MINARET, noting that the
former resulted in the NSA maintaining files on approximately
75,000 U.S. citizens between 1952 and 1974:
Persons included in these files included civil rights leaders,
antiwar activists, and Members of Congress. For at least 13
years, CIA employees were given unrestricted access to
these files, and one or more worked full time retrieving information that presumably was contributed to the CIA’s
domestic intelligence program—Operation CHAOS—which
existed from 1967 to 1974.88

For the Pike Committee, these programs violated both Section
605 of the Communications Act and the Fourth Amendment.89
The committee expressed particular concern about the NSA’s
“vacuum cleaner” approach to foreign intelligence gathering.90
The committee noted that international telephone calls, some
twenty-four million telegrams and fifty million telex (teletype)
messages entered, left, and transited the United States each
year, and millions of additional messages that traveled over
leased lines—“including millions of computer data transmissions electronically entering and leaving the country”—
presented further potential sources of intelligence.91
Coming on the heels of the Pentagon Papers, which demonstrated that the Johnson Administration had systematically lied
to the public and to Congress; the Watergate scandal, in which
the Nixon Administration orchestrated a June 1972 break-in at
the Democratic National Committee headquarters; and Presicies and Activities: Committee Proceedings: Proceedings of the H. Select Committee on
Intelligence, 94th Cong. (1975).
86. House Comm. on Gov’t Operations, supra note 46, at 2.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 14.
89. Id. at 15–17.
90. Id. at 18.
91. Id.
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dent Nixon’s resignation on August 9, 1974, the revelation of
these programs deepened the erosion of public confidence in
the executive branch. More specifically, their findings undermined citizens’ confidence in the intelligence agencies.92 Critical questions facing Congress were how to rebuild confidence
in the system, how to incorporate new technologies into the
existing infrastructure, and how to empower the intelligence
agencies to conduct electronic surveillance, while protecting
the privacy rights of U.S. citizens.
A timely judicial decision helped to lay the groundwork for
congressional action. In 1972 the Supreme Court had held that
the electronic surveillance of domestic groups, even where security issues might be involved, required that the government
first obtain a warrant.93 The “inherent vagueness of the domestic security concept,” and the significant possibility that it could
be abused to quash political dissent, underscored the importance of the Fourth Amendment—particularly when the
government was spying on its own citizens.94
Justice Powell, writing for the Court, emphasized the limits
of the decision: “[T]his case involves only the domestic aspects
of national security. We have not addressed, and express no
opinion as to, the issues which may be involved with respect to
activities of foreign powers or their agents.”95 Standards and
procedures for domestic security surveillance might differ from
those required by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968.96 Congress may wish to consider passing new laws covering such cases.97
Four critical changes followed. First, consistent with the
Church Committee’s recommendations, Congress created a
permanent Senate Intelligence Committee. Within a month of
the final report, a resolution to this effect was introduced, and
on May 19, 1976 it passed by overwhelming majority, 72-22.98
The new Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) was
92. 124 CONG. REC. 36,415 (1978) (statement of Rep. Morgan Murphy).
93. United States v. U.S. District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
94. Id. at 320.
95. Id. at 321–22.
96. See id. at 322.
97. See id. at 322–23.
98. S. Res. 400, 94th Cong. (1976).
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given exclusive oversight of the CIA and concurrent jurisdiction over the NSA and other elements of the intelligence community.99 The resolution directed that the intelligence community keep the new entity “fully and currently informed” of their
activities, including all “significant anticipated activities.”100 It
was to be a “select,” rather than a “standing.” committee, precisely to allow the Senate majority and minority leaders to decide its composition, and to avoid the same in the party caucuses preceding each new Congress.101 The chair and vice chair
would not be allowed to serve concurrently as chair or ranking
minority member of any major standing committee.102
Of the fifteen members selected, no more than eight would be
drawn from the majority party, ensuring balance between the
parties.103 In addition, the Committee’s composition would ensure cross-representation of related committees: Two members
each would be drawn from the Appropriations, Armed Services,
Foreign Relations, and Judiciary Committees.104 A limit of eight
years was placed on committee membership, to avoid intelligence agency capture.105 Notably, five of the first fifteen members, Walter Huddleston (D-KY), Gary Hart (D-CO), Robert
Morgan (D-NC), Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), and Howard Baker
(R-TN), had served as members of the Church Committee. Fourteen members of SSCI’s staff had served as staff members to the
same, including William Miller, the staff director for both the
Church Committee and the newly-minted SSCI.106
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Interview with William Miller, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 24, 2013). For discussion of the history of the founding of this committee and its subsequent development, see SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT OF
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES: THE U.S. EXPERIENCE, S. DOC. NO. 82-692 (1994). See also
FRANK J. SMIST, JR., CONGRESS OVERSEES THE UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, 1947–1989 (1990); L. BRITT SNIDER, THE AGENCY AND THE HILL: CIA’S RELATIONSHIP WITH CONGRESS, 1946-2004, 51–91 (2008). Following the rather dismal
mood that marked the Pike Committee’s operations, the House Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence was not founded until July 17, 1977. At that point, House
Resolution 658 passed 227-171, creating the Permanent Select Committee on Intelli-
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Second, the President issued an executive order “to improve
the quality of intelligence needed for national security, to clarify
the authority and responsibilities of the intelligence departments
and agencies, and to establish effective oversight to assure compliance with law in the management and direction of intelligence agencies and departments of the national government.”107
Executive Order 11,905 prohibited the CIA from engaging in
electronic surveillance in the United States and banned intelligence agencies from engaging in physical surveillance, electronic surveillance, unconsented physical searches, mail opening, or examining federal tax returns except as consistent with
procedures approved by the Attorney General or in accordance
with applicable statutes and regulations. 108 It prohibited the
infiltration of organizations for the purpose of reporting on
their activities, with the exception of organizations primarily
composed of non-U.S. persons that were reasonably believed to
be acting on behalf of a foreign power. 109 The order further
prevented any collection of information about U.S. persons’
domestic activities absent situations with a clear foreign intelligence or counterintelligence component.110
Despite the provisions contained in the executive order,
Congress considered legislative action crucial to reining in the
intelligence agencies and therefore, as a third outcome, chose to
rewrite the National Security Act to require a finding and notification for covert action.
gence (HPSCI). The structure of both committees remained relatively constant until
2004. The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States issued
its report in July 2004, criticizing the system of congressional oversight of intelligence agencies as “dysfunctional” and recommending either a joint committee on
intelligence (similar to the Joint Atomic Energy Committee), with authority both to
authorize and appropriate, or smaller committees, and the elimination of term limits. U.S. NAT’L COMM’N ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT 420–21 (2004). In 2004, the Senate eliminated the
eight-year term limits, elevated the committee to category A (Senators are generally
only able to serve on up to two “A” Committees), created an oversight subcommittee, and created an intelligence subcommittee in the Appropriations Committee. S.
Res. 445, 108th Cong. (2004).
107. Exec. Order No. 11,905, 41 Fed. Reg. 7703 (Feb. 19, 1976). This order was subsequently strengthened by Exec. Order No. 12,036, 43 Fed. Reg. 3674 (Jan. 26, 1978),
and replaced in part by Exec. Order No. 12,333, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 8, 1981).
108. Exec. Order No. 11,905, § 5(b)(1)–(5), 41 Fed. Reg. at 7728–30.
109. Id. § 5(b)(6).
110. Id. § 5(b)(7).
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Fourth, Congress passed the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. The aim was to empower the intelligence agencies to
collect information necessary to protect U.S. national security,
while preventing agencies from using foreign intelligence
gathering as an excuse for engaging in domestic surveillance of
U.S. citizens. The process began with the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1976, the first bill introduced in Congress,
which was supported by the President and Attorney General
and would require judicial warrants in foreign intelligence cases.111 Its successor bill, S. 1566, became the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978.112
B.

Protections Built into FISA

From the beginning, Congress made it clear that the legislation
was designed to prevent precisely the types of broad surveillance
programs and incursions into privacy represented by Project
MINARET, Operation SHAMROCK, COINTELPRO, Operation
CHAOS, and other intelligence-gathering initiatives that had
come to light.113 During consideration of the conference report on
S. 1566, for instance, Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) noted, “The
abuses of recent history sanctioned in the name of national securi-

111. 124 CONG. REC. 35,389 (1978) (statement of Sen. Charles Matthias, Jr.); see
also Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976, S. 3197, 94th Cong. (1976).
112. See Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783; 124 CONG. REC. 35,389 (1978).
113. Proponents of the bulk metadata collection program assert that the statute
was not intended to protect against invasive surveillance. Instead, the statute
“creates a balance between the criminal system’s restrictions on government
searches and the broader acceptance of information-gathering during wartime.”
John Yoo, The Legality of the National Security Agency’s Bulk Data Surveillance Programs, 37 HARV. J.L. PUB. POL’Y 901, 906 (2014). There are three problems with this
claim. First, the two statements are not in opposition—that is, the program could
be oriented toward curbing government surveillance even as it seeks a balance
between competing concerns. Second, the historical record does not support the
first part of the claim. The entire raison d’etre behind FISA was to create a framework to protect against overzealous use of surveillance. Third, FISA does not balance wartime information gathering with criminal law standards. It creates a
framework for national security, regardless of whether the country is engaged in
hostilities. The legislation specifically contemplates war, creating a short period of
suspension, following which the FISA procedures must again be followed. Instead
of a “wartime information gathering scheme[]”, it would be more accurate to describe FISA as establishing a national security framework that applies regardless
of whether or not the country is at war. See id.
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ty highlighted the need for this legislation.”114 For Kennedy, the
legislation represented the “final chapter in the ongoing 10-year
debate to regulate foreign intelligence electronic surveillance.”115
With the passage of FISA, the Senate would “at long last place
foreign intelligence electronic surveillance under the rule of
law.”116 Senator Birch Bayh, Jr. (D-IN) echoed Kennedy’s sentiments: “This bill, for the first time in history, protects the rights of
individuals from government activities in the foreign intelligence
area.”117 Senator Charles Mathias (R-MD) noted that enactment of
the legislation would be a milestone, ensuring “that electronic
surveillance in foreign intelligence cases will be conducted in conformity with the principles set forth in the fourth amendment.”118
The Foreign Intelligence Act of 1978 represented the culmination of a multi-branch, multi-year, cross-party initiative directed at bringing the collection of foreign intelligence within a
narrowly circumscribed legal framework.119 Congress consulted the NSA, FBI, CIA, and representatives of interested citizen
groups, gaining broad support for the measure.120 As a result,
FISA passed by significant majorities.121
Congress purposefully circumscribed the NSA’s authorities in
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act by adopting four key
protections. First, any information obtained from an electronic
intercept had to be tied to a specific person or entity, identified
114. 124 CONG. REC. 34,845 (1978).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. 124 CONG. REC. 35,389 (1978) (statement of Senator Mathias).
119. In 1972, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary’s Subcommittee on Administrative Practice and Procedure held extensive hearings on the subject of warrantless wiretapping. 122 CONG. REC. 7543 (1976). In 1975, the subcommittee issued a
report jointly with a special subcommittee of the Foreign Relations Committee,
calling for Congress to introduce legislation governing foreign intelligence collection. Id. In 1976, President Ford and Attorney General Levi introduced the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1976, H.R. 12,750, 94th Cong. (as introduced in the
House, Mar. 23, 1976). President Carter and Attorney General Bell subsequently
supported S. 1566, which became FISA. 124 CONG. REC. 36,409 (1978).
120. 124 CONG. REC. 37,738 (1978); 124 CONG. REC. 36,414 (1978).
121. S. 1566 passed the Senate 95-1. 124 CONG. REC. 36,409 (1978). H.R. 7308
passed the House 246-128. Id. In October 1978, the Senate adopted the Conference
Report “by an overwhelming voice vote, with no dissenting voice vote.” Id. The
House, in turn, adopted the Conference Report by a vote of 226-176. 124 CONG.
REC. 36,417–18 (1978).

784

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 37

as a foreign power or an agent thereof, before the collection of the
information. 122 Second, the government had to demonstrate
probable cause that the target, about whom information was to
be collected, was a foreign power or an agent thereof.123 For U.S.
persons, such probable cause could not be established solely on
the basis of otherwise protected First Amendment activities,
thus providing U.S. citizens with a higher level of protection.124
Third, Congress adopted minimization procedures to restrict the
type of information that could be obtained and retained. 125
Fourth, FISA provided for a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court (FISC) to oversee the process.126 Designed to introduce a
disinterested magistrate into the equation, FISC’s role was, narrowly, to ascertain whether the government had met the appropriate requirements for targeting before the acquisition of information. All of these restrictions centered on the interception of
electronic communications. Over time, the statute expanded to
apply a similar approach to physical searches, the placement of
pen registers and trap and trace, and searches of business records, as well as tangible goods.
1.

Entity Targeted Prior to Acquisition

From the outset, Congress sought to limit the amount of information the NSC and others acquired by requiring that the
target of surveillance be identified as a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power prior to the interception of communications. FISA defined a “foreign power” as:
(1) a foreign government or any component thereof, whether or not recognized by the United States;
(2) a faction of a foreign nation or nations, not substantially
composed of United States persons;
(3) an entity that is openly acknowledged by a foreign government or governments to be directed and controlled
by such foreign government or governments;

122. 50 U.S.C. § 1802(a) (2006).
123. Id. § 1804(a).
124. Id. § 1805(a)(2).
125. Id. § 1801(a).
126. Id. § 1803.
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(4) a group engaged in international terrorism or activities
in preparation therefor;
(5) a foreign-based political organization, not substantially
composed of United States persons; or
(6) an entity that is directed and controlled by a foreign
government or governments.127

Before passage of the bill, the Senate defined “foreign power,” with regard to terrorist groups, to mean a foreign-based
entity. The House amendments, in contrast, understood “foreign power” to include groups engaged in international terrorism or activities in preparation therefor. In the end, the Conference adopted the House definition, with the idea that limiting
such surveillance solely to foreign-based groups would be
“unnecessarily burdensome.”128
Throughout the nuanced discussion of the definition of “foreign power” in both houses was the understanding that prior to
collection of information, the government would have to establish that the target—in relation to which such information would
be obtained—qualified as a foreign power or an agent thereof.129
In focusing on the targets of the communications, Congress
rejected the NSA’s previous (and current) reading of what constituted a “target” in relation to data collection.130 That is, the
information to be obtained, at the moment of acquisition (not in
the context of subsequent analysis—the position Lieutenant
General Allen advocated for during the Church Committee
hearings, which the NSA has recently resurrected), had to relate directly to the individual or entity believed to be a foreign
power or an agent thereof.

127. Id. § 1801(a).
128. 124 CONG. REC. 33,782 (1978); see also 50 U.S.C. § 1801.
129. 124 CONG. REC. 33,784 (1978).
130. 5 Church Committee Report, supra note 38, at 16 (testimony of Lieutenant General Lew Allen, Jr.); Daniel F. Gilmore, Director Emphatic: NSA Does Not Bug Americans, WASH. POST, July 23, 1977, at A2 (“There are no U.S. citizens now targeted by
NSA in the United States or abroad.” (quoting Statement of Bobby R. Inman, Director, NSA, Before the Senate Subcommittee on Intelligence and Human Rights)).
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Probable Cause and Showing of Criminal Wrongdoing
Prior to Collection

A second protection stemmed from concerns evinced in the
Senate about how to determine whether the (specific) target was
a “foreign power” or “an agent thereof.” Foremost in legislators’
minds was the need to provide heightened protections for surveillance targets generally and U.S. citizens in particular. The
final bill accomplished this in two ways: by adopting of a standard of probable cause and, under certain circumstances, requiring a showing of criminal wrongdoing in order to acquire information. These elements underscore the particularity Congress
required before foreign intelligence gathering was allowed.
FISA incorporated a standard of probable cause. 131 Unlike
criminal law—in which the courts required establishing probable cause that a target had committed, was committing, or was
about to commit a particular offense—under FISA, the agency
requesting surveillance had to demonstrate probable cause that
the entity to be placed under surveillance was a “foreign power” or “an agent thereof,” and that the target was likely to use
the facilities to be monitored.132 For some entities, FISA also required a criminal showing for that entity to be considered a
“foreign power.” 133 Foreign governments are excluded from
this rule. When they are directly involved, no showing of crim131. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3).
132. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2006) (requiring, under Title III, that the
court must find “on the basis of the facts submitted by the applicant that . . . there
is probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has committed, or is
about to commit a particular offense enumerated in section 2516 of this chapter”),
with 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(3) (requiring, in contrast, that FISC find “on the basis of
the facts submitted by the applicant,” that “there is probable cause to believe
that . . . the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power: Provided, That no United States person may be considered a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power solely upon the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”). Note
that for ordinary criminal law regarding wire and oral communications (for example, telephone and microphone interceptions), section 2516 enumerates predicate offenses that qualify, such as bank fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1344) unlawful possession of a firearm (18 U.S.C. § 922(g)) espionage (for example, 18 U.S.C. § 794),
assassination (for example, 18 U.S.C. §§ 351, 1751), sabotage (for example, 18
U.S.C. § 2155), and terrorism (for example, 18 U.S.C. § 2332). For electronic communications (for example, e-mail), any federal felony may serve as a predicate. 18
U.S.C. § 2516(3).
133. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1801(c)(1).
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inal activity is required. Any foreign government, regardless of
whether it is an ally or an enemy of the United States, is designated a “foreign power.”134
For groups to qualify as foreign powers because they are engaged in international terrorism,135 they must be involved in
criminal activity. The statute defines “international terrorism”
to include, inter alia, “activities that . . . involve violent acts or
acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal
laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a
criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the
United States or any State.”136 Acts that would qualify individuals for inclusion in this category must be acts that would be
criminal if committed within the United States.
A group may be a “foreign power” not only when it engages in
international terrorism, but also when engaged in “activities in
preparation therefor.”137 This may or may not exceed the criminal
“attempt” standard, which is broadly understood as requiring a
“substantial step” toward the completion of an offense.138 Nevertheless, a “group” engaged in preparatory activities for international terrorism would satisfy criminal conspiracy standards.139
For agents of a foreign power, Congress inserted heightened
protections for U.S. persons.140 Specifically, FISA defines “agent
of a foreign power” as:
(1) any person other than a United States person, who—
134. Id. § 1801(a)(1).
135. Id. § 1801(a)(4).
136. Id. § 1801(c).
137. Id. § 1801(a)(4).
138. Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344, 349 (1991). This is not broader, however, than the “overt act” requirement contained in some criminal conspiracy statutes.
See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 371; see also Supplemental Brief for the United States app., In re
Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002) (No. 02-001) (comparing FISA and
Title III), available at https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/092502sup.html,
[http://perma.cc/68JX-BR3N].
139. 18 U.S.C. § 371.
140. A “United States person” is understood under the statute as “a citizen of the
United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence (as defined in
section 1101(a)(20) of title 8), an unincorporated association a substantial number of
members of which are citizens of the United States or aliens lawfully admitted for
permanent residence, or a corporation which is incorporated in the United States,
but does not include a corporation or an association which is a foreign power, as
defined in subsection (a)(1), (2), or (3) of this section.” 50 U.S.C. § 1801(i).
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(A) acts in the United States as an officer or employee of
a foreign power, or as a member of a foreign power
as defined in subsection (a)(4) of this section;
(B) acts for or on behalf of a foreign power which engages in clandestine intelligence activities in the
United States contrary to the interests of the United
States, when the circumstances of such person’s
presence in the United States indicate that such person may engage in such activities in the United
States, or when such person knowingly aids or
abets any person in the conduct of such activities or
knowingly conspires with any person to engage in
such activities . . . or
(2) any person who—
(A) knowingly engages in clandestine intelligence gathering activities for or on behalf of a foreign power,
which activities involve or may involve a violation
of the criminal statutes of the United States;
(B) pursuant to the direction of an intelligence service
or network of a foreign power, knowingly engages
in any other clandestine intelligence activities for or
on behalf of such foreign power, which activities
involve or are about to involve a violation of the
criminal statutes of the United States;
(C) knowingly engages in sabotage or international terrorism, or activities that are in preparation therefor,
for or on behalf of a foreign power;
(D) knowingly enters the United States under a false or
fraudulent identity for or on behalf of a foreign
power or, while in the United States, knowingly assumes a false or fraudulent identity for or on behalf
of a foreign power; or
(E) knowingly aids or abets any person in the conduct
of activities described in subparagraph (A), (B), or
(C) or knowingly conspires with any person to engage in activities described in subparagraph (A),
(B), or (C).141

141. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b).
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These rules stipulate that U.S. persons may be considered
agents of a foreign power only if their actions are consistent
with the five provisions in the second section. Taken together,
three categories emerge under which a U.S. person can be considered “an agent of a foreign power”: the person (1) engages
in espionage and clandestine intelligence activities; (2) engages
in sabotage and international terrorism (or aids, abets, or conspires to do the same); or (3) enters the United States under a
false identity. This means that for U.S. persons, for the most
part, evidence of criminality on par with criminal law must be
established before the collection of information.
Looking more closely, the first category requires that the individual knowingly engage in espionage and clandestine intelligence activities. Unlike the other two categories, there is some
variation here from criminal law, specifically with regard to the
“may involve” standard of Section 1801(b)(2)(A). 142 Something
less than the showing of probable cause required in ordinary
criminal cases would satisfy this provision. Thus, for counterintelligence operations, something less than probable cause is required
for evidence of criminality. But for a U.S. person to fall into this
category, some evidence of criminality must be involved.
For the second category, sabotage and international terrorism, the term “sabotage” is defined as “activities that involve a
violation of chapter 105 of title 18, or that would involve such a
violation if committed against the United States.”143 “International terrorism,” in turn, as noted above, is also defined in
terms of activities that are criminal or would be criminal if the
United States were directly involved. To be considered “an
agent of a foreign power” (and thus subject to surveillance under FISA), a U.S. person must actually be engaged in such activities, or activities in preparation for sabotage or international
terrorism—or knowingly aiding, abetting, or conspiring with
others engaged in similar activities.144

142. Id. § 1801(b)(2)(A).
143. Id. § 1801(d).
144. Id. § 1801(b)(2)(E).
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These provisions reflect criminal law standards. 145 As the
House of Representatives explained in the introduction to FISA:
This standard requires the Government to establish probable
cause that the prospective target knows both that the person
with whom he is conspiring or whom he is aiding or abetting is engaged in the described activities as an agent of a
foreign power and that his own conduct is assisting or furthering such activities. The innocent dupe who unwittingly
aids a foreign intelligence officer cannot be targeted under
this provision.146

The third category, which considers a U.S. person to be “an
agent of a foreign power” for knowingly entering the country
under false or fraudulent identity, almost always involves a
showing of criminality, simply because it is not possible to legally enter the United States without providing proof of one’s
identity to a government official. 147 It is similarly illegal to
knowingly assume a false identity under anti-fraud provisions
of the U.S. Code.148
FISA’s deliberate engagement of criminal law provisions and
standards has been acknowledged by the government in defense
of bringing down the wall between prosecution and investigation:
[A] U.S. person may not be an “agent of a foreign power”
unless he engages in activity that either is, may be, or would
be a crime if committed against the United States or within
U.S. jurisdiction. Although FISA does not always require a
showing of an imminent crime or “that the elements of a
specific offense exist,” Senate Intelligence Report at 13, it
does require the government to establish probable cause to
believe that an identifiable target is knowingly engaged in
terrorism, espionage, or clandestine intelligence activities or
is knowingly entering the country with a false identity or assuming one once inside the country on behalf of a foreign
power. Thus, while FISA imposes a more relaxed criminal

145. Compare id., with 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 371 (2006) (requiring actor to be engaged in
the illegal action himself or working with another to commit the offense); see also
Supplemental Brief for the United States, supra note 138.
146. H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, pt. 1, at 44 (1978).
147. 18 U.S.C. § 1001.
148. Id. § 1028.
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probable cause standard than Title III, those differences are
not extensive as applied to U.S. persons.149

The government cannot have it both ways: either U.S. persons
have heightened protections under FISA—protections that rise
to the level of those provided under Title III—or they do not.
Congress provided further protections for U.S. persons. The
statute limited the breadth of surveillance operations by requiring that probable cause could not be established solely on the
basis of otherwise protected First Amendment activity.150 This
was meant to ensure that the executive branch could not place
U.S. citizens under surveillance simply for exercising their First
Amendment rights.
3.

Minimization Procedures for Acquisition and Retention

A third protection inserted by Congress centered on the introduction of minimization procedures to protect activity not
related to foreign intelligence from government scrutiny.151 The
legislature insisted here on minimizing not just the analysis of
the information, but its “acquisition and retention.”152 Specifically, according to the statute:
“Minimization procedures”, with respect to electronic surveillance, means—
(1) specific procedures, which shall be adopted by the
Attorney General, that are reasonably designed in light
of the purpose and technique of the particular surveillance, to minimize the acquisition and retention, and
prohibit the dissemination, of nonpublicly available information concerning unconsenting United States persons . . . .153

Under FISA, only U.S. persons’ information must be subject to
minimization procedures.154

149. Supplemental Brief for the United States, supra note 138, at 28.
150. 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a)(2).
151. Id. § 1804(a)(4).
152. Id. § 1801(h) (emphasis added).
153. Id.
154. Id.
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Establishment of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and
Court of Review

As a further precaution against executive overreach, Congress provided in FISA for two courts: the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Court and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review (FISCR).
As aforementioned, a key principle throughout the debates
was the importance of heightened protections where U.S. persons’ information may be involved. The conference was deadlocked on how best to accomplish this, until the Senate receded
and accepted the House language exempting certain particularly sensitive surveillance (that is, relating solely to foreign powers) from judicial review. The decision rested on the grounds
that (1) such surveillance did not involve U.S. persons; and (2)
having removed the most sensitive information from external
review, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court could be
given a greater role in protecting the rights of each U.S. person
targeted by the government.155 The use of a judicial element
went some way towards providing for an independent, neutral, disinterested magistrate to review the strength of the government’s case supporting the initiation of surveillance.156
Initially, the statute provided for seven judges to sit on FISC.
That number has since expanded to include eleven judges
drawn from at least seven of the federal circuits, three of whom
must reside in the Washington, D.C. area. 157 Both the FISC
judges and the judges on FISCR are selected by the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court. 158 To avoid agency capture,
judges only may serve for up to seven years, at the conclusion
of which they are not eligible to serve again as FISC judges.159
From the beginning, FISC’s role was limited: it was merely to
grant or to deny applications for orders.160 The statute included
detailed instructions about what must be included in such applications: the identity of the federal officer making the applica155. 124 CONG. REC. 36,409 (1978).
156. Discussion with former members of the Church Committee, in Washington,
D.C. (Sept. 23, 2013).
157. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1).
158. Id. § 1803(a)(1)–(b).
159. Id. § 1803(d).
160. Id. § 1803(a).
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tion; the identity, if known, of the target; a statement of the
facts and circumstances relied upon to justify the applicant’s
belief that the target is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power and that each of the facilities or places at which electronic surveillance is directed is being (or about to be) used by a
foreign power or an agent thereof; a statement of the proposed
minimization procedures; a description of the nature of the information sought; a certification from an executive branch official; a summary statement of the means by which the surveillance will be effected; a statement of the facts concerning all
previous applications; and a statement of the period of time for
which the surveillance is required to be maintained.161
Where the government has met the necessary criteria, the
judge’s role is to enter an ex parte order as requested or to
modify it accordingly. Initially, such orders could be issued
only in relation to electronic surveillance. Subsequent amendments expanded FISC’s jurisdiction to physical searches, pen
registers and trap and trace devices, searches of business records, and tangible things.162 These alterations, however, were in
substance and not in form. The function being performed by
FISC throughout was the same: to grant or to deny orders prior
to the acquisition of information on particular targets.
C.

Subsequent Amendment

Since FISA’s introduction, Congress has amended the statute
to cover physical searches,163 pen register and trap and trace
devices,164 searches of business records,165 and tangible goods.166
161. Id. § 1804(a).
162. Id. §§ 1821–1824 (orders for physical search); id. § 1842 (pen register and
trap and trace devices); id. § 1861 (business records and tangible goods).
163. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995, Pub L. No. 103-359,
§ 302(c), 108 Stat. 3423, 3445 (1994) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1821–1829).
164. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272,
§ 601, 112 Stat. 2396, 2404–2410 (1998) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1846).
165. Id. § 602, 112 Stat. at 2410.
166. Various further amendments of these sections have been enacted. The USA
PATRIOT Act, for instance, changed the duration of certain FISA authorization
orders (§ 207), increased the number of FISC judges to 11 (§ 208); amended FISA
pen register and trap and trace provisions (§ 214), changed the purpose of electronic & physical searches (§ 218), and authorized coordination between intelligence and law enforcement (§ 504). Uniting and Strengthening America by
Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA

794

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 37

Because of their consistent structure and approach, these provisions have come to be referred to collectively as “traditional
FISA.” 167 A brief discussion of the subsequent amendments
helps to underscore Congress’s general approach and to elucidate ways in which the bulk collection of U.S. persons’ metadata violates the orientation of the statute and, as addressed in
Part II, the statutory language.
1.

Physical Search, Pen-Trap

Similar to the electronic surveillance provisions, physical
search orders under FISA are limited by the requirement that
the government establish the target of the search before acquiring the information. Specifically, physical search orders may be
used only to target “premises, information, material, or property used exclusively by, or under the open and exclusive control
of, a foreign power or powers.”168 The subsection adopts the
same definitions of “foreign power,” “agent of a foreign power,” “international terrorism,” “sabotage,” “foreign intelligence
information,” and “United States person” as used elsewhere in
the statute.169 It provides for FISC to grant or to deny orders
consistent with FISC’s role in electronic surveillance. 170 The
PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272. ITRPA subsequently
added a “lone wolf” provision via § 60001(a).
167. See, e.g., 1 DAVID S. KRIS & J. DOUGLAS WILSON, NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS & PROSECUTIONS, ch. 12 (2d ed. 2012). In addition to the aforementioned amendments, in 2001 Congress amended FISA to take account of roving
wiretaps. USA PATRIOT Act § 206, 115 Stat. at 282 (amending § 105(c)(2)(B) of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1805(c)(2)(B)). This alteration reflected a change that had been integrated into
criminal law measures in 1998. At that time, the House Conference Report explained:
Under current law, judges issue wiretap orders authorizing law
enforcement officials to place a wiretap on a specific telephone number.
Criminals, including terrorists and spies, know this and often try to avoid
wiretaps by using pay telephones on the street at random, or by using
stolen or cloned cell telephones. As law enforcement officials cannot
know the numbers of these telephones in advance, they are unable to
obtain a wiretap order on these numbers from a judge in time to intercept
the conversation, and the criminal is able to evade interception of his
communication.
H.R. REP. NO. 105-780, at 32 (1998) (Conf. Rep.).
168. 50 U.S.C. § 1822(a)(1)(A)(i).
169. Id. § 1821(1).
170. Id. §§ 1822–1824.
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government must make the same showings, particularly describing the target prior to FISC granting the order.171 Heightened protections are afforded to U.S. persons.172
In 1998, Congress amended FISA to allow for the installation
and use of pen register (recording numbers dialed from a particular phone) and trap and trace devices (acting as a caller ID
record). 173 The Attorney General, or a designated attorney,
must submit an application in writing and under oath either to
FISC or to a magistrate specifically appointed by the Chief Justice to hear pen register or trap and trace applications on behalf
of the FISA court.174 Similar to the provisions related to electronic communications and physical search, the application
must include information to show that the device has been, or
will in the future be, used by someone who is engaging, or has
engaged, in international terrorism or is a foreign power or
agent thereof. 175 In the event of an emergency, the Attorney
General can authorize the installation and use of a pen register
or trap and trace device without judicial approval.176 Nevertheless, a proper application must be made to the appropriate judicial authority within seven days.177
Following the 9/11 attacks, Congress relaxed the requirement
for factual proof for placement of a pen or trap. The applicant
no longer must demonstrate why he or she believes that an individual engaged in international terrorism will use a telephone line. Instead, the applicant must demonstrate only that
the information likely to be gained does not directly concern a
171. Id. § 1823.
172. See, e.g., id. § 1822(1)(A)(ii) (requiring the Attorney General to certify in
writing and under oath that “there is no substantial likelihood that the physical
search will involve the premises, information, material, or property of a United
States Person”); id. § 1822(1)(A)(iii) (requiring minimization procedures for U.S.
persons’ information).
173. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272,
§§ 601–602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2404 (1998); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1841–1846 (pen and trap); id.
§§ 1861–1862 (tangible things).
174. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(a)–(b).
175. As with the application for electronic surveillance, the applicant must include the name of the official seeking surveillance, as well as certification that “the
information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing foreign intelligence or
international terrorism investigation.” Id. § 1842(c)(1)–(2).
176. Id. § 1843(a).
177. Id. § 1843(a)(2).
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U.S. person and will be relevant to protection against international terrorism.178 This provision, hotly contested by civil libertarians, was scheduled to sunset on December 31, 2005,179 but in
2006 Congress made it permanent.180 Although the provision
relaxes the standard for obtaining information from particular
telephone lines, it still establishes a higher bar for obtaining
U.S. persons’ information.
The statute understands the terms “pen register” and “trap
and trace device” consistent with the criminal law standard
defining a pen register as:
[A] device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted, provided, however, that such information
shall not include the contents of any communication.181

A “trap and trace device” is defined as:
[A] device or process which captures the incoming electronic
or other impulses which identify the originating number or
other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information
reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic
communication, provided, however, that such information
shall not include the contents of any communication.182

In addition to all dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling
information sent from or received by a target, orders may require electronic communication service providers to disclose
further information, including:
(I)

the name of the customer or subscriber;

(II)

the address of the customer or subscriber;

(III)

the telephone or instrument number, or other subscriber number or identifier, of the customer or subscriber,

178. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT Act) Act of 2001, Pub.
L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272, 287.
179. USA PATRIOT Act § 215, 115 Stat. at 287 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
§ 1861 (2000 & Supp. V 2001)); id. § 224, 115 Stat. at 295 (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C. § 2510 (2000 & Supp. V 2001) (note)).
180. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No.
109-177, § 102, 120 Stat. 192 (2006).
181. 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
182. Id. § 3127(4).
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including any temporarily assigned network address
or associated routing or transmission information;
(IV)

the length of the provision of service by such provider to the customer or subscriber and the types of
services utilized by the customer or subscriber;

(V)

in the case of a provider of local or long distance telephone service, any local or long distance telephone
records of the customer or subscriber;

(VI)

if applicable, any records reflecting period of usage
(or sessions) by the customer or subscriber; and

(VII)

any mechanisms and sources of payment for such
service, including the number of any credit card or
bank account utilized for payment for such service.183

These provisions are consistent with Congress’s approach in
FISA: namely, particularized showing in relation to the target,
a decision prior to the collection of information, issuance of an
individualized order by the court, and heightened protections
for U.S. persons.
2.

Business Records, Tangible Goods, and Section 215

Following the Oklahoma City bombing, in 1998 Congress
amended FISA to authorize the production of certain kinds of
business records of those suspected of being foreign powers or
agents of a foreign power: namely, documents maintained by
common carriers, public accommodation facilities, storage facilities, and vehicle rental facilities.184 Any records obtained under
this provision had to be for “an investigation to gather foreign
intelligence information or an investigation concerning international terrorism.”185 The application had to include “specific and
articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person to
whom the records pertain is a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power.”186
As with the other provisions of traditional FISA, Congress assigned the terms “foreign power,” “agent of a foreign power,”
183. 50 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(2)(C)(i).
184. Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. 105-272, § 602,
112 Stat. 2396, 2410 (1998).
185. Id.
186. Id.

798

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy

[Vol. 37

“foreign intelligence information,” and “international terrorism”
the same meanings as employed in relation to electronic surveillance.187 Congress also required intelligence agencies to follow
the same steps as those taken with regard to electronic surveillance (i.e., to submit an application to FISC to obtain an order,
which then compels the companies to hand over the records).188
Initially, the FBI did not heavily rely on the business records
provision. Between 1998 and 2001, the FBI used it only once.
Nevertheless, in 2001 Congress expanded the types of records
that could be obtained, authorizing intelligence agencies to apply for an order from FISC “requiring the production of any
tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents,
and other items).” 189 Congress eliminated restrictions on the
types of businesses or entities on which such an order could be
served.190 It retained, however, the general contours of FISA,
specifying that such items be obtained in the course of “an investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”191 Congress again added heightened protections for U.S. persons, requiring that such
investigations, where directed towards a U.S. person, “not be

187. Id.
188. Id.
189. USA PATRIOT Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 215, 115 Stat. 272, 287. Congress
also amended FISA to require that applicants to FISC certify that “a significant
purpose of the surveillance is to obtain foreign intelligence.” 50 U.S.C.
§ 1804(a)(6)(B) (2006 & Supp. V 2011). This shift, from the prior language that
“the” purpose be to obtain foreign intelligence, had the effect of removing a wall
that had built up within the Department of Justice between intelligence officers
and criminal prosecutors. The government argued that the latter should be allowed to advise the former concerning the initiation, operation, continuation, or
expansion of FISA searches or surveillance. In re All Matters Submitted to the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 623 (FISA Ct. 2002).
The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review upheld the change. See In re
Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002). This alteration, however, simply
recognizes parallels between criminal violations and national security threats. It
does not suddenly shift the focus of the statute to allow intelligence agencies to
collect information on millions of Americans not suspected of any wrongdoing.
190. Compare USA PATRIOT Act § 215, 115 Stat. at 287, with Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999, Pub. L. No. 105-272, § 602, 112 Stat. 2396, 2410 (1998).
191. Id.
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conducted . . . solely upon the basis of activities protected by
the first amendment to the Constitution.”192
In the new statute, Congress eliminated the requirement that
the application include “specific and articulable facts” indicating that the individual to whom the records pertain is a foreign
power or an agent thereof.193 Nevertheless, from the beginning
the Department of Justice rightly understood that the scope of
information obtainable under the tangible goods provision was
still narrow, in that the information must pertain directly to the
person targeted in the authorized investigation. A memorandum sent in October 2003 to all Field Offices explained:
The business records request is not limited to the records of
the target of a full investigation. The request must simply be
sought for a full investigation. Thus, if the business records
relating to one person are relevant to the full investigation of
another person, those records can be obtained by a FISC order
despite the fact that there is no open investigation of the person to whom the subject of the business records pertain.194

The relevance standard adopted was thus specific with regard
to the connection between the records sought and the target of
the investigation, as well as limited with regard to the actual
establishment of a particular investigation.
For the first two years, Attorney General guidelines allowed
business record requests only as part of full field investigations.
But in 2003, in the same memo specifying that the records must
be directly related to the person under investigation, the General
Counsel of the National Security Law Unit indicated that the
type of investigation that must already be established, and to
which the records being sought must pertain, “may be revised in
the near future to allow the use of a FISC business records order
in a preliminary investigation.” 195 “Near future” indeed: two
days later, on October 31, 2003, the Attorney General issued a
192. Compare USA PATRIOT Act § 215, 115 Stat. at 287, with Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 § 602, 112 Stat. at 2410.
193. USA PATRIOT Act § 215, 115 Stat. at 287.
194. FBI Memorandum from General Counsel, National Security Law Unit, to
All Field Offices, Business Records Orders Under 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (Oct. 29, 2003),
available
at
http://epic.org/privacy/terrorism/usapatriot/foia/field_memo.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/0LD8wREXHF1].
195. Id.
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thirty-eight page document establishing new guidelines for national security investigations—and allowing agents to obtain
business records during preliminary investigations.196
Despite the expansion to preliminary investigations, the
specificity embedded in the relevance principle remained. To
open a preliminary investigation, the Attorney General required in his 2003 guidelines that, inter alia, the individual targeted in the investigation be an international terrorist or an
agent of a foreign power, or any individual, group, or organization engaged in activities constituting a threat to national security for, or on behalf of, a foreign power, or may be the target
of a recruitment or infiltration effort by an international terrorist, foreign power, or an agent of a foreign power.197
There are two points to make about this novel construction.
First, the Attorney General emphasized particular “individuals,” “groups,” or “organizations” as the targets of preliminary
investigations. This was consistent with FISA’s traditional approach. Second, only once a preliminary investigation was established could agents then make use of “authorized techniques” to obtain information (e.g., mail opening, physical
search, or electronic surveillance requiring judicial order or
warrant).198 This meant that the target had to be determined (in
the course of which the FBI would open a preliminary investigation) before orders allowing for the acquisition of tangible
goods could issue.
Section 215 of the USA PATRIOT Act, the tangible goods provision, was set to expire December 31, 2005. 199 Congress has
since renewed it seven times.200 It is now set to expire June 1,
196. See The Attorney General’s Guidelines for FBI National Security Investigations and Foreign Intelligence Collection 3–4, 15 (Oct. 31, 2003), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fbi/nsiguidelines.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/0rvAkw2hfHR].
197. Id. at 14.
198. Id. at 15.
199. USA PATRIOT Act,Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 224, 115 Stat. 272, 295 (2001).
200. See An Act to Amend the USA PATRIOT Act to Extend the Sunset of Certain
Provisions of that Act and the Lone Wolf Provision of the Intelligence Reform and
Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 to July 1, 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-160, 119 Stat. 2957
(2005) (extension until Feb. 3, 2006); An Act To Amend the USA PATRIOT Act to Extend the Sunset of Certain Provisions of Such Act, Pub. L. No. 109-170, 120 Stat. 3
(2006) (extension until Mar. 10, 2006); USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-177, 120 Stat. 192 (2006) (extension until Dec. 31, 2009);
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2015.201 In 2005, in the course of extending Section 215, Congress
added language tying the section more closely to FISA’s overarching structure. It required applicants to submit a statement of
facts establishing “reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant to an authorized investigation
(other than a threat assessment).”202 The investigation to which
the order is tied must be conducted under guidelines approved
by the Attorney General. 203 The purpose of the investigation
must be “to obtain foreign intelligence information not concerning a United States person or to protect against international ter-

Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-118, 123 Stat. 3409
(2009) (allowing for a short-term, sixty day extension of 50 U.S.C. § 1861 until February
28, 2010); An Act to Extend Expiring Provisions of the USA PATRIOT Improvement
and Reauthorization Act of 2005 and Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention
Act of 2004 until February 28, 2011, Pub. L. No. 111-141, 124 Stat. 37 (2010) (extension
until Feb. 28, 2011); FISA Sunsets Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-3, 125 Stat. 5
(extension until May 27, 2011); PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. No.
112-14, 125 Stat. 216 (extension until June 1, 2015).
201. PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011, Pub. L. No. 112-14, 125 Stat. 216.
Note that in a race against the clock, President Obama signed the most recent, fouryear extension of Section 215 just minutes before the midnight deadline, May 26,
2011. Patriot Act extension signed into law despite bipartisan resistance in Congress,
WASH. POST, May 27, 2011, http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/patriot-actextension-signed-into-law-despite-bipartisan-resistance-incongress/2011/05/27/AGbVlsCH_story.html, [http://perma.cc/0q4UyoJK3EU]. A
bipartisan group of lawmakers had rallied against the measure, with the result that
the USA PATRIOT Sunsets Extension Act of 2011 passed the Senate 72 to 23 and the
House 250 to 153. With President Obama at a summit in France, the White House
took the unusual step of having him sign the bill with an autopen—prompting
commentators to question whether it was legal under Art. I, § 7 of the U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., Originalism and the Autopen: Obama’s “Signing” of Patriot Act Extension
Constitutional,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PROF BLOG
(May
30,
2011),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/conlaw/2011/05/originalism-and-the-autopen.html, [http://perma.cc/09EN7mYcRaW]. The White House apparently relied on
a memorandum opinion issued by the Office of Legal Counsel in 2005. See Memorandum Opinion from the Office of Legal Counsel to the President, Whether the
President May Sign a Bill by Directing that his Signature be Affixed to It (July 7,
2005), available at http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/files/opinion_07072005.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/0YSughFJSVz].
202. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 § 106, 120
Stat. at 196 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861 (2006)).
203. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(2)(A). Such guidelines are issued consistent with Executive Order 12,333. In 2008, the Department of Justice issued new, consolidated
guidelines. Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations (Oct. 3,
2008),
available
at
http://www.justice.gov/ag/readingroom/guidelines.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/0GfT5Uq7Wro].
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rorism or clandestine intelligence activities.”204 The underlying
investigation may not be directed at a U.S. person based solely
on otherwise protected First Amendment activity.205
Tangible things are presumptively relevant to an investigation where they pertain to: (1) “a foreign power or an agent of a
foreign power”; (2) “the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign power,” themselves the subject of an authorized investigation; or (3) “an individual in contact with, or known to, a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject of an auauthorized investigation.”206
For certain materials—namely, “library circulation records,
library patron lists, book sales records, book customer lists,
firearms sales records, tax return records, educational records,
or medical records”—with information identifying an individual, only the Director of the FBI, the Deputy Director of the FBI,
or the Executive Assistant Director for National Security may
make the application; none of these individuals may further
delegate their authorities in this respect.207
In the 2005 amendments, Congress required “an enumeration
of the minimization procedures” related to the retention and
dissemination of any tangible things obtained.208 Any orders issued “may only require the production of a tangible thing if
such thing can be obtained with a subpoena duces tecum issued
by a court of the United States in aid of a grand jury investigation or with any other order issued by a court of the United
States directing the production of records or tangible things.”209
As discussed below, the telephony metadata program, by FISC’s
own admission, fails to satisfy this statutory requirement.210
204. USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 § 106, 120
Stat. at 196 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1861).
205. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(2)(B).
206. See id. § 1861(b)(2)(A); id. § 1861(c)(1).
207. Id. § 1861(a)(3).
208. Id.
209. Id. § 1861(c)(2)(D).
210. Any individual served with an order is gagged from telling anyone other
than individuals to whom disclosure is necessary to comply with the order or an
attorney to obtain legal advice or help with regard to producing the items sought.
Id. § 1861(d). Under the statute, an individual on whom an order has been served
may challenge the legality of the order by filing a petition with the court within a
year, requesting that the order be modified or set aside. Id. § 1861(f)(2)(A)(i).
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Broad Surveillance in Place of Particularization

The telephony metadata program lacks the particularization
that marks Congress’s approach to domestic foreign intelligence gathering in FISA. The statute rejects the wholesale collection of domestic information. It relies on the prior targeting
of foreign intelligence targets to justify surveillance. It provides
U.S. persons a heightened level of protection. And it seeks to
minimize the acquisition (not just the retention and dissemination) of information.
1.

Wholesale Collection of Information

Project MINARET, which represented precisely the type of
surveillance program that FISA was designed to forestall, was
not nearly as extensive as the telephony metadata program.
Over the course of Project MINARET, for instance, the watch
list included approximately 1650 U.S. citizens in total.211 At no
time were there more than 800 U.S. citizens’ names on the list,
out of a population of about 200 million Americans.212
Today, in contrast, there are approximately 316 million Americans, a significant number of which have access to mobile devices.213 Verizon, which is only one of the telecommunications
companies served with a FISC order, is estimated to have a market share of 31.3% of the total number of wireless subscribers.214
As of October 2013, this translated into 101.2 million wireless
accounts.215 This number eclipses the total number of U.S. citizens subject to the most egregious programs previously operated by the NSA, which gave rise to FISA in the first place.
The telephony program also goes substantially beyond the
previous surveillance operation in its focus on calls of a purely
211. 5 Church Committee Report, supra note 38, at 33 (testimony of Lieutenant
General Lew Allen, Jr., Director, National Security Agency).
212. Id. at 30, 33–34.
213. U.S. and World Population Clock, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/popclock/, [http://perma.cc/NN4C-R3LM] (last visited
Mar. 20, 2014).
214. Kyle Woodley, Don’t Sweat a BUD Monopoly, INVESTORPLACE (Jan. 14, 2013),
http://investorplace.com/2013/01/dont-sweat-a-bud-monopoly/#.Uu_OVI5xKPc,
[http://perma.cc/4EPZ-6PC3].
215. Roger Cheng, Verizon posts $2.23B profit, adds 1.1M wireless connections, CNET
(Oct. 17, 2013), http://news.cnet.com/8301-1035_3-57607860-94/verizon-posts-$2.23bprofit-adds-1.1m-wireless-connections/, [http://perma.cc/J4XN-QXGD].
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local nature. According to the Director of the National Security
Agency, Project MINARET did not monitor entirely domestic
conversations.216 The FISC Order issued in April 2013, however,
specifically requires the collection of information “wholly within
the United States, including local telephone calls.”217 Set to expire on July 19, 2013, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence has confirmed that FISC has again renewed the order.218
As discussed above, Congress designed the statute to be
used in specific cases of foreign intelligence gathering. By limiting the targets of electronic surveillance, requiring probable
cause, disallowing investigations solely on the basis of otherwise protected First Amendment activities, and insisting on
minimization procedures, Congress sought to restrict agencies’
ability to violate U.S. citizens’ privacy. The business records
provision built on this approach, adopting the same definitions
that prevailed in other portions of the statute and requiring
that agencies obtain orders to collect information on individuals believed to be foreign powers or agents of a foreign power.
Congress later deliberately inserted “relevant” into the statute
to ensure the continued specificity of targeted investigations.
In addition, Congress empowered FISC to consider each instance of placing an electronic wiretap. The NSA’s program, in
contrast, delegates such oversight to the Executive, leaving all
further inquiries of the databases to the agency involved. Once
the NSA collects the telephony metadata, it is the NSA (and not
FISC) that decides which queries to use, and which individuals
to target within the database.
This change means that FISC is not performing its most basic
function: protecting U.S. persons from incursions into their
privacy. Instead, it leaves the determination of whom to target
to the agency’s discretion. Traditional FISA depends upon the
criteria in the statute being met before collection of information.
216. See 5 Church Committee Report, supra note 38, at 36.
217. In re Application of the Fed. Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring
the Prod. of Tangible Things from Verizon Bus. Network Servs., Inc., Secondary
Order, No. BR 13-80, at 2 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2013).
218. See Press Release, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court Renews Authority to Collect Telephony Metadata (July
19,
2013),
available
at
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/pressreleases/191-press-releases-2013/898-foreign-intelligence-surveillance-courtrenews-authority-to-collect-telephony-metadata, [http://perma.cc/0tZiDuzYCvX].
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That is, the authorities apply at the moment data is acquired—
not when it is subsequently analyzed for more information.
Although the government argues that intelligence is not acquired until it is mined for more information, or until a human
operator is involved in the analysis, this view is neither expressed in the relevant statutory language nor congruent with
the government’s own internal position.219
2.

Absence of Prior Targeting

The government has indicated that the information obtained
from this program is important because, “by analyzing it, the
Government can determine whether known or suspected terrorist operatives have been in contact with other persons who may
be engaged in terrorist activities, including persons and activities
within the United States.”220 The government sees the enormous
number of records as central to the success of the program.221
Once the records are obtained—once the “haystack” is created—
the government can then go about finding out who the threats
are—the proverbial needles in the haystack.222
This process is backwards. The whole point of FISA is for the
government to first identify the target, and then to use this
identification to obtain information. In contrast, the government is now arguing that it can obtain information as a way of
figuring out who the targets should be. This directly contradicts FISA’s design.
219. See, e.g., Eric H. Holder, Jr., Att’y General of the United States, Minimization Procedures Used by the National Security Agency in Connection with Acquisitions of Foreign Intelligence Information pursuant to Section 702 of the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, as Amended 1 (Jan. 8, 2007), available at
http://epic.org/2013/06/nsa-targeting-and-minimization.html,
[http://perma.cc/0PKxzba3aiL] (“Acquisition means the collection by NSA or the
FBI through electronic means of a non-public communication to which it is not an
intended party.”).
220. SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 1.
221. Id. at 4 (“It would be impossible to conduct these queries effectively without a large pool of telephony metadata to search, as there is no way to know in
advance which numbers will be responsive to the authorized queries.”).
222. See, e.g., How Disclosed NSA Programs Protect Americans, and Why Disclosure
Aids Our Adversaries: Hearing Before the H. Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence,
113th Cong. (2013) (statement of James Cole, Deputy Att’y Gen.), available at
http://intelligence.house.gov/video/how-disclosed-nsa-programs-protect-americansand-why-disclosure-aids-our-adversaries, [http://perma.cc/0NeE3FAYFbT].

806

Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy
3.

[Vol. 37

No Higher Threshold for U.S. Persons

In addition, as detailed above, there are myriad ways in
which FISA creates extra protections for U.S. persons. In light
of the historical context, the reason for this is clear. The statute
arose from revelations about the cavalier manner in which the
intelligence agencies were treating Americans’ right to privacy.
New protections thus centered on creating higher standards for
targeting U.S. persons, as well as for later analysis and dissemination of U.S. persons’ information.
Outside of minimization procedures relating to the downstream manipulation and dissemination of information, however, the telephony metadata program does not recognize a
higher protection for U.S. persons at the moment of data acquisition. The failure to create higher standards thus runs counter
to the approach Congress adopted in passing FISA.
E.

Role of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court

In at least three important ways, FISC no longer serves the purpose for which it was designed. First, Congress created the court
to determine whether the executive branch had met its burden of
demonstrating that there was sufficient evidence to target individuals within the United States, prior to collection of such information. The telephony metadata program demonstrates that FISC
has abdicated this responsibility to the executive branch generally,
and to the NSA in particular. Continued noncompliance underscores concern about relying on the intelligence community to
protect the Fourth Amendment rights of U.S. persons.
Second, Congress did not envision a lawmaking role for
FISC. Its decisions were not to serve as precedent, and FISC
was not to offer lengthy legal analyses, crafting in the process,
for instance, exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement or defenses of wholesale surveillance programs.
Third, questions have recently been raised about the extent
to which FISC can fulfill the role of being a neutral, disinterested magistrate. Congress went to great lengths, for instance, to
try to ensure diversity on the court. To the extent that the appointments process implies an ideological predilection, at a
minimum, it is worth noting that almost all of the judges who
serve on FISC and FISCR are Republican appointees. The rate
of applications being granted, in conjunction with the in cam-
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era and ex parte nature of the proceedings, also raises questions about the extent to which FISC serves as an effective
check on the executive branch. The lack of technical expertise
of those on the court further introduces questions about the
judges’ ability to understand how the authorities they are extending to the NSA are being used.
1.

Reliance on NSA to Ascertain Reasonable, Articulable Suspicion

In 1978 Congress created FISC to serve as a neutral, disinterested observer. In this capacity, one of its principal responsibilities was to ascertain whether the government had demonstrated probable cause that individuals to be targeted under FISA
were foreign powers or agents thereof, and likely to use the
facilities to be placed under surveillance. As was previously
discussed, consistent with this approach, in 1998 Congress introduced the business records provision, requiring in the process that the government submit a statement of “specific and
articulable facts” to the court in support of its application. Although the showing was eliminated in 2001, four years later
Congress re-introduced a requirement that the government
submit a statement of facts establishing “reasonable grounds to
believe that the tangible things” to be obtained are “relevant to
an authorized investigation.” This language puts the court in
the position of verifying whether the government has met its
burden of proof prior to intelligence collection. The court, however, no longer serves in this function.
To the contrary, FISC’s primary order authorizing the collection of telephony metadata required that designated NSA officials make a finding that there is “reasonable, articulable suspicion” (RAS) that a seed identifier proposed for query is
associated with a particular foreign terrorist organization prior
to its use. It is thus left to the executive branch to determine
whether the executive branch has sufficient evidence to place
individuals or entities under surveillance.
The dangers associated with the court removing itself from
the process are clear. Documents recently released under court
orders in a related FOIA case establish that for nearly three
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years, the NSA did not follow these procedures 223 —even
though numerous NSA officials were aware of the violation.224
Noncompliance incidents have continued. Collectively, these
incidents raise serious question as to whether FISC is performing the functions for which it was designed.
a.

Failure to Report Initial Noncompliance

Although the NSA had been contravening the order since
May 2006, it was not until early 2009, when representatives of
the Department of Justice met with NSA representatives to be
briefed on the NSA’s handling of the telephony metadata, that
the illegal behavior was brought to FISC’s attention.225 President Barack Obama took office on January 20, 2009; it appears
that recognition of the noncompliance occurred during the
transition. During the briefing and in subsequent discussions,
DOJ representatives inquired about the alert process. Learning
of the process being used, DOJ personnel expressed concern
that the program had been misrepresented to FISC.226 The NSA
had been using identifiers employed to collect information under Executive Order 12,333—not FISA—to search the telephony

223. See In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], Order Regarding
Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident Dated Jan. 15, 2009, No. BR 08-13
(FISA Ct. Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/
pub_Jan%2028%202009%20Order%20Regarding%20Prelim%20Notice%20of%20C
ompliance.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0soKuBTCNQL]; see also DNI Clapper Declassifies
Intelligence Community Documents Regarding Collection Under Section 501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, IC ON RECORD, (Sept. 10, 2013),
http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/post/60867560465/dni-clapper-declassifiesintelligence-community, [http://perma.cc/KDV2-3ZT6].
224. Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander at 25–26, In re Prod. of
Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorand
um%20of%20US.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT] (listing seven people in the
Signals Intelligence Directive, two from the Office of the General Counsel, and one
additional person whose name has not been disclosed who knew, or may have
known of the problem since May 2006). Three additional people from the General
Counsel’s office and from SID became aware of the use of non-RAS-approved identifiers via e-mail on May 25, 2006. Id. at 26. The DNI noted an additional “indeterminate number of other NSA personnel who knew or may have known the alert list
contained both RAS and non-RAS selectors.” Id. at 26.
225. Id. at 27–28.
226. Id. at 27.
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database.227 This meant that the standards applying to foreigners were used in relation to U.S. persons.
227. NSA’s general SIGINT authorities derive from (1) Exec. Order No. 12,333,
§ 1.7, 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec. 4, 1981) (authorizing the NSA to “[c]ollect (including through clandestine means), process, analyze, produce, and disseminate signals intelligence information for foreign intelligence and counterintelligence purposes to support national and departmental missions”); (2) National Security
Council Intelligence Directive 6, Foreign Wireless and Radio Monitoring (Dec. 12,
1947), available at http://www.foia.cia.gov/sites/default/files/document_conversions/
50/NSCID_No_6_Foreign_Wireless_and_Radio_Monitoring_12_Dec_1947.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/0dy3BfySG6k] (noting that the “DCI shall conduct all Federal monitoring of foreign propaganda and press broadcasts required for the collection of
intelligence information to meet the needs of all Departments and Agencies in connection with the National Security” and that the DCI “shall disseminate such intelligence information to the various Departments and Agencies which have an authorized interest therein”); and (3) Department of Defense Directive 5100.20 (Jan. 26,
2010), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/510020p.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/0uksdWff7fo] (“[T]he National Security Agency (NSA) is the U.S.
Government (USG) lead for cryptology, and its mission encompasses both Signals
Intelligence (SIGINT) and Information Assurance (IA) activities. The Central Security
Service (CSS) conducts SIGINT collection, processing, analysis, production, and dissemination, and other cryptologic operations as assigned by the Director, NSA/Chief,
CSS (DIRNSA/CHCSS). NSA/CSS provides SIGINT and IA guidance and assistance to
the DoD Components, as well as national customers . . . .”). In addition, some, but not
all, of the SIGINT activities undertaken by NSA are governed by FISA. Declaration of
Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander at 34, In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorand
um%20of%20US.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT].
When executing its SIGINT mission, NSA is only authorized to collect, retain, or
disseminate information concerning U.S. persons consistent with Attorney General guidelines. The current procedures approved by the Attorney General are
located in the DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, REGULATION 5240.1-R, PROCEDURES
GOVERNING THE ACTIVITIES OF DOD INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS THAT AFFECT
UNITED STATES PERSONS 24–37, as well as a classified annex to the regulation
overseeing the NSA’s electronic surveillance. Declaration of Lieutenant General
Keith B. Alexander at 34, In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No.
BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 13, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT].
To administer the program, the NSA constructed two lists: the first, an “alert
list,” includes all identifiers (foreign and domestic) of interest to counterterrorism
analysts. Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order
Dated Jan. 28, 2009 at 10, In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No.
BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT]. The second, the “station table,” is a historical
listing of all telephone identifiers that had undergone a reasonable, articulable
suspicion determination, including the results. Id. But see Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander at 9, In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [RE-
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The DOJ informed FISC within a week of the meeting that
the government had been querying the business records in a
manner that contravened both the original order and sworn
statements of several executive branch officials.228 FISC was not
amused. Judge Reggie Walton expressed concern “about what
appears to be a flagrant violation of its Order in this matter.”229
The NSA had repeatedly misled FISC in its handling of the database.230 FISC immediately issued an order, directing the NSA
to comprehensively review the agency’s handling of telephony
metadata.231 It gave the government until February 17, 2009 to
file a brief to defend its actions and to help FISC to determine
whether further action should be taken against the government
or its representatives.232
The NSA initially admitted only “that NSA’s descriptions to
[FISC] of the alert list process . . . were inaccurate and that the
Business Records Order did not provide the Government with
authority to employ the alert list in the manner in which it
did.” 233 It further acknowledged, “the majority of telephone
DACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memora
ndum%20of%20US.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT] (referring to the first
source as the “Address Database” and describing it as “a master target database
of foreign and domestic telephone identifiers”).
228. In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], Order Regarding Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident Dated Jan. 15, 2009, No. BR 08-13, at 2
(FISA
Ct.
Jan
28,
2009),
available
at
http://www.dni.gov/
files/documents/section/pub_Jan%2028%202009%20Order%20Regarding%20Preli
m%20Notice%20of%20Compliance.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0zB1dSnc7k5].
229. Id. at 4.
230. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 1 (see page 94 of 1846
and 1862 Production, Mar. 5, 2009) (“The management controls designed by the
Agency to govern the processing, dissemination, data security, and oversight of
telephony metadata and U.S. person information obtained under the Order are
adequate and in several aspects exceed the terms of the Order.”).
231. In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [Redacted], Order Regarding Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident Dated Jan. 15, 2009, No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct.
Jan. 28, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/
pub_Jan%2028%202009%20Order%20Regarding%20Prelim%20Notice%20of%20C
ompliance.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0zB1dSnc7k5].
232. See id. at 2.
233. Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated
Jan. 28, 2009 at 1–2, In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 0813 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT].
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identifiers compared against the incoming BR metadata in the
rebuilt alert list were not RAS-approved.”234 The actual numbers, reported to FISC in February 2009, were staggering: as of
January 15, 2009, “only 1,935 of the 17,835 identifiers on the
alert list were RAS-approved.”235
It was not that the NSA was unaware of the requirements established by the statute and by FISC. The Attorney General
had, consistent with the primary order, established minimization procedures, among which was the following:
Any search or analysis of the data archive shall occur only
after a particular known telephone number has been associated with [REDACTED] More specifically, access to the archived data shall occur only when NSA has identified a
known telephone number for which, based on the factual
and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts giving rise
to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the telephone
number is associated with [REDACTED] organization; provided, however, that a telephone number believed to be
used by a U.S. person shall not be regarded as associated
with [REDACTED] solely on the basis of activities that are
protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution.236

Nevertheless, apparently, neither the Signals Intelligence Directorate nor the Office of the General Counsel had caught the fact
234. Id. at 11; see also id. at 6. Note that the NSA refers to FISC-authorized Business Record metadata as “BR metadata.” In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], Order, No. BR 08-13, at 4 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009), available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_March%202%202009%20Order
%20from%20FISC.pdf, [http://perma.cc/5KGD-SWMW].
235. Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated
Jan. 28, 2009 at 11, In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 0813 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT]; see also Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith
B. Alexander at 8, In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13
(FISA
Ct.
Feb.
13,
2009),
available
at
http://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT].
236. Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated
Jan. 28, 2009 at 4, In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13
(FISA
Ct.
Feb.
17,
2009),
available
at
http://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT], (citing Order, No. BR 06-05, at 5) (internal footnote omitted).
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that nearly ninety percent of the queries to the bulk dataset had
been illegal.237 Nor had they realized that their reports to FISC
claiming that only RAS-approved numbers were being run
against the bulk metadata were false.238
Meanwhile, the NSA had disseminated 275 reports to the FBI
as a result of contact chaining and queries of NSA’s archive of
telephony metadata.239 Thirty-one of these had resulted directly
237. Id. at 11 (“Based upon NSA’s recent review, neither NSA SID nor NSA
OGC identified the inclusion of non-RAS-approved identifiers on the alert list as
an issue requiring extensive analysis.”).
238. See, e.g., Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated Jan. 28, 2009 at 13, In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED],
No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009) (quoting NSA Report to FISC at 12–15, In re
Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 06-05), available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memora
ndum%20of%20US.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT] (“As of the last day of
the reporting period addressed herein, NSA had included a total of 3980 telephone numbers on the alert list, which include foreign numbers and domestic
numbers, after concluding that each of the foreign telephone numbers satisfied
the standard set forth in the Court’s May 24, 2006 [Order] . . . . To summarize the
alert system: every day new contacts are automatically revealed with the 3980
telephone numbers contained on the alert list described above, which themselves
are present on the alert list either because they satisfied the reasonable articulable
suspicion standard, or because they are domestic numbers that were either a FISC
approved number or in direct contact with a number that did so.”); see also Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander at 7, In re Prod. of Tangible
Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memora
ndum%20of%20US.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT] (reprinting the same
report text and stating, “in short, the reports filed with the Court incorrectly stated that the telephone identifiers on the alert list satisfied the RAS standard. In
fact, the majority of telephone identifiers included on the alert list had not been
RAS approved”). Note that No. BR 06-05 is the initial authorization of the telephony metadata program, May 24, 2006. No. BR-08 was a renewal application, filed
Aug. 18, 2006. No. BR 08-13 is a subsequent authorization. The May 2006 order,
however, has seven tabs for different docket numbers, all of which have been
redacted, suggesting that there are other, related programs underway.
239. Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated
Jan. 28, 2009 at 17, In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 0813 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT]; Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander at 42, In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13
(FISA
Ct.
Feb.
13,
2009),
available
at
http://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT] (further noting that the 275 reports provided to
the FBI tipped a total of 2549 telephone identifiers as being in contact with identifiers used to query the system).
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from the automated alert process. 240 In a careful use of language, the government noted, “NSA did not identify any report that resulted from the use of a non-RAS-approved ‘seed’
identifier.”241 The government did not detail how complete the
NSA had been in considering the reports; nor did it claim that
none of the reports had resulted from non-RAS-approved identifiers.242 The government also did not address the dissemination of metadata reports within NSA and subsequent actions
that resulted from the process.
Despite the gross violation of FISC’s order, the government
argued that FISC should neither rescind nor modify its order.243
As required by FISC, the NSA had undertaken an end-to-end
system engineering and process review (technical and operational) of its handling of business records metadata; it had undertaken a review of domestic identifiers to ensure that they
are RAS-compliant; and it had undertaken an audit of all queries made of the business records metadata repository since
November 1, 2008 with the purpose of determining if any queries had been made using non-RAS-approved identifiers.244 The
NSA had again trained its employees and adopted new technologies to limit the number of “hops” permitted from an RAS-

240. Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated
Jan. 28, 2009 at 17, In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 0813 (FISA Ct. Feb. 17, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT].
241. Id.
242. See Declaration of Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander at 36–37, In re Prod.
of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 13, 2009), available
at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%
20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT] (“[The NSA]
has . . . conducted a review of all 275 reports of domestic contacts NSA has disseminated as result of contact chaining [REDACTED] of the NSA’s Archive of BR FISA
material. NSA has identified no report that resulted from the use of a non-RAS approved identifier as the initial seed identifier for chaining through the BR FISA material.” (internal footnotes omitted)).
243. Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated
Jan. 28, 2009 at 2, 15–21, In re Production of Tangible Things From [REDACTED],
No.
BR
08-13
(FISA
Ct.
Feb.
17,
2009),
available
at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memora
ndum%20of%20US.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT].
244. Id. at 19.
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approved seed identifier to three.245 The government offered to
take additional steps to avoid having the program shut down,
all of which amounted to involving DOJ’s National Security
Division more deeply in the telephony metadata program.246
b.

Further Noncompliance

Although the January 2009 incident represents the first admission of noncompliance that was made public, it is far from
the first—or only—time that the NSA acted outside the scope
of its authority to collect records under section 215 of the USA
PATRIOT Act.247 Recently released documents provide myriad
further examples.
In September 2006, for instance, the NSA’s Inspector General
expressed concern that the agency was collecting more data
than authorized under the order.248 The NSA had been obtaining 16-digit credit card numbers as well as names or partial
names contained in the records of operator-assisted calls.249 It

245. Id. at 20.
246. See id. at 20–21 (listing under “Additional Oversight Mechanisms the government Will Implement”: (1) NSA’s OGC consulting with DOJ’s National Security Division (NSD) on “all significant legal opinions that relate the interpretation,
scope and/or implementation” of FISC orders related to BR 08-13; (2) NSA’s OGC
providing NSD with copies of the mandatory procedures; (3) NSA’s OGC
promptly providing NSD with copies of all formal briefing and/or training materials; (4) arranging meetings among NSA’s OGC, NSD, and NSA’s Director of
Signals Intelligence prior to seeking renewal of the orders; (5) meetings once per
period of future orders between NSA’s OIG and NSD; (6) review and approval of
all proposed automated query processes prior to implementation).
247. See, e.g., Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated Jan. 28, 2009 at 19, In re Production of Tangible Things From [REDACTED],
No.
BR
08-13,
available
at
http://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/section/pub_Feb%2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT] (citing notice of compliance filed Jan. 26, 2009,
which reports that between Dec. 10, 2008, and Jan. 23, 2009, two analysts conducted 280 queries using non-RAS-approved identifiers).
248. See OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., supra note 1, at 2–3 (see page 95–96 of
1846 and 1862 Production, Mar. 5, 2009) (“[M]anagement controls do not provide
reasonable assurance that NSA will comply with the following terms of the Order:
‘NSA may obtain telephony metadata, which includes comprehensive communications, routing information, including but not limited to session identifying information, trunk identifier, and time and duration of a call. Telephony metadata
does not include the substantive content of any communications, or the name,
address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer.’”).
249. See id. at 3 (see page 96 of 1846 and 1862 Production, Mar. 5, 2009).
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later emerged that an over-collection filter inserted in July 2008
failed to function.250
On October 17, 2008, the government reported to FISC that,
after FISC authorized the NSA to increase the number of analysts working with the business records metadata, and had directed that the NSA train the newly-authorized analysts, thirtyone (out of eighty-five) analysts subsequently queried the
business records metadata in April 2008 without even being
aware that they were doing so.251 The upshot was that NSA analysts used 2373 foreign telephone identifiers to query the business records metadata without first establishing reasonable,
articulable suspicion.252 Despite taking corrective steps, on December 11, 2008, the government notified FISC that an analyst
had not installed a modified access tool and, resultantly, had
again queried the data using five identifiers for which no RAS
standard had been satisfied.253
Just over a month later, the government informed FISC that,
between December 10, 2008 and January 23, 2009, two analysts
had used 280 foreign telephone identifiers to query the business records metadata without first establishing RAS.254
The process initiated in January 2009 identified additional
incidents where the NSA had failed to comply with FISC’s orders.255 In February 2009, the NSA brought two further matters
250. In re Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], Order, No. BR 0813, at 17 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/section/pub_March%202%202009%20Order%20from%20FISC.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/0FW9D1bPVUv] (citing Government’s Response to the Court’s
Order of Jan. 16, 2009, at 13).
251. Id. at 9.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 10 (citing Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident at 2, No. BR 0808 (FISA Ct. Dec. 11, 2008)).
254. Id. (citing Notice of Compliance Incident at 2, No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Jan.
26, 2009)).
255. Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated Jan.
28, 2009 at 6, In re Prod. of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct.
Feb. 17, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%
2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT]; see
also Press Release, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, DNI Clapper Declassifies
Intelligence Community Documents Regarding Collection Under Section 501 of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) (Sept. 10, 2013), available at
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases-2013/927draft-document, [http://perma.cc/0B43x9pG7Go]; SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra
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to FISC’s attention. The first centered on the NSA’s use of one
of its analytical tools to query the business records metadata,
using non-RAS-approved telephone numbers.256 This tool had
been used since FISC’s initial order in May 2006 to search both
the business records metadata and other NSA databases.257 Also in February 2009, the NSA notified DOJ’s National Security
Division that the NSA’s audit had identified three analysts who
conducted chaining on the business records metadata using
fourteen telephone identifiers that had not been RAS-approved
before the queries.258
In May 2009, two additional compliance issues arose.259 The
first compliance incident is completely redacted. The second
notes a dissemination-related problem: that the unminimized
results of some queries of metadata had been “uploaded [by
the NSA] into a database to which other intelligence agencies . . . had access.”260 According to the government, providing
other agencies access to this information may have resulted in
note 2, at 5 (“Since the telephony metadata collection program under Section 215
was initiated, there have been a number of significant compliance and implementation issues that were discovered . . . . The incidents, and the Court’s responses,
were . . . reported to the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees in great detail.”).
256. Notice of Compliance Incidents at 2, In re Production of Tangible Things
from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 26, 2009), available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2026%202009%20Notificat
ion%20of%20Compliance%20Incident.pdf, [http://perma.cc/KQ87-TM6B].
257. Id. at 3.
258. According to Keith Alexander’s Supplemental Declaration, one analyst
conducted contact chaining queries on four non-RAS-approved telephone identifiers on November 5, 2008; a second analyst conducted one contact chaining query
on one non-RAS-approved telephone identifier on November 18, 2008; and a third
analyst conducted contact chaining queries on three non-RAS-approved telephone identifiers on December 31, 2008; one non-RAS approved identifier on January 5, 2009; three non-RAS approved identifiers on January 15, 2009; and two
non-RAS approved identifiers on January 22, 2009. Supplemental Declaration of
Lieutenant General Keith B. Alexander at 8, In re Production of Tangible Things,
No.
BR
08-13
(FISA
Ct.
Feb.
25,
2009),
available
at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%2026%202009%20Notificat
ion%20of%20Compliance%20Incident.pdf, [http://perma.cc/J79T-T3VD].
259. In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], Order, No. BR 09-06, at
4 (FISA Ct. June 22, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/
pub_Jun%2022%202009%20Order.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0D4dE8vxr98] (referencing government responses to the court’s May 29, 2009 Supplemental Order).
260. Id. at 5 (quoting Preliminary Notice of Compliance Incident at 2, No. BR 0906 (FISA Ct. June 16, 2009)).
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the dissemination of U.S. person information in violation of
both U.S. Signals Intelligence Directive 18 as well as the more
restrictive conditions FISC imposed in BR 09-06.261
c.

FISC Response

Repeatedly, instead of rescinding prior collection programs,
FISC merely imposed further requirements on the government.262 By spring of 2009, FISC had become fed up with the
NSA—yet, not fed up enough to actually halt the program. Instead, it insisted on two procedures designed to give FISC
greater insight into how the NSA was using and distributing
information related to the telephony metadata: that the NSA
return to FISC before each query of the database, and that the
NSA file weekly reports with FISC detailing any dissemination
of the information. Both protections proved temporary.
FISC’s first temporary solution was to require what traditional
FISA actually required: NSA application to FISC prior to targeting. Between institution of the review and the final report, FISC
required the NSA to seek approval to query the database on a
case-by-case basis. FISC was particularly concerned that the
NSA had averred that having access to all call detail records
“is vital to NSA’s counterterrorism intelligence mission” because “[t]he only effective means by which NSA analysts are
able continuously to keep track of [REDACTED] and all affiliates of one of the aforementioned entities [who are taking
steps to disguise and obscure their communications and

261. Id.
262. The government cites multiple other cases, with key information redacted
as follows: “[REDACTED] Primary Order, docket number [REDACTED] at 11-12
(requiring, in response to an incident of noncompliance, NSA to file with the
Court every thirty days a report discussing, among other things, queries made
since the last report to the Court and NSA’s application of the relevant standard);
see also [REDACTED] docket numbers [REDACTED] (prohibiting the querying of
data using “seed” accounts validated using particular information).” Memorandum of the United States in Response to the Court’s Order Dated Jan. 28, 2009 at
16, In re Prod. of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb.
17, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Feb%
2012%202009%20Memorandum%20of%20US.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0TjRzWGeXcT].
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identities], is to obtain and maintain an archive of metadata
that will permit these tactics to be uncovered.263

According to FISC, the NSA had also suggested that:
To be able to exploit metadata fully, the data must be collected in bulk . . . . The ability to accumulate a metadata archive and set it aside for carefully controlled searches and
analysis will substantially increase NSA’s ability to detect
and identify members of [REDACTED].264

Because the order being sought meant, if granted, that the
NSA would be collecting call detail records of U.S. persons located within the United States, who were not themselves the
target of any FBI investigation and whose metadata could not
otherwise be legally obtained in bulk, FISC had adopted minimization procedures. It had required, inter alia, that:
[A]ccess to the archived data shall occur only when NSA has
identified a known telephone identifier for which, based on
the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent persons act, there are facts
giving rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the telephone identifier is associated with [REDACTED].265

FISC had a difficult time believing the NSA’s claim that its noncompliance with FISC’s orders resulted from NSA personnel believing that FISC’s restrictions on access to the business records
metadata only applied to “archived data” (that is, data located in
certain databases). “That interpretation of [FISC’s] Orders,” Judge
Reggie Walton wrote, “strains credulity.”266 The NSA had compounded its bad behavior by repeatedly submitting inaccurate

263. In re Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], Order, No. BR 0813, at 2 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009) (quoting Application Exhibit A, Declaration of
[REDACTED], Signals Intelligence Directorate Deputy Program Manager [REDACTED], NSA at 5, In re Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No.
BR
08-13
(FISA
Ct.
Dec.
11,
2008)),
available
at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_March%202%202009%20Order
%20from%20FISC.pdf, [http://perma.cc/BP9D-DUUL].
264. Id. (quoting Application Exhibit A, Declaration of [REDACTED], Signals
Intelligence Directorate Deputy Program Manager [REDACTED], NSA at 5–6, In
re Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13).
265. Id. at 3 (emphasis omitted) (quoting In re Production of Tangible Things
from [REDACTED], Primary Order, No. BR 08-13, at 8 (FISA Ct. Dec. 11, 2008)).
266. Id. at 5.
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descriptions of how it developed and used the alert list process.267
In support of its claim that the program was vital for U.S. national
security, the NSA had offered as evidence the paltry claim that,
after nearly three years of sweeping up all telephony metadata,
the NSA had generated 275 domestic security reports that, in turn,
had spurred three preliminary investigations.268
FISC objected to the government’s assertion that FISC “need
not take any further remedial action.”269 FISC has also noted
that, until the NSA has completed the review, “[FISC] sees little
reason to believe that the most recent discovery of a systemic,
ongoing violation—on February 18, 2009—will be the last.”270
Accordingly, starting in March 2009, though the NSA could
continue to collect data and to test the telephony metadata system, it would only be allowed to query it with a FISC order—
or, in an emergency, to query the database and then to inform
FISC by 5:00 PM, Eastern Time, on the next business day.271 In
September 2009, however, FISC lifted the requirement for the
NSA to seek approval in every case.272
The second protection FISC introduced was, starting on July 3,
2009, to require the NSA to file a weekly report with FISC, listing
each time, over the seven-day period ending the previous Friday, in which the NSA had shared, “in any form, information
obtained or derived from the [REDACTED] BR metadata collec-

267. Id. at 6.
268. Id. at 13 (“[T]he mere commencement of a preliminary investigation, by
itself, does not seem particularly significant . . . The time has come for the government to describe to the Court how, based on the information collected and
analyzed during [the duration of the program], the value of the program to the
nation’s security justifies the continued collection and retention of massive quantities of U.S. person information.”).
269. Id. at 14 (quoting Notice of Compliance Incident at 6, In re Production of
Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 08-13 (FISA Ct. Feb. 26, 2009)).
270. Id. at 16.
271. Id. at 18–19.
272. See Press Release, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, DNI Clapper Declassifies Intelligence Community Documents Regarding Collection Under Section
501 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) (Sept. 10, 2013), available at
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases2013/927-draft-document, [http://perma.cc/0B43x9pG7Go].
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tions with anyone outside NSA.”273 Again, consistent with traditional FISA, FISC added special protections for U.S. persons:
For each such instance, the government shall specify the
date on which the information was shared, the recipient of
the information, and the form in which the information was
communicated (e.g., written report, email, oral communication, etc.). For each such instance in which U.S. person information has been shared, the Chief of Information Sharing
of NSA’s Signals Intelligence Directorate shall certify that
such official determined, prior to dissemination, the information to be related to counterterrorism information and
necessary to understand the counterterrorism information or
to assess its importance.274

In August 2009, the government submitted its end-to-end assessment of the NSA telephony metadata system.275 FISC lifted
its requirements, leaving future dissemination decisions up to
the NSA. Whether the requirements with which the NSA was
left effectively check the exercise of authorities is questionable.
Before the dissemination of information of U.S. persons’ information outside the Agency, an NSA official must determine
that the information is “related to counterterrorism information
and is necessary to understand the counterterrorism information or assess its importance.” 276 Because the government
already considers all of the information in the database to be
relevant to counterterrorism investigations, and has already
argued to FISC (and FISC has agreed), that the collection of
such data is necessary to understand its counterterrorism information, the degree to which this restriction really prevents
such dissemination is open to question.

273. In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], Order, No. BR 0906, at 7 (FISA Ct. June 22, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents
/section/pub_Jun%2022%202009%20Order.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0Ur433saA6q].
274. Id.
275. Report of the United States, In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 09-09 (FISA Ct. Aug. 13, 2009), available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_August%2019%202009%20Repo
rt%20of%20the%20US%20with%20Attachments%2020130910.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/0j3hGV41doz].
276. SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 5.

No. 3]

Bulk Metadata Collection
d.

821

Technological Gap

A critical part of FISC’s failure to provide effective oversight
of the process relates to FISC’s decision to have the NSA perform the targeting decision. Part of the problem also stems
from FISC’s discomfort with the technological aspects of the
collection and analysis of digital information. For much of the
discussion of noncompliance incidents, for instance, it appears
that neither the NSA nor FISC had an adequate understanding
of how the algorithms operate. Nor did they understand the
type of information that had been incorporated into different
databases, and whether they had been subjected to the appropriate legal analysis before data mining.
A similar problem may accompany the reporting requirements to Congress. In March 2009, for example, the DOJ submitted several FISC opinions and government filings—relating
to the discovery and remediation of compliance incidents in its
handling of bulk telephony metadata—to the Chairmen of the
Intelligence and Judiciary Committees.277 A subsequent letter
noted that the House and Senate Intelligence and Judiciary
Committees had received briefings in March, April, and August before receiving a copy of the NSA’s review in September
2009.278 To the extent that the representations of the agency are
277. Letter from M. Faith Burton, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., to the Hon.
Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate; the Hon. Dianne
Feinstein, Chairman, Select Comm. on Intelligence, U.S. Senate, the Hon. John
Conyers, Jr., Chairman, Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives;
the Hon. Silvestre Reyes, Chairman, Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, U.S.
House
of
Representatives
(Mar.
5,
2009),
available
at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Mar%205%202009%20Cover%2
0Letter%20to%20Chairman%20of%20Intel%20and%20Judiciary%20Committees.p
df, [http://perma.cc/TEN8-VUZG].
278. Press Release, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, DNI Clapper Declassifies Intelligence Community Documents Regarding Collection Under Section 501
of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) (Sept. 10, 2013), available at
http://icontherecord.tumblr.com/, [http://perma.cc/0B43x9pG7Go]; Letter from
Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen., to the Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, Chairman,
Comm. on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate; the Hon. Dianne Feinstein, Chairman, Select
Comm. on Intelligence, U.S. Senate; the Hon. John Conyers, Jr., Chairman, Comm.
on the Judiciary, U.S. House of Representatives; the Hon. Silvestre Reyes, Chairman, Permanent Select Comm. on Intelligence, U.S. House of Representatives
(Sept. 3, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/
pub_Sep%203%202009%20Cover%20letter%20to%20Chairman%20of%20the%20In
telligence%20and%20Judiciary%20Committees.pdf, [http://perma.cc/09KwyBTiXcp].
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heavily dependent on technical knowledge, the implications
may not be readily apparent to lawmakers.
2.

Issuance of Detailed Legal Reasoning and Creation of Precedent

To enforce the specialized probable cause standard encapsulated in FISA, Congress created a court of specialized but exclusive jurisdiction.279 Its job was to ascertain whether sufficient
probable cause existed for a target to be considered a foreign
power, or an agent thereof; whether the applicant had provided the necessary details for the surveillance; and whether the
appropriate certifications and findings had been made.
It is thus surprising that the government considers these orders now to be evidence of precedent, on the basis of which, it
argues, the programs are legal. In ACLU v. Clapper,280 for instance, the government responded to the argument that it had
exceeded its statutory authority under FISA by arguing:
[S]ince May 2006, fourteen separate judges of the FISC have
concluded on thirty-four occasions that the FBI satisfied this
requirement, finding “reasonable grounds to believe” that
the telephony metadata sought by the Government “are relevant to authorized investigations . . . being conducted by
the FBI . . . to protect against international terrorism.281

The government went on to cite Judge Eagan’s August 2013
memorandum opinion in further support of its interpretation
of “relevance.”282 These were the only points of reference that
mattered: “Considering that the Government has consistently
demonstrated the relevance of the requested records to the
FISC’s satisfaction, as Section 215 requires, it is difficult to understand how the government can be said to have acted in excess of statutory authority.”283

279. Theodore W. Ruger, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s Appointments to the FISA Court:
An Empirical Perspective, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 239, 244 (2007).
280. 959 F. Supp. 2d 724 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
281. Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction at 16, Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, available at
https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/2013.10.01_govt_oppn_to_pi_motion.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/0KsuWbyJspP].
282. Id.
283. Id.
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Even more surprising than the role the granting of orders is
playing for establishing legal precedent is the revelation that
FISC has greatly broadened the “special needs” exception to
the Fourth Amendment to embrace wholesale data collection.284
Although the Supreme Court has never recognized such an exception, FISC’s unique constitutional interpretation has served
to authorize broad collection of information on U.S. citizens.
Notably, because of the secret nature of FISC’s proceedings and
the ex parte nature of the court, there are no advocates who
could appeal a decision based on this interpretation to the Supreme Court. Consequently, an unreviewable, complex body of
law, establishing doctrines unrecognized by the Supreme
Court, has emerged as precedent for future application to FISC.
In In re Directives, FISCR looked back at its decision in In re
Sealed Case to confirm “the existence of a foreign intelligence
exception to the warrant requirement.”285 It acknowledged that
FISCR had “avoided an express holding that a foreign intelligence exception exists by assuming arguendo that whether or
not the warrant requirements were met, the statute could survive on reasonableness grounds.”286 FISCR went on to determine that, as a federal appellate court, it would “review findings of fact for clear error and legal conclusions (including
determinations about the ultimate constitutionality of government searches or seizures) de novo.”287 It then asserted, for the
first time, a foreign intelligence surveillance exception to the
Fourth Amendment:
The question . . . is whether the reasoning of the special
needs cases applies by analogy to justify a foreign intelligence exception to the warrant requirement for surveillance
undertaken for national security purposes and directed at a
foreign power or an agent of a foreign power reasonably believed to be located outside the United States. Applying
principles derived from the special needs cases, we conclude

284. See Eric Lichtblau, In Secret, Court Vastly Broadens Powers of N.S.A., N.Y.
TIMES, July 7, 2013, at A1.
285. In re Directives [REDACTED] Pursuant to Section 105B of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004, 1010 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008).
286. Id.
287. Id. at 1009.
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that this type of foreign intelligence surveillance possesses
characteristics that qualify it for such an exception.288

The court analogized the exception to the 1989 Supreme
Court consideration of the warrantless drug testing of railway
workers, on the grounds that the government’s need to respond to an overriding public danger could justify a minimal
intrusion on privacy.289 The government subsequently cited In
re Directives in its August 9, 2013 white paper, defending the
telephony metadata program, in support of an exception to the
Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.290
FISC continues to go beyond its mandate. In August 2013, for
instance, FISC issued a twenty-nine-page Amended Memorandum Opinion regarding the FBI’s July 18, 2013 application for
the telephony metadata program.291 Appending the seventeenpage order to the opinion, Judge Claire V. Eagan considered
Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the statutory language of
Section 215, and the canons of statutory construction to justify
granting the order.292 Similarly, in a 2002 per curiam opinion,
FISCR suggested the case raised “important questions of statutory interpretation, and constitutionality” and concluded “that
FISA, as amended by the Patriot Act, supports the government’s position, and that the restrictions imposed by the FISA
court are not required by FISA or the Constitution.”293
Congress did not design the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court or the Court of Review to develop its own jurisprudence.
Particularly in light of the secrecy and lack of adversarial process inherent in the court, it is concerning that FISC’s decisions
have taken on a force of their own in legitimizing the collection
of information on U.S. citizens.

288. Id. at 1011.
289. Id. at 1010–11.
290. SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 15.
291. In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-109
(FISA Ct. 2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br13-09primary-order.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0LkgNZzvbBu].
292. Id. at 28–29.
293. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 719–20 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
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Judicial Design

As mentioned above, Congress tried to construct an evenhanded, neutral arbiter by requiring that (a) FISC judges be selected by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court from at least
seven different federal districts; (b) the judges serve staggered
terms of up to seven years; and (c) having once served, such
judges are ineligible for further service.294 To ensure diversity,
any federal district court judge (including a senior judge), who
has not previously served on FISC, may be selected.295 FISCR,
in turn, is comprised of judges selected by the Chief Justice.296
This system has been called into question on two grounds:
first, the lack of diversity regarding judicial appointment and,
second, the high rate of applications being granted by FISC.
Given these characteristics, critics question how effectively
FISC operates as a check on the executive branch. The observations are important, but, without more information, it is difficult to determine the extent to which the current state of affairs
has substantively impacted the process.
a.

Appointments

To the extent that political ideology is reflected in the appointments process, the court is heavily weighted toward one
side of the political spectrum. The past two Chief Justices have
been appointed by Republican presidents, and they have tended to select judges that have been nominated by Republican
administrations.297 Only one of the current eleven judges serving on FISC is a Democratic nominee. Over the past decade, of
the twenty judges appointed to FISC and FISCR, only three
have been Democratic nominees.
Although this raises questions about the even-handedness of
the FISC appointments process, it would be premature to draw
substantive conclusions based solely on the political makeup of
the bench. Any meaningful examination of how composition
influences the outcome of cases would need to compare either
FISC decisions with other, more diverse courts, or the individual
294. 50 U.S.C. § 1803(a)(1), (d) (2006 & Supp. V 2011).
295. Id. at § 1803(a).
296. Id. at § 1803(b).
297. See infra Figure 1.
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decisions reached by FISC judges appointed by one party with
decisions reached by judges appointed by the opposing party.
Such studies would be almost impossible to conduct. FISC
opinions are classified. Beyond this, they are sui generis, in that
FISC is the only court that considers FISA applications. It also
may be that externalities influence which judges opt for FISC
membership. That is, more Republican appointees than Democratic appointees may inquire or make clear that they would be
interested in serving on FISC. No studies have yet been conducted demonstrating why the appointments process aligns
with political party, making any conclusions as to the effect
somewhat arbitrary.
To the extent that political ideology enters into the equation, the
way in which it has interacted with the court’s role in establishing
precedent deserves notice, as it undermines the appearance of a
neutral arbiter and emphasizes deference to and support for
greater power for the executive. According to the public record,
FISCR, for instance, has only met twice: once in 2002 and once in
2008.298 On both occasions, the panels consisted entirely of Republican appointees, some of whom had publicly argued that FISA
was an unconstitutional usurpation of executive power.
Judge Laurence Silberman of the D.C. Circuit testified to
Congress in 1978 (when FISA was being debated) that the legislation violated the Constitution.299 Judge Silberman, who had
previously served as Deputy Attorney General, was “absolutely convinced that the administration bill, if passed, would be
an enormous and fundamental mistake which the Congress
and the American people would have reason to regret.”300 For
Judge Silberman, the judiciary’s role in any national security
electronic surveillance should be circumscribed. He explained:

298. See In re Directives [REDACTED] Pursuant to Section 105B of Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551 F.3d 1004 (FISA. Ct. Rev. 2008); In re Sealed
Case, 310 F.3d 717.
299. See Foreign Intelligence Electronic Surveillance: Hearings on H.R. 5794, H.R.
9745, H.R. 7308, and H.R. 5632 Before the Subcomm. on Legislation of the H. Permanent
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 95th Cong. 221 (1978) (statement of the Hon. Laurence
H. Silberman), available at http://www.cnss.org/pages/foreign-intelligencesurveillance-act-fisa.html, [http://perma.cc/8EMD-ZGLW].
300. Id. at 217.
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I find the notion that the President’s constitutional authority
to conduct foreign affairs and to command the armed forces
precludes congressional intervention into the manner by
which the executive branch gathers intelligence, by electronic or other means, to be unpersuasive, and in that respect I
agree with my colleague here to the left. But to concede the
propriety of a congressional role in this matter is by no
means—and this is the burden of my testimony—to concede
the propriety or constitutionality of the judicial role created
by the administration’s bill.301

The Judge’s chief concern was not a so-called “imperial presidency,” but the advent of an “imperial judiciary.”302 The authorities transferred to FISC thus represented an unconstitutional
erosion of executive power.303 Another FISC judge, Ralph Guy,
similarly argued for the government as a U.S. Attorney in United
States v. United States District Court304 that the President did not
need a warrant to engage in national security surveillance. 305
Along with Judge Leavy, a Reagan appointee, Judges Silberman
and Guy heard the first appeal in the history of FISA—issuing a
decision that made it possible for the government to use the
looser restrictions in FISA even in cases in which the primary
purpose of the investigation was criminal in nature.306
With the court overwhelmingly constituted by nominees of
one political party, it is perhaps unsurprising that some of the
most important decisions have been made by panels entirely
constituted by the same. The FISCR panel that appears to have
created a foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement lacked a diverse political base. It
included Chief Judge Selya and Senior Circuit Judges Winter
and Arnold—appointees of Presidents Ronald Reagan and
George H. W. Bush.
To the extent that political appointments stand in as a proxy
for political ideologies, such as greater deference to the executive branch, the lack of diversity in the appointments process—
301. Id. at 219.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
305. See generally id.
306. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 736 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2002).
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especially in regard to some of the most important and farreaching secret decisions issued by the court—raises important
questions about the extent to which FISC, as conceived by
Congress, is serving as neutral arbiter. Without more detailed
information about the judicial process, however, the extent to
which this is the case remains in question.
FIGURE 1: JUDGES APPOINTED TO THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE COURT AND COURT OF REVIEW BY ORIGINAL
APPOINTMENT TO THE BENCH307
District Judge

Court

Rosemary M.
Collyer*
Claire Eagan*

FISC

Dates of
appointment
3/8/2013–3/7/2020

FISC

2/13/2013–5/18/2019

Michael W.
Mosman*
Raymond J.
Dearie*
William C.
Bryson**
Jennifer B.
Coffman
F. Dennis Saylor IV*
Martin L.C.
Feldman*
Susan W.
Wright*
Thomas F. Hogan*
Morris S. Ar-

FISC

5/4/2013–5/3/2020

FISC

7/2/2012–7/1/2019

FISCR

12/1/2011–5/18/2018

Appointing
President
George W.
Bush
George W.
Bush
George W.
Bush
Ronald
Reagan
Bill Clinton

FISC

5/19/2011–1/8/2013

Bill Clinton

FISC

5/19/2011–5/18/2018

FISC

5/19/2010–5/18/2017

FISC

5/19/2009–5/18/2016

FISC

5/19/2009–5/18/2016

FISCR

6/13/2008–5/18/2015

George W.
Bush
Ronald
Reagan
George H.
W. Bush
Ronald
Reagan
George H.

307 . See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance
Court of Review: Current and Past Members, FEDERATION AM. SCIENTISTS,
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/fisc-members.pdf, [http://perma.cc/9FVCXGMC] (last visited Dec. 2, 2013).
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W. Bush
Ronald
Reagan
Bill Clinton

FISC

5/19/2008–5/18/2015

Mary A.
McLaughlin*
Reggie Walton*
Roger Vinson

FISC

5/19/2008–5/18/2015

FISC

5/19/2007–5/18/2014

FISC

5/4/2006–5/3/2013

John D. Bates

FISC

2/22/2006–2/21/2013

Bruce M. Selya

FISCR

5/19/2005–5/18/2012

Malcolm Howard
Frederick J.
Scullin
Dee Benson

FISC

5/19/2005–5/18/2012

FISC

5/19/2004–5/18/2011

FISC

4/8/2004–4/7/2011

Ralph Winter

FISCR

George P. Kazen
Robert Broomfield
Colleen KollarKotelly
James G. Carr

FISC

11/14/2003–
5/18/2010
7/15/2003–5/18/2010

FISC

10/1/2002–5/18/2009

FISC

5/19/2002–5/18/2009

George W.
Bush
Ronald
Reagan
George W.
Bush
Ronald
Reagan
Ronald
Reagan
Ronald
Reagan
George W.
Bush
Ronald
Reagan
Jimmy
Carter
Ronald
Reagan
Bill Clinton

FISC

5/19/2002–5/18/2008

Bill Clinton

James Robertson
John E. Conway
Edward Leavy

FISC

Bill Clinton

FISCR

5/19/2002–
12/19/2005
5/19/2002–
10/30/2003
9/25/2001–5/18/2008

Nathaniel M.
Gorton
Claude M. Hilton

FISC

5/19/2001–5/18/2008

FISC

5/18/2000–5/18/2007

FISC

Ronald
Reagan
Ronald
Reagan
George W.
Bush
Ronald
Reagan
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Michael J. Davis
Ralph B. Guy,
Jr.
Harold A.
Baker
Stanley S.
Brotman
William H.
Stafford
Royce C. Lamberth
Laurence H.
Silberman
Paul H. Roney

FISC

5/18/1999–5/18/2006

Bill Clinton

FISCR

10/8/1998–5/18/2005

Gerald Ford

FISC

5/18/1998–5/18/2005

FISC

7/17/1997–5/18/2004

Jimmy
Carter
Gerald Ford

FISC

5/19/1996–5/18/2003

Gerald Ford

FISC

5/19/1995–5/18/2002

FISCR

6/18/1996–5/18/2003

FISCR

9/13/1994–5/18/2001

John F. Keenan

FISC

7/27/1994–5/18/2001

James C.
Cacheris
Earl H. Carroll

FISC

9/10/1993–5/18/2000

FISC

2/23/1993–5/18/1999

Charles
Schwartz Jr.
Bobby R.
Baldock
Ralph G.
Thompson
Frank H.
Freedman
Wendell A.
Miles
Robert W.
Warren
Sidney Aronovitz
Joyce H. Green

FISC

8/5/1992–5/18/1998

Ronald
Reagan
George W.
Bush
Richard
Nixon
Ronald
Reagan
Ronald
Reagan
Jimmy
Carter
Gerald Ford

FISCR

6/17/1992–5/18/1998

FISC

6/11/1990–5/18/1997

FISC

5/30/1990–5/18/1994

FISC

9/21/1989–5/18/1996

FISCR
FISC

10/30/1989–
5/18/1996
6/8/1989–5/18/1992

FISC

5/18/1988–5/18/1995

Ronald
Reagan
Gerald Ford
Richard
Nixon
Richard
Nixon
Richard
Nixon
Gerald Ford
Jimmy
Carter
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Conrad K. Cyr

FISC

Collins J. Seitz

FISCR

5/18/1987–
11/20/1989
3/19/1987–3/18/1994

831
Ronald
Reagan
Lyndon B.
Johnson

* Denotes current members of FISC
**Denotes current members of FISCR
b.

Order Rate

Augmenting concerns prompted by the lack of diversity in
terms of appointments to FISC and FISCR is the rather notable
success rate the government enjoys in its applications to the
court. Scholars have noted that the success rate is “unparalleled
in any other American court.”308 Over the first two and a half
decades, for instance, FISC approved nearly every single application without any modification. 309 Between 1979 and 2003,
FISC denied only three out of 16,450 applications.310
Since 2003, FISC has ruled on 18,473 applications for electronic
surveillance and physical search (2003–2008), and electronic surveillance (2009–2012).311 Court supporters note that a significant
number of these applications are either modified or withdrawn
by the government prior to FISC ruling. But even here, the numbers are quite low: 493 modifications still only comes to 2.6% of
the total number of applications. Simultaneously, the government has only withdrawn twenty-six applications prior to FISC
ruling.312 These numbers speak to the presence of informal processes, whereby FISC appears to be influencing the contours of
applications. Without more information about the types of modifications that are being required, however, it is impossible to

308. Ruger, supra note 266, at 245.
309. See 1 KRIS & WILSON, supra note 167, at 469; Letter from Attorney Gen. William
French Smith to Dir., Admin. Office of the U.S. Courts (Apr. 22, 1981), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/1980rept.html, [http://perma.cc/0gryFWv7hZe]
(“No orders were entered which modified or denied the requested authority, except
one case in which the Court modified an order and authorized an activity for which
court authority had not been requested.”).
310. LAURA K. DONOHUE, THE COST OF COUNTERTERRORISM: POWER, POLITICS,
AND LIBERTY 232 (2008).
311. See infra Figure 2.
312. Id.
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gauge either the level of oversight or the extent to which FISC is
altering the applications.
Critics also point to the risk of capture presented by in camera,
ex parte proceedings, and note that out of 18,473 rulings, FISC
has only denied eight in whole and three in part. Whatever the
substantive effect might be, the presentational impact is of note.
FIGURE 2: FISC RULINGS ON ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND
PHYSICAL SEARCH (2003–2008) AND ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE (2009–2012)313
Year

Applications
on which
FISC ruled

Approved

Modified

Denied
in part

Denied
in whole

Withdrawn
by gov’t

2003314
2004316
2005318
2006320

1727
1756317
2072319
2176321

1724
1756
2072
2176

79
94
61
73

0
0
0
1

3315
0
0
0

0
3
2
5

313. Starting in 2009, the Department of Justice began providing the breakdown
of the number approved, modified, denied in part, denied in whole, or withdrawn
by the government prior to the FISC ruling only for those applications involving
electronic communications. Prior to that time, these numbers were combined.
314. Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to Mr. L. Ralph Mecham, Dir., Admin.
Office of the United States Courts (Apr. 30, 2004), available at
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2003rept.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0Vu9UXSTi4y].
315. An additional application was initially denied but later approved. Id.
316. Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker,
U.S.
House
of
Representatives
(Apr.
1,
2005),
available
at
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2004rept.pdf, [http://perma.cc/4W63-92U5].
317. Of 1758 submitted, three were withdrawn prior to FISC ruling and one was
resubmitted. Id.
318. Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. J. Dennis Hastert, Speaker,
U.S.
House
of
Representatives
(Apr.
28,
2006),
available
at
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2005rept.pdf, [http://perma.cc/UV22-GC3G].
319. Of 2074 submitted, two were withdrawn prior to FISC ruling, and one was
resubmitted. Id.
320. Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Nancy Pelosi, Speaker, U.S.
House
of
Representatives
(Apr.
27,
2007),
available
at
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2006rept.pdf, [http://perma.cc/32AX-FEYA].
321. Of 2181 submitted, five were withdrawn prior to FISC ruling. Id.
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2082
1321327
1506329
1674331

2370
2083325
1320
1506
1674

86
2
14
14
30

1
0
1
0
0
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3323
1
1
0
0

0
0
8
5
2

322. Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney
Gen., Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Nancy
Pelosi, Speaker, U.S. House of Representatives (Apr. 30, 2008), available at
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2007rept.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/NTD67CJ4].
323. Discrepancy in the numbers stems in part from holdover applications and denials. Two applications, for instance, filed in 2006 were not approved until 2007. Id.
324. Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative
Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Harry Reid, Majority Leader, U.S.
Senate
(May
14,
2009),
available
at
https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2008rept.pdf, [http://perma.cc/8KA4-E9UC].
325. Discrepancy in the numbers stems in part from holdover applications and
denials. Two applications filed in CY 2007 were not approved until CY 2008. Id.
326. Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative
Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President, U.S.
Senate (Apr. 30, 2010), available at https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa
/2009rept.pdf, [http://perma.cc/5VA5-8R6B].
327. For the first time since 2003, no numbers are available for modifications or
denials for the full number of applications submitted (physical search, electronic
surveillance, and combined applications). Instead, the report notes that of the 1376
total submitted in the former three categories, 1329 were related to electronic surveillance. Eight of these applications were withdrawn, one denied in whole, one
denied in part, and fourteen modified, with 1320 approved. The number of applications is thus missing the numbers for physical search and physical search combined applications. Id.
328. Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative
Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Harry Reid, Majority Leader, U.S.
Senate (Apr. 29, 2011), available at https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa
/2010rept.pdf, [http://perma.cc/G36L-LBED].
329. The total number of electronic surveillance, physical search, and combined
applications was 1579. The report, however, isolates the electronic applications (1511),
and provides breakdowns for modifications, denials, etc., for just that category. Of the
total of 1511, five were withdrawn by the government prior to FISC ruling. Id.
330. Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative
Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President, U.S.
Senate (Apr. 30, 2012), available at https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa
/2011rept.pdf, [http://perma.cc/HD44-EAY5].
331. Note that there were 1745 total applications that included electronic surveillance and physical searches for foreign intelligence purposes. It appears that
approximately seventy of the orders related solely to physical search, as the
breakdown for electronic surveillance is only done for the 1674. Two of the initial
orders were withdrawn prior to FISC ruling. Id.
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Setting modifications aside for the moment, the deference
that appears to exist regarding outright denials or granting of
orders seems to extend to FISC rulings with regard to business
records. Almost no attention, however, has been paid to this
area. It appears that FISC has never denied an application for an
order under this section. That is, of 751 applications since 2005,
all 751 have been granted, as the following figure shows.
FIGURE 3: ORDERS FOR THE PRODUCTION OF TANGIBLE GOODS
Year

2005334
2006335
2007336
2008337

Number of applications
to FISC under 50 U.S.C.
§ 1862(c)(2)
155
43
6
13

Number of applications
granted by FISC
155
43
6
13

332. Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Harry Reid,
Majority Leader, U.S. Senate (Apr. 30, 2013), available at https://www.fas.org
/irp/agency/doj/fisa/2012rept.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0KymPaptHiZ].
333. The government made a total of 1856 applications for electronic surveillance or physical searches; of those, 1789 included requests for electronic surveillance. Of those, one was withdrawn by the government prior to FISC ruling. Id.
334. Letter from William E. Moschella, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Richard B. Cheney, President, U.S. Senate (Apr. 28, 2006), available at http://www.justice.gov/nsd/foia
/foia_library/2005fisa-ltr.pdf, [http://perma.cc/UK7V-FQDN].
335. Letter from Richard A. Hertling, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of
Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Richard B. Cheney,
President, U.S. Senate (Apr. 27, 2007), available at http://www.justice.gov/nsd/foia
/foia_library/2006fisa-ltr.pdf, [http://perma.cc/E9ME-5PEQ].
336. Letter from Brian A. Benczkowski, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen.,
Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Richard B.
Cheney, President, U.S. Senate (Apr. 30, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/
nsd/foia/foia_library/2007fisa-ltr.pdf, [http://perma.cc/M5L7-3QGR].
337. Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative
Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President, U.S.
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It is important to underscore that the lack of more contextual
data cautions against inferring too much from the nonexistent
rate of denial. In passing the tangible goods provision, Congress
tied the court’s hands, requiring FISC to grant applications once
the statutory conditions are met.342 To the extent, then, that FISC
is deferential to the executive, responsibility lies at least in part
with the legislature. In addition, it is almost impossible to tell,
outside of the classified world, the extent to which the court
pushes back on the DOJ—not just in regard to specific orders,
but in relation to broader rules and procedures, as well as in an
oversight capacity. Two examples come to mind.
In 2010, John D. Bates, Presiding Judge of FISC, issued a declassified Rules of Procedure, requiring notice and briefing of nov-

Senate (May 14, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/nsd/foia/foia_library/
2008fisa-ltr.pdf, [http://perma.cc/RVY8-GWLR].
338. Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative
Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President, U.S.
Senate (Apr. 30, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/nsd/foia/foia_library/
2009fisa-ltr.pdf, [http://perma.cc/MNA7-XGLD].
339. Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative
Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President, U.S.
Senate (Apr. 29, 2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/nsd/foia/foia_library/
2010fisa-ltr.pdf, [http://perma.cc/3QQX-NK9W].
340. Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative
Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Joseph R. Biden, Jr., President, U.S.
Senate (Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/nsd/foia/foia_library
/2011fisa-ltr.pdf, [http://perma.cc/57T5-CYR2].
341. Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legislative Affairs, U.S. Department of Justice, to the Hon. Joseph R. Biden,
Jr., President, U.S. Senate (Apr. 30, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov
/nsd/foia/foia_library/2012fisa-ltr.pdf, [http://perma.cc/0tNcrgUS6nx].
342. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(1) (2006) (“Upon an application made pursuant to this
section, if the judge finds that the application meets the requirements of subsections (a) and (b), the judge shall enter an ex parte order as requested, or as modified approving the release of tangible things.” (emphasis added)).
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el issues before the court.343 This document suggested that FISC
would not, in the future, simply accept applications in new areas
of the law without first considering the underlying legal issues.
Second, the recently-released judicial opinions from 2009
suggest that FISC was pressuring the NSA with regard to its
failure to ensure that the identifiers run against the database be
subjected to a test of reasonable, articulable suspicion. The
court was clearly uncomfortable with the pattern of misinformation that had marked the government’s previous representations to FISC. But, these same documents also reveal the extent
to which the court relies on the NSA to police its own activities—again raising questions about the extent to which FISC
adequately performs its envisioned role. As a final note, it is
important to recognize that the sheer volume of the numbers
associated with the tangible goods provisions (751) is remarkable in part because any one order could result in the collection
of millions of records on millions of people, as we have seen
with the telephony metadata program. In light of the in camera, ex parte proceedings, these numbers raise further questions about FISC’s role.
II.

BULK COLLECTION AND FISA’S STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The telephony metadata program violates FISA’s express
statutory language in three areas: first, with regard to the language “relevant to an authorized investigation”; second, in relation to the requirement that the information sought be obtainable under subpoena duces tecum; and third, in its
violation of the restrictions specifically placed on pen registers
and trap and trace equipment.
A.

“Relevant to an Authorized Investigation”

The government argues that the NSA’s telephony metadata
program is consistent with the language of 50 U.S.C. § 1861 in that
all telephone calls in the United States, including those of a wholly
343. FISA CT. R. 11, available at https://www.fas.org/irp/agency/doj/fisa/fiscrules2010.pdf, [http://perma.cc/5K96-A4LZ]. The current rules, issued November 1,
2010, superseded both the Feburary 17, 2006 Rules of Procedure and the May 5,
2006 Procedures for Review of Petitions Filed Pursuant to Section 501(f) of the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, As Amended.
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local nature, are “relevant” to foreign intelligence investigations.
The word “relevant” itself, the administration states, “is a broad
term that connotes anything ‘[b]earing upon, connected with, [or]
pertinent to a’ specified subject matter.”344 Turning to its “particularized legal meaning,” the government argues:
It is well-settled in the context of other forms of legal process
for the production of documents that a document is ‘relevant’ to a particular subject matter not only where it directly
bears on that subject matter, but also where it is reasonable
to believe that it could lead to other information that directly
bears on that subject matter.345

That massive amounts of data may be involved is of little import:
Courts have held in the analogous contexts of civil discovery
and criminal and administrative investigations that ‘relevance’ is a broad standard that permits discovery of large
volumes of data in circumstances where doing so is necessary
to identify much smaller amounts of information within that
data that directly bears on the matter being investigated.346

Applied to the telephony metadata program, though recognizing that the telephony metadata program is “broad in scope,”
the government argues that there are nevertheless “reasonable
grounds to believe” that the category of data (i.e., all telephone
call data), when queried and analyzed, “will produce information pertinent to FBI investigations of international terrorism.”347 For communications data, the government argues, connections between individual data points can only be reliably
identified through large-scale data mining.348 As DOJ explained
to Congress: “The more metadata NSA has access to, the more
likely it is that NSA can identify, discover and understand the
network of contacts linked to targeted numbers or addresses.”349
344. SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra
LISH DICTIONARY 561 (2d ed. 1989)).

note 2, at 9 (quoting 13 THE OXFORD ENG-

345. Id.
346. Id. at 1–2.
347. Id. at 2.
348. See id.
349. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY’S BULK COLLECTION PROGRAMS FOR USA PATRIOT ACT REAUTHORIZATION 5 (2011), available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2011_CoverLetters_Report_Collection.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/S7CD-E8Z7].
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There are two sets of responses to the government’s arguments. The first centers on the government’s claim that all telephony metadata is relevant. The second concerns the connection in the statutory language between the relevance of the
information to be obtained and “an authorized investigation.”350
1.

Relevance Standard

Four legal arguments undermine the government’s claim
that there are “reasonable grounds” to believe that hundreds of
millions of daily telephone records are “relevant” to an authorized investigation. First, the NSA’s interpretation of “relevant”
collapses the statutory distinction between relevant and irrelevant records, thus obviating the government’s obligation to
discriminate between the two. Second, this reading renders
meaningless the qualifying phrases in the statute, such as “reasonable grounds.” Third, the government’s interpretation establishes a concerning legal precedent. Fourth, the broad reading of “relevant” contravenes congressional intent.
First, in ordinary usage, something is understood as relevant
to another thing when a demonstrably close connection between the two objects can be established.351 This is also the way
in which courts have consistently applied the term to the collection of information—as with grand-jury subpoenas, where
the information collected must bear some actual connection to
a particular investigation.352
350. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A)(i)–(iii) (2006).
351. See, e.g., OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY 1474 (3d ed. 2010) (defining relevant as “the state of being closely connected or appropriate to the matter in
hand”); MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 1051 (11th ed. 2006) (defining “relevant” as “having significant and demonstrable bearing on the matter at
hand”); see also Memorandum of Law in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 9–12, ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13-cv-03994 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26,
2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/natsec/clapper/2013.08.26%
20ACLU%20PI%20Brief.pdf, [http://perma.cc/CCV9-ZSHT].
352. See, e.g., Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 383, 387–88 (2004) (noting
that “overbroad” discovery orders were “anything but appropriate” because they
“ask[ed] for everything under the sky”); Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341
U.S. 214, 221 (1951) (overturning use of a “catch-all provision” in a subpoena on
grounds that it was “merely a fishing expedition to see what may turn up”); In re
Horowitz, 482 F.2d 72, 79 (2d Cir. 1973) (Friendly, J.) (narrowing a grand-jury
subpoena because it improperly required an individual to turn over the contents
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In contrast, almost none of the information the government
obtained under the bulk metadata collection program is demonstrably linked to an authorized investigation. The government itself has admitted this. Writing to Representative James
Sensenbrenner, Peter Kadzik, the Principal Deputy Assistant
Attorney General, acknowledged, “most of the records in the
dataset are not associated with terrorist activity.”353 FISC Judge
Reggie Walton drew the point more strongly:
The government’s applications have all acknowledged that,
of the [REDACTED] of call detail records NSA receives per
day (currently over [REDACTED] per day), the vast majority
of individual records that are being sought pertain neither to
[REDACTED] . . . In other words, nearly all of the call detail
records collected pertain to communications of non-U.S.
persons who are not the subject of an FBI investigation to obtain foreign intelligence information, [and] are communications of U.S. persons who are not the subject of an FBI investigation to protect against international terrorism or
clandestine intelligence activities.354

In other words, most of the information being collected does
not relate to any individuals suspected of any wrongdoing.
In defense of its broad interpretation, the government argues
that it must collect irrelevant information to ascertain what is
relevant. This means that the NSA, in direct contravention of
the statutory language, is collapsing the distinction between
relevant and irrelevant records—a distinction that Congress
required be made before collection. Because of this collapse, the
NSA is gaining an extraordinary amount of information. The
records the government sought under the telephony metadata
program detail the daily interactions of millions of Americans
who are not themselves connected in any way to foreign powof multiple filing cabinets “without any attempt to define classes of potentially
relevant documents or any limitations as to subject matter or time period”).
353. Letter from Peter J. Kadzik, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S.
Department of Justice, to the Hon. F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., U.S. House of Representatives 2 (July 16, 2013), available at http://1.usa.gov/12GN8kW,
[http://perma.cc/9F49-US7R].
354. In re Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], BR 08-13, at 11–12
(FISA
Ct.
Mar.
2,
2009),
available
at
http://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/section/pub_March%202%202009%20Order%20from%20FISC.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/9YZ-CMCV].
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ers or agents thereof. They include private and public interactions between senators, between members of the House of Representatives, and between judges and their chambers, as well as
information about state and local officials. They include parents communicating with their children’s teachers, and
zookeepers arranging for the care of animals. Metadata information from calls to rape hotlines, abortion clinics, and political
party headquarters are likewise not exempt from collection—
the NSA is collecting all telephony metadata.
Second, in addition to collapsing the distinction between relevant and irrelevant records, reading FISA to allow this type of
collection would neuter the qualifying phrases contained in 50
U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A). The statute requires, for instance, that
there be “reasonable grounds” to believe that the records being
sought are relevant.355 Although FISA does not define “reasonable grounds,” the Supreme Court has treated this phrase as
the equivalent of “reasonable suspicion.”356 This standard requires a showing of “specific and articulable facts which, taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant” an intrusion on an individual’s right to privacy.357
The FISC order requires that Verizon disclose all domestic telephone records—including those of a purely local nature.358 According to Verizon Communications News Center, as of last
year the company had 107.7 million wireless customers, connecting an average of 1 billion calls per day.359 It is impossible that
the government provided specific and articulable facts showing
reasonable grounds for the relevance of each one of those cus-

355. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A).
356. See, e.g., United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31, 36 (2003); United States v.
Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 227 (1985); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
881–82 (1975); KRIS & WILSON, supra note 167, § 19:3.
357. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968).
358. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from Verizon Bus. Network Svcs., Secondary Order, BR 13-80, at 2 (FISA
Ct. Apr. 25, 2013), available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/
2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order?guni=Article:in%20body%20link,
[http://perma.cc/C6XM-RWNM].
359 . Verizon Communications Company Statistics, VERIZON COMMUNICATIONS
NEWS CENTER, http://www.statisticbrain.com/verizon-communications-companystatistics/, [http://perma.cc/J267-NK6Y] (last visited March 13, 2014).
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tomers or calls. Interpreting all records as relevant effectively
renders the “reasonable grounds” requirement obsolete.
The statute does not explain precisely what makes a tangible
item relevant to an authorized investigation. Nevertheless, the
act suggests that tangible things are “presumptively relevant”
when they:
[P]ertain to—(i) a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power; (ii) the activities of a suspected agent of a foreign
power who is the subject of such authorized investigation;
or (iii) an individual in contact with, or known to, a suspected agent of a foreign power who is the subject of such authorized investigation.360

This section appears not to apply to the telephony metadata
program. It would be impossible to establish that all customer and
subscriber records pertain to a foreign power or an agent thereof,
or to a particular, suspected agent of the same, who is the subject
of an authorized investigation. Perhaps five or ten customers may
fall into this category, but to include millions simply pushes the
bounds of common sense. Accordingly, the telephony metadata
are neither relevant nor presumptively relevant.
Third, the breadth of the government’s interpretation establishes a troubling precedent. If all telephony metadata are relevant to foreign intelligence investigations, then so are all e-mail
metadata, all GPS metadata, all financial information, all banking records, all social network participation, and all Internet
use. Both the DOJ and FISC have suggested that there may be
other programs in existence that operate in a similar fashion.361
Some media reports appear to support this. On September 28,
2013, for instance, the New York Times reported that the NSA
“began allowing the analysis of phone call and email logs in
November 2010 to begin examining Americans’ networks of

360. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A).
361. See, e.g., In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production
of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], BR 13-109, at 19–20 (FISA Ct. Aug. 29,
2013), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/courts/fisc/br13-09-primaryorder.pdf, [http://perma.cc/95LF-ACV7] (“This Court has previously examined
the issue of relevance for bulk collections. See [6 LINES OF REDACTED TEXT]
While those matters involved different collections from the one at issue here, the
relevance standard was similar.”).
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associations.”362 If all telephony metadata are relevant, then so
are all other data—which means that very little would, in fact,
be irrelevant to such investigations. If this is the case, then such
an interpretation radically undermines not just the limiting
language in the statute, but the very purpose for which Congress introduced FISA in the first place.
Fourth, the government’s interpretation directly contradicts
Congress’s intent in adopting Section 215. At the introduction
of the measure, Senator Arlen Specter explained that the language was meant to create an incentive for the government to
use the authority only when it could demonstrate a connection
to a particular suspected terrorist or spy.363 During a House Judiciary Committee meeting on July 17, 2013, Representative
James Sensenbrenner (R-WI) reiterated that Congress inserted
“relevant” into the statute to ensure that only information directly related to national security probes would be included—
not to authorize the ongoing collection of all phone calls placed
and received by millions of Americans not suspected of any
wrongdoing.364 Soon afterwards, he wrote:
This expansive characterization of relevance makes a mockery of the legal standard. According to the administration,
everything is relevant provided something is relevant. Congress intended the standard to mean what it says: The records requested must be reasonably believed to be associated
with international terrorism or spying. To argue otherwise
renders the standard meaningless.365

Other members of Congress have made similar claims.366

362. James Risen & Laura Poitras, N.S.A. Examines Social Networks of U.S. Citizens, N.Y. TIMES, Sep. 29, 2013, at A1.
363. 151 CONG. REC. 13,440 (2005).
364. Oversight of the Administration’s Use of FISA Authorities: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Rep. James Sensenbrenner).
365. James Sensenbrenner, How secrecy erodes democracy, POLITICO, July 22, 2013,
http://politi.co/1baupnm, [http://perma.cc/9CG4-NM2Y].
366. See, e.g., Oversight of the Administration’s Use of FISA Authorities: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (July 17, 2013) (statement of Rep.
Jerrold Nadler) (“[I]f we removed that word from the statute, [the government]
wouldn’t consider . . . that it would affect [its] ability to collect meta-data in any
way whatsoever, which is to say [it is] disregarding the statute entirely.”).
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Connection to “an Authorized Investigation”

There are three ways in which the telephony metadata program violates FISA’s requirement in section 1861 that the order
be sought for use in an “authorized investigation.”367 First, the
guidelines establishing when such an investigation exists apply
solely to the initial collection of the information. The FISC order,
by contrast, allows the collection of the data on an ongoing basis,
tying instead the search of such information to authorized investigations. Second, under the Attorney General guidelines, for
each of the levels there is a predicate specificity required before
the collection of information: namely, that the investigation be
premised on specific individuals, groups, or organizations, or
violations of criminal law. The telephony metadata program, in
contrast, requires no such specificity before the collection of the
data. Third, the orders issued by FISC empower the NSA to
conduct searches of the data in future authorized investigations.
In other words, the collection of the metadata is considered relevant to investigations generally. This means that the orders do
not, in fact, relate to (existing) authorized investigations.
a.

Collection of the Information

FISA, as mentioned above, requires that the government submit a statement of facts demonstrating reasonable grounds to
believe that the records being sought are relevant to an authorized investigation (other than a threat assessment).368 Its definition of an “authorized investigation” refers to guidelines approved by the Attorney General under Executive Order
12,333.369 The most recent of these guidelines, the Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations, provides three categories of investigations: assessments (i.e., “threat assessments”
under the 2003 guidelines and Section 215); predicated investigations (subdivided into “preliminary” and “full” investigations);
and enterprise investigations (a variant of full investigations).370
367. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2006).
368. Id.
369. Id. § 1861(a)(2)(A).
370. U.S. DEP ’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ’S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI O PERATIONS 16–18 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/
readingroom/guidelines.pdf, [http://perma.cc/EU8-WC26]; Fact Sheet: Attorney
General Consolidated guidelines for FBI Domestic Operations, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
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FISA, as noted above, makes it clear that the tangible records in
question may not be sought as part of the first level of national
security investigations, the assessment stage.371 There is an important reason for this restriction. It is the most general level
and, as such, lacks the factual predicate required for the use of
more intrusive techniques of information gathering.
Between 2003 and 2008, for instance, at the threat assessment
stage the FBI could collect information on “individuals, groups,
and organizations of possible investigative interest, and information on possible targets of international terrorist activities or
other national security threats.”372 But the only techniques allowed, as noted by the Attorney General, were “relatively nonintrusive investigative techniques.”373 This included:

(Oct. 3, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2008/October/08-ag889.html, [http://perma.cc/MHT7-MSXY] (noting that the new, consolidated
guidelines “replace five existing sets of guidelines that separately addressed criminal investigations generally, national security investigations, and foreign intelligence collection, among other matters. In contrast to previous guidelines, the new
guidelines are generally unclassified, providing the public with ready access in a
single document to the basic body of operating rules for FBI activities within the
United States”). For the previous guidelines, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL’S GUIDELINES FOR FBI NATIONAL SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS AND FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION (2003), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/
agency/doj/fbi/nsiguidelines.pdf, [http://perma.cc/7NPR-3SV3] [hereinafter AG’S
NSI GUIDELINES] (redacted in part); see also David S. Kris, On the Bulk Collection of
Tangible Things, LAWFARE RES. PAPER SERIES, Sept. 29, 2013, at 17, available at
http://www.lawfareblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Lawfare-Research-PaperSeries-No.-4-2.pdf, [http://perma.cc/3Z99-EJN9]. Also note that on December 16,
2008, the FBI issued a Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide to help to implement the September 2008 Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations. FBI Records:
the
Vault,
FEDERAL
BUREAU
OF
INVESTIGATION,
available
at
http://vault.fbi.gov/FBI%20Domestic%20Investigations%20and%20Operations%20
Guide%20%28DIOG%29/fbi-domestic-investigations-and-operations-guide-diog2008-version, [http://perma.cc/D29U-JPAW]. A new FBI Domestic Investigations
and Operations Guide was released Oct. 15, 2011 and updated June 15, 2012. See
FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, DOMESTIC INVESTIGATIONS AND OPERATIONS
GUIDE
(2012),
available
at
http://www.aclu.org/files/pdfs/email-contentfoia/FBI%20docs/June%202012%20FBI%20DIOG.pdf, [perma.cc/ZPD5AVV3]. In
addition to the AG-Dom (Attorney General’s Guidelines for Domestic FBI Operations), and the DIOG (Domestic Investigations and Operations Guide), every FBI
HQ operational division has a PG (policy implementation guide) that supplements
the DIOG. Id. at xxix.
371. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A).
372. AG’S NSI GUIDELINES, supra note 370, at 3.
373. Id.
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[O]btaining publicly available information, accessing information available within the FBI or Department of Justice, requesting information from other government entities, using
online informational resources and services, interviewing
previously established assets, non-pretextual interviews and
requests for information from members of the public and
private entities, and accepting information voluntarily provided by governmental or private entities.374

Nowhere in the discussion of the threat assessment stage did the
2003 guidelines contemplate the use of court-ordered surveillance.
In 2008, the Attorney General expanded the tools that could
be used during the assessment stage to include: publicly available information; all available federal, state, local, tribal, or foreign governmental agencies’ records; online services and resources; human source information; interviews or requests for
information from members of the public and private entities;
information voluntarily provided by governmental or private
entities; observation or surveillance not requiring a court order;
and grand jury subpoenas for telephone or electronic mail subscriber information.375 The addition of the last two items broadened the type of information that could be obtained. Similarly,
whereas the previous guidelines noted that mail covers, mail
openings, and nonconsensual electronic surveillance or any
other investigative technique covered by 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–
2521 “shall not be used during a preliminary inquiry,”376 the 2008
guidelines dropped any equivalent language.
Even with the broadening, however, under FISA, tangible
goods may not be obtained under section 215 during the assessment stage. The purpose is to place a higher burden on the government to justify the use of more intrusive surveillance. If such
methods are to be used, and the related information collected,

374. Id.
375. U.S. DEP ’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL ’S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI O PERATIONS, supra note 370, at 20.
376. U.S. DEP ’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL ’S GUIDELINES ON GENERAL
C RIMES, RACKETEERING ENTERPRISE AND D OMESTIC S ECURITY/TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS II(B)(5)(a)–(c) (1989), available at http://www.justice.gov/ag/
readingroom/generalcrimea.htm#general, [http://perma.cc/HP9Q-ZAXU].
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there must be a factual predicate establishing a higher level of suspicion
as to the presence of criminal activity or a threat to national security.377
For preliminary investigations, this means that the government must have information or an allegation indicating the existence of criminal activity or a threat to U.S. national security
prior to initiating the investigation.378 For a full investigation,
there must be “an articulable factual basis for the investigation
that reasonably indicates” criminal activity or a threat to U.S.
national security.379 For an enterprise investigation (a variant of
a full investigation), there must be an articulable factual basis
for the investigation reasonably indicating “that the group or
organization may have engaged or may be engaged in, or may
have or may be engaged in planning or preparation or provision of support for” racketeering, international terrorism or
other threats to U.S. national security, domestic terrorism, furthering political or social goals wholly or in part through activities that involve force or violence and a violation of federal
criminal law, or a closed range of other offences.380 The guidelines thus distinguish between the different levels based on a
factual predicate of wrongdoing, which then acts as a valve on the
level of intrusiveness that the government can adopt in collecting more information.
In contrast, the primary order for the telephony metadata program does not follow this approach. Instead, it authorizes the
collection of data for 90-day periods without any factual predicate
supporting the acquisition or collection of data. It is thus incompatible with the approach adopted in the Attorney General’s guidelines. The order also shifts the emphasis to the analysis of such
data—which is to be conducted in connection with an authorized investigation. This is not, however, what is required by the
FBI’s own guidelines. It is the collection of such information that

377. The guidelines explain: “A predicated investigation relating to a federal
crime or threat to the national security may be conducted as a preliminary investigation or a full investigation. A predicated investigation that is based solely on
the authority to collect foreign intelligence may be conducted only as a full investigation.” U.S. DEP ’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL’ S G UIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI O PERATIONS, supra note 370, at 21.
378. Id.
379. Id. at 21–22.
380. Id. at 23.
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is premised on the existence of an authorized investigation—not
the subsequent analysis of data in the course of the same.
b.

Specificity

According to the Attorney General’s guidelines, for predicate
investigations (for which tangible items orders under Section 215
may be sought) specificity is required before the collection of information—namely, the investigation must be premised on the
past or present wrongdoing or foreign intelligence activities of
specific individuals, groups, or organizations. The telephony
metadata program, in contrast, collects all call records, without
specifying the individuals, groups, or organizations of interest.
For the past decade, specificity has been integral to the
guidelines’ approach. Under the 2003 Attorney General’s
guidelines, for instance, preliminary investigations were authorized “when there is information or an allegation indicating
that a threat to the national security may exist.”381 Such investigations were particular, in that they related to specific individuals, groups, and organizations.382
Under the 2008 guidelines, a preliminary investigation must
relate to “a” federal crime or threat to national security.383 For
foreign intelligence gathering, the guidelines require that only
full investigations be used. 384 These are defined in singular
terms, such as “[a]n activity constituting a federal crime or a
threat to national security.”385 Alternatively, the circumstances
may indicate that “[a]n individual, group, organization, entity
is or may be a target of attack, victimization, acquisition, infiltration, or recruitment in connection with criminal activity.”386
For enterprise investigations, the text of the guidelines clearly
refers to “the group or organization.”387
Not only are the investigations specific regarding the targets,
they are specific regarding the facts that support the initiation of
381. AG’S NSI GUIDELINES, supra note 370, at 3.
382. Id. at 4.
383. U.S. DEP ’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL ’S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC FBI O PERATIONS, supra note 370, at 21.
384. Id. at 22.
385. Id. at 21.
386. Id.
387. Id. at 23.
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the predicate investigation. For enterprise investigations, this
means that there must be “an articulable factual basis for the investigation that reasonably indicates that the group or organization” was involved in the commission of certain crimes and activities.388 Full investigations, in turn, require specific and articuarticulable facts giving reason to believe that a threat to national
security may exist.389 Like preliminary investigations, such inquiries are specific in that they may relate to individuals, groups,
and organizations.390 In contravention of the Attorney General
guidelines, the telephony metadata program collects data, using
precisely those tools that are limited to preliminary and full investigations, absent the specificity otherwise required.
c.

Future Authorized Investigations

Third, FISA contemplates the relevance of information to an
investigation already in existence at the time the order is granted.
The statutory language is very specific. Applications must include “a statement of facts showing that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are relevant
to an authorized investigation.”391 The placement of the word
“are” before the word “relevant” suggests that at the time the
records are being sought, their relevance to an investigation
must be established.
The orders issued by FISC, however, depart from the statutory
language, empowering the NSA to obtain the data in light of
their relevance to future “authorized investigations”—and requiring telecommunications companies to indefinitely provide
such information in the future.392 How can the court know that
all such telephony data will be relevant to investigations that are
not yet opened? As noted by amici in In re Electronic Privacy In388. Id.
389. Id. at 22.
390. Id. at 21.
391. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A) (2006).
392. In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-80, at 2–
3 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2013), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents
/PrimaryOrder_Collection_215.pdf, [http://perma.cc/TB5P-C8TZ] (“[T]he court
finds as follows: (1) There are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible
things sought are relevant to authorized investigations (other than threat assessments) being conducted by the FBI . . . .”).
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formation Center, Congress could have used any number of alternative auxiliary verbs—”such as ‘can’; ‘could’; ‘will’; or ‘might.’
But it chose not to do so. Instead, Congress required relevance to
an investigation existing at the time of the application.”393
In addition, the information sought must be relevant “to an authorized investigation.” This is both singular (“an”) and past
tense, in that it has already been “authorized.” The House Report
that accompanied the first introduction of the business records
provisions explained that the purpose of this language was to
provide “for an application to the FISA court for an order directing the production of tangible items such as books, records, papers, documents and other items upon certification to the court
that the records sought are relevant to an ongoing foreign intelligence
investigation.”394 Yet, how can the court with any certainty suggest
that all investigations in the future will be authorized?
The government’s argument, instead of centering on a particular investigation, appears to create a categorical exception
for the collection of records. Specifically, it argues that when
the government “has reason to believe that conducting a search
of a broad collection of telephony metadata records will produce counterterrorism information . . . the standard of relevance under Section 215 is satisfied.”395 That is, the determination depends on the nature of the information to be extracted,
not on the prior existence of a directly related, authorized investigation. “Authorized investigations” thus become merely a
category for which the information is useful.396 The language in
the FISC order is not “an authorized investigation,” but, rather,
“authorized investigations.”397
That the government has one investigation open on al Qaeda,
or even “thousands of open full or enterprise investigations on
393. Brief for Cato Institute as Amicus Curiae in support of Petitioner, In re Electronic Privacy Information Center, No. BR 13-58, at 4 (U.S. Aug. 12, 2013).
394. H.R. REP. NO. 107-236, pt. 1, at 61 (2001).
395. SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 8–9.
396. See id. at 6 (“The telephony metadata records are sought for properly predicated FBI investigations into specific international terrorist organizations and
suspected terrorists.”).
397. See In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order
Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-80, at
2–3 (FISA Ct. Apr. 25, 2013), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents
/PrimaryOrder_Collection_215.pdf, [http://perma.cc/TB5P-C8TZ].
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terrorist groups or targets, and their sponsors, some or all of
which could underlie the bulk telephony metadata collection
applications and orders,”398 fails to justify the collection of so
many records—indeed, most of those collected—that are not in
any way directly connected to these authorized investigations.
This interpretation, moreover, contradicts congressional intent.
As Representative F. James Sensenbrenner, one of the principal
authors of the USA PATRIOT Act, noted, “Congress intended to
allow the intelligence communities to access targeted information for specific investigations. How can every call that every
American makes or receives be relevant to a specific investigation? This is well beyond what the Patriot Act allows.”399
B.

Subpoena Duces Tecum

The only express limit on the type of tangible item that can
be subject to an order under 50 U.S.C. § 1861 is that it “can be
obtained with a subpoena duces tecum issued by a court of the
United States in aid of a grand jury investigation or with any
other order issued by a court of the United States directing the
production of records or tangible things.”400 Although it may be
said as a general matter that Congress intended intelligence
collection to be subject to different standards than those that
apply in a criminal context, in at least the provisions relevant to
tangible goods, it is clear that a criminal standard governs the
type of information that can be obtained via order. Specifically,
the collection must be consistent with a subpoena duces tecum.
The government argues that the telephony metadata program is consistent with this provision, and that its determination must be given the highest level of deference by the
courts. 401 FISC has expressed its agreement with the government’s position:
398. Kris, supra note 370, at 20.
399. Jim Sensenbrenner, This abuse of the Patriot Act must end, THE GUARDIAN,
June 9, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2013/jun/09/abusepatriot-act-must-end, [http://perma.cc/UJW3-P4PG].
400. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(c)(2)(D) (2006).
401. See, e.g., Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Preliminary Injunction at 17 n.8, ACLU v. Clapper, 13-cv-3994 (S.D.N.Y.
Oct. 1, 2013) (citing United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 301 (1991) (grand
jury subpoena challenged on relevancy grounds must be upheld unless “there is
no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the Government seeks will
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Call detail records satisfy [the subpoena duces tecum] requirement, since they may be obtained by (among other
means) a ‘court order for disclosure’ under 18 U.S.C.
§ 2703(d). Section 2703(d) permits the government to obtain
a court order for release of non-content records, or even in
some cases of the contents of a communication, upon a
demonstration of relevance to a criminal investigation.402

To evaluate the government’s claim, it is first necessary to
consider the legal instrument. A subpoena duces tecum is a
writ or process used to command a witness to bring with him
and produce to the court books, papers, and other items, over
which he has control and which help to elucidate the matter at
hand.403 Unlike warrants, something less than probable cause is
required.404 The rationale behind this is that the purpose of the
instrument is not to conduct a search absent a suspect’s consent, but, rather, to obtain documents and information that the
prosecution has concluded will be material in a case.405
The authority to issue a subpoena is not unlimited. Under
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, “the court may quash
or modify the subpoena if compliance would be unreasonable
or oppressive.”406 Precisely what counts as reasonable (or not)
is heavily context-dependent.407 In United States v. Nixon,408 the
Court laid out a three-part test, requiring the government to
establish relevancy, admissibility, and specificity, in order to
enforce a subpoena in the trial context.409
produce information relevant to the general subject of the grand jury’s investigation”)), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/2013.10.01_govt_oppn_to_
pi_motion.pdf, [http://perma.cc/7BSL-PJ7T]; NLRB v. Am. Med. Response, Inc.,
438 F.3d 188, 193 (2d Cir. 2006) (in a proceeding to enforce an administrative subpoena, “the agency’s appraisal of relevancy” to its investigation “must be accepted so long as it is not obviously wrong,” and the “district court’s finding of relevancy” will be affirmed unless it is “clearly erroneous”).
402. In re Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], Supplemental
Opinion, No. BR 08-13, at 2 n.1 (FISA Ct. Dec. 12, 2008).
403. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *382.
404. See United States v. R. Enters., Inc., 498 U.S. 292, 297 (1991).
405. Joshua Gruenspecht, “Reasonable” Grand Jury Subpoenas: Asking for Information in the Age of Big Data, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 543, 544 (2011).
406. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c)(2).
407. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 337 (1985).
408. 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
409. See id. at 699–700.
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The Nixon standard, however, does not apply in the context
of grand jury proceedings.410 In 1991 the Court explained:
The multifactor test announced in Nixon would invite procedural delays and detours while courts evaluate the relevancy and admissibility of documents sought by a particular subpoena . . . . Requiring the Government to explain in
too much detail the particular reasons underlying a subpoena threatens to compromise the ‘indispensable secrecy
of grand jury proceedings.’ Broad disclosure also affords
the targets of investigation far more information about the
grand jury’s workings than the Rules of Criminal Procedure appear to contemplate.411

The Court went on to note that this does not mean that the
grand jury’s investigatory powers are limitless; to the contrary,
they are still subject to Rule 17(c).412 Nevertheless, grand jury
subpoenas are given the benefit of the doubt, with the burden
of showing unreasonableness on the recipient seeking to avoid
compliance. 413 For claims of irrelevancy, motions to quash
“must be denied unless the district court determines that there
is no reasonable possibility that the category of materials the
Government seeks will produce information relevant to the
general subject of the grand jury’s investigation.”414
At the broadest level, then, the government’s assertion, at least
with regard to the burden of proof regarding the information to
be obtained and the deference afforded a grand jury subpoena,
appears to be valid. But there are three critical flaws in the government’s reasoning: first, subpoenas may not be used for fishing expeditions; second, they must be focused on specific individuals or alleged crimes prior to the collection of information; and
third, the emphasis is on past wrongdoing—not on potential future relationships and actions. In addition, remarkably, FISC has
admitted that the telephony metadata order it issued violates the
statutory language requiring that the information to be obtained
comport with the requirements of a subpoena.

410. R. Enters., 498 U.S. at 297–99.
411. Id. at 298–99 (citations and quotations omitted).
412. Id. at 299.
413. Id. at 301.
414. Id.
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Fishing Expeditions

The government’s contention, consistent with United States v. R.
Enterprises, Inc., is that to fall outside the statutory confines, there
must be no reasonable possibility that the category of materials
sought under Section 215 will produce relevant information.415
Although that case did give a fair amount of latitude in the standard of relevancy applied to grand jury subpoenas, it also established important limits. “Grand juries,” the Court wrote, “are not
licensed to engage in arbitrary fishing expeditions.”416
In other words, subpoenas may not be used to obtain massive
amounts of information from which evidence of wrongdoing—
absent prior suspicion—can be derived. A grand jury, for example, could not convene in Bethesda, Maryland, and simply begin
collecting telephony metadata, which it could subsequently mine
to find evidence of criminal behavior. To the contrary, an investigator must have a reasonable suspicion that some document or
communication exists, and that it is directly relevant to the investigation in question, for the Court to order its production.
The Court has used this logic to quash a subpoena duces tecum requiring that computer hard drives and floppy disks be
produced.417 The subpoena requested was held to be overbroad
because the subpoenaed materials “contain[ed] some data concededly irrelevant to the grand jury inquiry.”418 Judge Mukasey
quashed the subpoena on the grounds that the government
could narrow the documents requested prior to acquisition.419
He also rejected the claim that the broader sweep of information was justified by the breadth of the investigation underway: even an “expanded investigation” did “not justify a
subpoena which encompassed documents completely irrelevant to its scope.”420
415. See Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition, supra note 401, at 18–19.
416. R. Enters., 498 U.S. at 299.
417. In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum Dated November 15, 1993, 846 F.
Supp. 11, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1994).
418. Id.
419. Id. at 13–14.
420. Id. (quotation marks omitted); see also Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 76–77
(1906) (finding a subpoena duces tecum “far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as reasonable” where it did not “require the production of a single contract, or of contracts with a particular corporation, or a limited number of documents, but all understandings, contracts, or correspondence between” a company
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As discussed above in relation to the relevance standard, almost all of the telephony metadata collected under Section 215 is
unrelated to criminal activity. In Judge Reggie Walton’s words,
“Ordinarily, this alone would provide sufficient grounds for a
FISC judge to deny the application.”421 The principle at work
here was recognized by the Eastern District of New York:
“While the standard of relevancy [as applied to subpoenas] is a
liberal one, it is not so liberal as to allow a party ‘to roam in
shadow zones of relevancy and to explore matter which does
not presently appear germane on the theory that it might conceivably become so.’”422 A subpoena duces tecum may not be
used to compel the production of records simply because at
some point, in the future, they might become relevant.
In a world limited by the physical manifestation of evidence,
practicality helped to cabin the scope of subpoenas. Technology may have changed what is possible in terms of the volume
and nature of records that can be obtained and stored, and the
level of insight that can be gleaned. But it does not invalidate
the underlying principle. Subpoenas, even those issued by
grand juries, may not be used to engage in fishing expeditions.
2.

Specificity

Grand jury investigations are specific. That is, they represent investigations into particular individuals, or particular
entities, in relation to which there is reasonable suspicion that
some illegal behavior has occurred. The compelled production of records or items is thus limited by reference to the target of the investigation.

and six others, over a multi-year period); Ealy v. Littlejohn, 569 F.2d 219, 227 (5th
Cir. 1978) (“When the grand jury goes on a fishing expedition in forbidden waters,
the courts are not powerless to act.”); Cessante v. City of Pontiac, No. CIV. A. 07cv-15250, 2009 WL 973339, at *12 (E.D. Mich. Apr. 9, 2009) (“While some of the
information sought may be relevant or lead to relevant information, the request
for ‘anything and everything’ is overly broad and not narrowly tailored to meet
the relevancy requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b).”).
421. In re Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], Order, No. BR 0813, at 9 (FISA Ct. Mar. 2, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/
documents/section/pub_March%202%202009%20Order%20from%20FISC.pdf,
[perma.cc/3YGG-NBTQ].
422. In re Fontaine, 402 F. Supp. 1219, 1221 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (quoting Broadway
& Ninety Sixth St. Realty Co. v. Loew’s, Inc., 21 F.R.D. 347, 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1958)).
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If a grand jury were, for instance, focused on the potentially
criminal acts of the head of a crime family in New York, absent
reasonable suspicion of some sort of connection to the syndicate, it could not issue a subpoena for the telephone records of
the Parent-Teacher’s Association at Briarwood School in Santa
Clara, California. In contrast, the Section 215 orders are broad
and non-specific. That is, on the basis of no particular suspicion, all call records, many of which are of a purely local nature, are swept up by the NSA.423
In response to this argument, the government points out that
there is some precedent in the law for the government to collect
records in bulk that may be relevant to an investigation and
then to subject such records to subsequent analysis to determine which items are, in fact, relevant. In one case, the Eighth
Circuit upheld a subpoena, even though most of the records
bore no relationship to any criminal activity.424 This case, however, fails to support the government’s argument with regard
to Section 215 and the bulk collection of metadata.
In In re Grand Jury Proceedings, the government served two
grand jury subpoenas duces tecum on Western Union.425 The
first required production of monthly wire transactions at the
Royalle Inn, Kansas City, Missouri, for a period of thirteen
months. 426 The second required production of Telegraphic
Money Order Applications above $1000 from the Royalle Inn,
Kansas City, Missouri, between January 1984 and February
1986.427 Western Union moved to quash the subpoenas on the
ground that they amounted to an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment.428 The government
responded by alleging that drug dealers in Kansas City were
using Western Union to transmit money.429
423. See In re an Application From the FBI for the Production of Tangible Things
from [REDACTED], Order, No. 06-05, at 2 (FISA Ct. May 24, 2006), available at
http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/785206/pub-may-24-2006-order-fromfisc.pdf, [http://perma.cc/FDS9-SYXE].
424. In re Grand Jury Proceedings: Subpoena Duces Tecum, 827 F.2d 301 (8th
Cir. 1987).
425. Id.
426. Id.
427. Id.
428. Id.
429. Id.
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The Eighth Circuit noted that it had previously held that
Western Union customers have no privacy interest in Western
Union records.430 The court cited the Supreme Court’s holding
in United States v. Miller, in which the Supreme Court determined, consistent with Smith v. Maryland, that bank customers
do not enjoy a legitimate expectation of privacy in bank records
subject to subpoena.431
The court in In re Grand Jury specifically noted that the request at issue—namely, the production of records from Royalle
Inn—was not as sweeping as subpoenas that the judiciary had
found to be outside the bounds of acceptability. In Federal Trade
Commission v. American Tobacco Co., for instance, the Supreme
Court refused to uphold the FTC’s direction to two tobacco
companies to produce letters and contracts. 432 The FTC had
claimed “an unlimited right of access to the respondents’ papers . . . relevant or irrelevant, in the hope that something
[would] turn up.”433 The Eighth Circuit similarly declined to
uphold a subpoena calling for an attorney’s records over a tenyear period. 434 The collection of all U.S. persons’ telephony
metadata is more properly considered in the same league as
FTC v. American Tobacco Co. and Schwimmer v. United States, in
which the courts recognized the overbroad use of government
authority, as opposed to the more limited collection of information at issue in In re Grand Jury Proceedings.
3.

Past Crimes

Grand jury investigations are also retroactive, searching for
evidence of a past crime. The telephony metadata orders, in
contrast, are both past- and forward-looking, in that they anticipate the possibility of illegal behavior in the future. Although
most of the individuals in the database are suspected of no
wrongdoing whatsoever, the minimization procedures allow
for any information obtained from mining the data to then be
430. United States v. Gross, 416 F.2d 1205, 1213 (8th Cir. 1969); accord Newfield
v. Ryan, 91 F.2d 700, 703 (5th Cir. 1937).
431. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440–443 (1976).
432. See FTC v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 305 (1924).
433. Oklahoma Press Publ’g Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 207 n.40 (quoting FTC,
264 U.S. at 305).
434. Schwimmer v. United States, 232 F.2d 855, 861–62 (8th Cir. 1956).
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used in criminal prosecution. This is an unprecedented use of
subpoena information-gathering authority amounting to a
permanent, ongoing grand jury investigation into all possible
future criminal acts.
4.

March 2009 FISC Opinion

FISC has openly recognized that the information it obtains from
the metadata program could not otherwise be collected with any
other legal instrument—including a subpoena duces tecum. In a
secret opinion in March 2009, Judge Reggie Walton wrote:
Because the collection would result in NSA collecting call
detail records pertaining to [REDACTED] of telephone
communications, including call detail records pertaining to
communications of United States (U.S.) persons located
within the U.S. who are not the subject of any FBI investigation and whose metadata could not otherwise be legally captured in bulk, the government proposed stringent minimization procedures that strictly controlled the acquisition,
accessing, dissemination, and retention of these records by
the NSA and FBI.435

Later in the document, he again noted that the information
“otherwise could not be legally captured in bulk by the government.”436 These assertions directly contradict the statutory
requirement that the information could otherwise be obtained
via subpoena duces tecum and amount to an admission, by the
court, that the program violated the statute.
What makes the the court’s failure to stop the illegal program
even more concerning, perhaps, is Judge Walton’s explanation
of why, even though the information could not legally be obtained in any other way, FISC allowed the government to proceed. He continued:
Nevertheless, the FISC has authorized the bulk collection of
call detail records in this case based upon: (1) the government’s explanation, under oath, of how the collection of and
access to such data are necessary to analytical methods that
are vital to the national security of the United States; and (2)
435. In re Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], Order, BR 08-13, at
2 (FISA Ct. Mar.2, 2009), available at http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/
pub_March%202%202009%20Order%20from%20FISC.pdf, [perma.cc/X67-5REV].
436. Id. at 12.
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minimization procedures that carefully restrict access to the
BR metadata and include specific oversight requirements.437

In other words, FISC allowed an illegal program to operate because the government (1) promised that it was vital to U.S. national security, and (2) was directed by the court to police its
own house by following the minimization procedures. The
former is a flimsy excuse for allowing the executive branch to
break the law. The latter highlights the extent to which the
court, precisely because of the size of the collection program in
question, was dependent on the NSA: “In light of the scale of
this bulk collection program, the Court must rely heavily on
the government to monitor this program to ensure that it continues to be justified . . . and that it is being implemented in a
manner that protects the privacy interests of U.S. persons.”438
Recall that Congress created FISC to protect U.S. persons’
privacy interests. Congress did not anticipate that FISC would
simply hand over this responsibility to the NSA.
C.

Evisceration of Pen-Trap Provisions

All of the information obtained through the telephony
metadata program is already provided for in FISA’s pen register
and trap and trace provisions.439 The FISC order requires that
telecommunication service providers turn over all telephony
metadata between the United States and abroad or wholly with-

437. Id.
438. Id.
439. The government recently declassified two FISC opinions about a bulk electronic communications metadata program conducted under the Pen Register and
Trap and Trace provisions of FISA. The program reportedly was ended because it
failed to deliver the operational value expected. Although acknowledging the
operational similarities, no discussion has been made public as to why the telephony metadata program was not conducted under section 402 of FISA, as its electronic communications bulk metadata collection counterpart was. See Press Release, Office of the Dir. of Intelligence, DNI Clapper Declassifies Additional
Intelligence Community Documents Regarding Collection Under Section 501 of
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (Nov. 18, 2013), available at
http://www.dni.gov/index.php/newsroom/press-releases/191-press-releases2013/964-dni-clapper-declassifies-additional-intelligence-community-documentsregarding-collection-under-section-501-of-the-foreign-intelligence-surveillanceact-nov, [perma.cc/54VA-5H6A].
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in the United States, including local telephone calls.440 Telephony
metadata, in turn, includes “comprehensive communications
routing information, including but not limited to session identifying information (e.g., originating and terminating telephone
number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) number, International Mobile station Equipment Identity (IMEI)
number, etc.), trunk identifier, telephone calling card numbers,
and time and duration of call.”441 It does not include the name,
address, or financial information of a subscriber or customer.442
Under FISA subchapter three, the government may obtain
customers’ and subscribers’ telephone numbers, local or long
distance telephone records, and “any records reflecting the period of usage (or sessions) by the customer or subscriber.”443
The government may also obtain any “associated routing or
transmission information” related to the telephone or instrument number of the customer or subscriber.444
Unlike the NSA’s current practice, however, each order under
the pen-trap provisions must be approved by either FISC or a
magistrate judge appointed for the purpose of approving pentrap orders under FISA.445 Orders must specify the precise identity (if known) of the person who is the subject of the investigation, and the person to whom is leased or in whose name the
telephone line is listed.446 Heightened protections are provided
for U.S. persons: collection may not be conducted solely on the
basis of otherwise protected First Amendment activity.447
440. In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from Verizon Business Network Services, Inc., No. BR 13-80, at 2 (FISA Ct. July 19, 2013), available at
http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/jun/06/verizon-telephonedata-court-order?guni=Article:in%20body%20link, [perma.cc/V53B-RM2D].
441. Id.
442. Id.
443. 50 U.S.C. § 1842d (2006).
444. Id.
445. Id. § 1842(b)(2).
446. Id. § 1842(d)(2)(A)(i)-(ii).
447. Id. § 1842(c)(2) (requiring “certification by the applicant that the information likely to be obtained is foreign intelligence information not concerning a
United States person or is relevant to an ongoing investigation to protect against
international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, provided that such
investigation of a United States person is not conducted solely upon the basis of
activities protected by the first amendment to the Constitution”).
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What the NSA is doing with the telephony metadata program is essentially obtaining all of this same information, without first making a particularized showing in relation to the target, obtaining an individualized court order, or ensuring the
U.S. persons’ data are given heightened protection. The issue is
thus not whether U.S. persons’ data are being collected “solely
on the basis of otherwise protected First Amendment activity”—but that they are being collected without any individualized
suspicion and on no basis whatsoever. In essence, the NSA has
sidestepped the carefully-constructed protections of subchapter
three to collect all telephony metadata.
D.

Potential Violation of Other Provisions of Criminal Law

There are, in addition, other statutory provisions that raise
questions about the legality of the current telephony metadata
program. In December 2008, FISC issued a “Supplemental
Opinion” giving the court’s reasons for concluding that the
records to be produced pursuant to the telephony metadata
orders were properly subject to production under 50 U.S.C.
§ 1861.448 The reason behind the order appears to be that, although such orders were previously approved, for the first time
the government had identified the provisions of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2702–2703 that are relevant to the question.
Under 50 U.S.C. § 1861, Congress empowered the government to apply to FISC “for an order requiring the production of
any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items).”449 The court placed special emphasis
on the use of the word “any,” suggesting that it “naturally
connotes ‘an expansive meaning,’ extending to all members of
a common set, unless Congress employed “language limiting
[its] breadth.”450
448. In re Production of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], Supplemental
Opinion, No. BR 08-13, at 1 (FISA Ct. Dec. 12, 2008), available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Dec%2012%202008%20Supple
mental%20Opinions%20from%20the%20FISC.pdf, [http://perma.cc/X2ZR-9TM2].
449. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(a)(1) (emphasis added).
450. In re Production of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], Supplemental
Opinion, No. BR 08-13, at 1 (FISA Ct. Dec. 12, 2008), available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Dec%2012%202008%20Supple
mental%20Opinions%20from%20the%20FISC.pdf, [http://perma.cc/X2ZR-9TM2]
(quoting United States v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 5 (1997)).
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The court had apparently considered “any” to be without
limit, until 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702–2703 was brought to its attention.451 This statute laid out an apparently exhaustive set of circumstances under which telephone service providers could
provide customer or subscriber records to the government.452
An order under 50 U.S.C. § 1861 was not included in this list.453
At the same time that Congress had passed section 215 of the
USA PATRIOT Act, moreover, it had amended sections 2702
and 2703 in ways that appeared to re-affirm that communications service providers could only divulge records to the government in particular circumstances—without specifically noting FISC orders.454
Judge Walton reconciled this tension in a most curious manner. He pointed to National Security Letters—a completely different form of subpoena (i.e., an administrative subpoena), noting that in the USA PATRIOT Act, Congress empowered the
FBI, without prior judicial review, to compel a telephone service provider to produce “subscriber information and toll billing records information,” on the basis of FBI certification of relevance to an authorized foreign intelligence investigation. 455
Judge Walton pointed to the heightened requirements of Section 1861, i.e., that the government provide a “statement of
facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that
the tangible things sought are relevant” to a foreign intelligence investigation, and that FISC determine that the application is sufficient.456 He then noted that Section 2703(c)(2) expressly permits the government to use administrative
451. Id. at 3.
452. 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3) (establishing that, except as provided in § 2702(c), a
provider “shall not knowingly divulge a record or other [non-content] information pertaining to a subscriber or customer . . . to any governmental entity”); id.
§ 2703(c)(1) (“A governmental entity may require a provider . . . to disclose a record or other [non-content] information pertaining to a subscriber . . . or customer . . . only when the governmental entity” proceeds according to one of the potential routes laid out in § 2703(c)(1)(A)-(E) (2013).).
453. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(1).
454. In re Production of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], Supplemental
Opinion, No. BR 08-13, at 3 (FISA Ct. Dec. 12, 2008), available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Dec%2012%202008%20Supple
mental%20Opinions%20from%20the%20FISC.pdf, [http://perma.cc/X2ZR-9TM2].
455. Id.; 18 U.S.C. § 2709(a).
456. 50 U.S.C. § 1861(b)(2)(A).
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subpoenas to obtain certain categories of non-content information from a provider—and concluded that Congress surely
could not have intended a higher standard for FISC orders.457
The problem with his reasoning is that despite the precision
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2702–2703 and the concurrent amendment of
these sections with the introduction of USA PATRIOT Act section 215, Congress nowhere included in the language of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2703–2703 provision for FISC orders as an exception
to the closed set. Instead, it allowed the provision of telephony
metadata to the government only in two cases: first, when the
governmental entity uses an administrative subpoena authorized by a federal or state statute; or, second, when a federal or
state grand jury or trial subpoena issues.458 The next paragraph,
moreover, ties the provision directly to the actual commission
of a crime. A court order for disclosure under Section 2703(c)
may only be issued by a court of competent jurisdiction where
the government can provide “specific and articulable facts
showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that . . . the records or other information sought, are relevant
and material to an ongoing criminal investigation.”459 The types
of records the FBI sought from FISC, by contrast, extended well
beyond records either relevant or material to an ongoing criminal investigation. Furthermore, under 18 U.S.C. § 2703(d), the
judiciary is empowered to quash or modify such orders where
the records being requested “are unusually voluminous in nature.”460 It would be difficult to imagine any telephony metadata database more voluminous than one collecting all call data in
the United States. As such, the statute contemplates yet further
limits on the collection of information.

457. 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2); In re Production of Tangible Things From [REDACTED], Supplemental Opinion, No. BR 08-13, at 3 (FISA Ct. Dec. 12, 2008), available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/section/pub_Dec%2012%202008%20Supple
mental%20Opinions%20from%20the%20FISC.pdf, [http://perma.cc/X2ZR-9TM2].
458. Id. § 2703(b)(1)(B).
459. Id. § 2703(d).
460. Id.
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CONSTITUTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS

In its White Paper, the government argues that the telephony
metadata collection program complies with the Constitution.461
In so doing, it relies on Smith v. Maryland, in which the Supreme Court held that participants in telephone calls lack a
reasonable expectation of privacy (for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment) in the telephone numbers dialed and received on
one’s phone. 462 Judge Eagan similarly relies on Smith in her
August 2013 memorandum opinion on the bulk collection program.463 It is the only Supreme Court Fourth Amendment case
that she directly discusses, on the grounds that it is dispositive
of the question of whether the NSA has the authority to collect
all telephony metadata.464
The government’s reliance on Smith v. Maryland is problematic. The case involved individualized, reasonable cause to believe that the target of the pen register engaged in criminal behavior and threatening and obscene conduct.465 The placement
of the pen register, moreover, was obtained via consent.466 Most
importantly, significant technological and societal changes
mean that the intrusiveness of the technology and the resultant
harm to U.S. citizens’ privacy interests are fundamentally different from the situation that the Court confronted in 1979.
The cornerstone of the government’s argument is Katz v. United States, a case in which the Supreme Court supplemented trespass doctrine with a reasonable expectation of privacy. 467 But
Katz itself was an effort by the Court to understand the Fourth
Amendment in light of changing technologies. Since that time,
tension has developed into what is now a split on the Court between those who consider Fourth Amendment incursions in
terms of physical trespass, and those who adopt the reasoning of

461. See SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 19.
462. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 745 (1979).
463. In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-109, at 6
(FISA Ct. Aug. 29, 2013).
464. Id.
465. Smith, 442 U.S. at 737.
466. Id.
467. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
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Katz more broadly. Thus, a series of cases involving thermal
scanners,468 GPS devices, 469 and highly-trained dogs 470 have divided along these lines.
Regardless of which approach one adopts, there is a strong
argument that bulk collection falls within constitutional protections. The telephony metadata program amounts to a general
warrant, the prohibition of which gave rise to the Fourth
Amendment. The reason such warrants were rejected is because they amounted to granting the government an indefinite
right of trespass, for which redress (because of their execution
with legal sanction) could not be sought. Beyond the general
warrant concern, the bulk telephony metadata program digitally trespasses on the private lives of U.S. citizens.
Under the reasonable expectation of privacy test, Americans
do not expect that information provided to telephone service
providers will be collected wholesale by the government to ascertain whom they call, who calls them, how long they talk,
and where they are located when they do so. Most Americans
do not even realize that they are providing this information to
their telephone companies when they make a phone call. Nor
do they realize the significant social network and substantive
analysis that can be performed on this data to generate new
insights into their private lives.
A variant of the government’s argument suggests that the
only point at which an individual has a privacy interest is not
at the moment of acquisition of data, but at the moment when
the data is subjected to individual queries or logarithmic processing. That is, the “search” in question relies on two additional considerations: (a) whether knowledge is being extracted
(or further knowledge is being generated) from a broader data
set comprised of third party data and (b) whether a human interlocutor is involved in the exchange.
There are a number of problems with this approach. In addition to the trespass and reasonable expectation considerations
discussed above, the Supreme Court has never carved out an
“automation exception” to the Fourth Amendment. It is at the
468. See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
469. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
470. See, e.g., Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
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point that the thermal imaging device records heat signatures,
that the GPS chip is attached, and that the dog steps onto the
porch, that the search has occurred. That is the point at which
an individual’s private information is recorded. In addition,
human beings have been involved in the process all the way
along—regardless of the nature of the collection device. A human being makes the decision to obtain telephony metadata
and to record it. Human beings program the equipment and
arrange for it to be activated and to receive the information.
They decide how it will be stored, accessed, and shared in the
future. Analysis of the data is simply the final step in a long
series of human decisions.
A final argument offered in support of the program is that,
even if privacy interests are recognized, the national security
interests at stake override whatever privacy intrusion arises
from the bulk collection of telephony metadata.471 Variants of
this argument emphasize threats that the country faces and the
extent to which access to information significantly strengthens
the intelligence community’s hand. DOJ explained to Congress:
“[T]hese . . . collection programs significantly strengthen the
Intelligence Community’s early warning system for the detection of terrorists and discovery of plots against the homeland.”472 This claim lacks specificity. Usefulness qua usefulness
is never sufficient justification for overriding statutory or constitutional constraints.
A.

The Problem with Smith v. Maryland

The Fourth Amendment establishes “[t]he right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”473 In 1967, the Supreme Court interpreted this language in a manner that protected people, not places. 474 Justice Stewart, writing for the
Court, explained, “What a person knowingly exposes to the
471. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Report on the National Security Agency’s Bulk Collection Programs for USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization 5 (2011), available at
http://www.dni.gov/files/documents/2011_CoverLetters_Report_Collection.pdf,
[http://perma.cc/J6WA-4C6V].
472. Id.
473. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
474. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
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public, even in his own home or office, is not a subject of
Fourth Amendment protection. But what he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.”475 As Justice Harlan noted in his concurrence, the question is both subjective and objective: An individual must have exhibited an actual expectation of privacy
and that expectation must “be one that society is prepared to
recognize as ‘reasonable.’”476 Resultantly, “a man’s home is, for
most purposes, a place where he expects privacy, but objects,
activities, or statements that he exposes to the ‘plain view’ of
outsiders are not ‘protected’ because no intention to keep them
to himself has been exhibited.”477
In Smith v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that a pen register placed on a telephone line did not constitute a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, because persons making phone calls do not have a reasonable expectation
that the numbers they dial will remain private.478 The key sentence from the decision centered on the customer’s relationship
with the telephone company: “A person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he voluntarily turns over to
third parties.”479 It is this sentence that spawned what has come
to be known as the “third party doctrine.”480
The government relies on this opinion and the resultant
third-party doctrine to argue that the telephony metadata program is constitutional. In the DOJ’s August 2013 White Paper,
it suggests that a Section 215 order is not a search because “the
Supreme Court has expressly held participants in telephone
calls lack any reasonable expectation of privacy under the
Fourth Amendment in the telephone numbers dialed.” 481 In
ACLU v. Clapper, the government again cited to the Court’s rea475. Id. at 351–52 (citations omitted).
476. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
477. Id.
478. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–46 (1979).
479. Id. at 743–44.
480. See also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (extending the third
party doctrine to banking records). But see United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266,
288 (6th Cir. 2010) (declining to extend the third party doctrine to an e-mail stored
with an Internet Service Provider on the grounds that customers have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their e-mail).
481. SECTION 215 WHITE PAPER, supra note 2, at 19.
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soning in Smith v. Maryland that, even if a subscriber harbored
a subjective expectation that the numbers dialed would remain
private, it would not be reasonable because individuals have
“no legitimate expectation of privacy in information” voluntarily turned over “to third parties.”482 The government suggested
that because courts subsequently followed Smith to find no reasonable expectation of privacy in the sending or receipt of email and Internet protocol addressing information, as well as
subscriber information, “Smith is fatal to Plaintiffs’ claim that
the collection of metadata records of their communications violates the Fourth Amendment.”483
Judge Eagan similarly relied almost exclusively on Smith v.
Maryland in her August 2013 opinion: “The production of telephone service provider metadata is squarely controlled by the
U.S. Supreme Court decision in Smith v. Maryland.”484 She reasoned that because customers are aware that telephone service
providers maintain call detail records in the normal course of
business, customers assume the risk that the telephone company will provide those records to the government.485 That information was collected in bulk was of no consequence: “[W]here
one individual does not have a Fourth Amendment interest,
grouping together a large number of similarly-situated individuals cannot result in a Fourth Amendment interest springing into existence ex nihilo.”486
The problem with these arguments is that they fail to consider
the specific facts and circumstances in Smith. They also fail to
address critical ways in which the privacy interests impacted by

482. Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Dismiss the
Complaint at 32–33, ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13-cv-03994 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26, 2013)
(quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 743–744).
483. Id. at 33.
484. In re Application of the Federal Bureau of Investigation for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from [REDACTED], No. BR 13-109 slip
op. at 6. The only other case directly cited in Judge Eagan’s Fourth Amendment
discussion appears to be a decision of the FISA court itself, with secondary citations. The details of the secret court opinion that she cites as precedent, however,
are redacted. Id. at 8.
485. Id. at 7–8.
486. Id. at 9.
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the use of pen registers and their application to broad sectors of
the population have changed as technology has advanced.487
First, consider the facts of Smith v. Maryland. On March 5, 1976,
Patricia McDonough was robbed in Baltimore, Maryland.488 After
giving the police a description of the robber and a 1975 Monte
Carlo she had seen near the scene of the crime, she started receiving threatening and obscene phone calls from a man who identified himself as the robber.489 At one point, the caller asked her to
go out in front of her house.490 When she did, Ms. McDonough
saw the 1975 Monte Carlo moving slowly past her home.491 On
March 16, the police observed a car of the same description in her
neighborhood.492 Tracing the license plate, police discovered that
the car was registered to Michael Lee Smith.493
The following day, the police asked the telephone company,
without a warrant, to install a pen register to trace the numbers
called from Smith’s home telephone.494 The company agreed,
and that same day Smith called Ms. McDonough’s home.495 On
the basis of this and other information, the police applied for
and obtained a warrant to search Smith’s house.496 Upon executing the warrant, police found a telephone book with the
corner turned down to Ms. McDonough’s name and number.497
In a subsequent six-man lineup, Ms. McDonough identified
Smith as the person who robbed her.498
Although the police did not obtain a warrant prior to installing the pen register, at a minimum, reasonable suspicion
had been established that the target of the surveillance, Michael
Lee Smith, had robbed, threatened, intimidated, and harassed
Patricia McDonough. The police, accordingly, installed the pen
487. This failure further underscores the absence of opposing counsel—an omission
that would seem to be of particular import when assessing constitutional concerns.
488. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 737 (1979).
489. Id.
490. Id.
491. Id.
492. Id.
493. Id.
494. Id.
495. Id.
496. Id.
497. Id.
498. Id.
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register consistent with their reasonable suspicion that Smith
was engaged in criminal wrongdoing.
The telephony metadata program is an entirely different situation. The NSA is engaging in bulk collection absent any reasonable suspicion that the individuals, whose telephone information is being collected, are engaged in any wrongdoing. To
the contrary, almost all of the information obtained will bear no
relationship whatsoever to criminal activity. The government,
however, wants to place a pen register and trap and trace on all
U.S. persons—essentially treating everyone in the United States
as though they are Michael Lee Smith.
In Smith, the police wanted only to record the numbers dialed from the suspect’s telephone.499 Although it is now often
forgotten, at the time the case was decided telephone companies were treated as utilities, with local telephone calls billed by
the minute. What was unique about the technology involved in
the pen register was that it could both identify and record the
numbers dialed from a telephone—a function that the phone
company itself did not have. The purpose of the pen register
was therefore specific and limited.
By contrast, the bulk collection program now collects the
numbers dialed, the numbers that call a particular number,
trunk information, and session times. While the police in 1976
were concerned with whether Michael Lee Smith was calling
one specific number, the NSA metadata program now collects
all numbers called—in the process obtaining significant
amounts of information about individuals. Calls to a rape crisis
line, an abortion clinic, a suicide hotline, or a political party
headquarters reveal significantly more information than what
was being sought in Smith. This makes the sheer amount of information available significantly different.
Trunk information, moreover, reveals not just the target of a
particular telephone call, but where the callers and receivers
are located.500 At the time of Smith, the police were only able to
tell when someone was located at Smith’s home. The telephone
499. Id. at 737.
500. Hearing on Continued Oversight of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 3 (2013) (written testimony of Edward W. Felten, Professor, Princeton Univ.).
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did not follow Smith around. In contrast, mobile technologies
now allow the police to ascertain where persons are located,
creating a second layer of surveillance based simply on trunk
identifier information. The bulk collection of records, moreover, means that the government has the ability to do that for
not just one person, but for the entire country.
Further characteristics distinguish the case. In Smith v. Maryland, for instance, the police sought the information for a short
period. The bulk metadata collection program, by contrast,
while continued at 90-day intervals, has been operating for
seven years now and the NSA argues that it should be a permanent part of the government surveillance program.
In Smith, the telephone company consented to placing the
pen register on the line. There was no element of compulsion
involved. This is a critical element in the analysis. The Fourth
Amendment only applies to government actors. To the extent,
then, that private companies are acting in their private capacities, the Fourth Amendment does not apply. In 1989, however,
the Supreme Court considered a case in which a railroad company conducted drug testing on employees at the behest of the
government.501 The Supreme Court held that when private actors act under compulsion of the sovereign authority, they
must be viewed as an instrument or agent of the government.502
In the case of the telephony metadata program (and in contrast to the situation in Smith v. Maryland), the government is
compelling the telephone companies to produce all telephony
metadata, under court order and with threat of sanction for
failing to abide by the terms of the secondary order. The telecommunication service providers are thus acting directly at the
behest of the government and, as such, should be considered
within the reach of the Fourth Amendment.
Perhaps the most important difference between the two situations lies in the realms of technology and social construction.
The extent to which we rely on electronic communications to
conduct our daily lives is of a fundamentally different scale
and complexity than the situation that existed at the time the
Court heard arguments in Smith. Resultantly, the extent of in501. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
502. Id. at 614.
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formation that can be learned about not just individuals, but
about neighborhoods, school boards, political parties, Girl
Scout troops—indeed, about any social, political, or economic
network—simply by the placement of a pen register or trap
and trace, is far beyond what the Court contemplated in 1979.
B.

More Intrusive Technologies and Their Impact on Privacy

The government argues that even if one sets aside Smith v.
Maryland and considers the collection of telephony metadata to
be a search, it is nevertheless reasonable. 503 This claim dramatically understates both the evolution of technology and the intrusiveness of the program. Millions of Americans’ communications are currently being tracked. The data include intimate
details about U.S. citizens’ lives that can be mined for further
information. Significant social analysis can also be conducted
on the data. Sophisticated algorithms, for instance, can be applied to pen register information to ascertain where the important nodes are in a network. Alliances, friendships, and
predilections can be uncovered by studying patterns in behavior. And unlike raw content, the type of information that can be
gleaned is ordered—making it in some ways even more useful
than content itself.
Consider the sheer volume of communications being monitored. Although the FISC orders that the government has released and acknowledged relate solely to one company (Verizon), officials have also acknowledged that the acquisition of
telephony metadata extends to the largest telephone service
providers in the United States: Verizon, AT&T, and Sprint.504
This means that every time the average U.S. citizen makes a
telephone call, the NSA is collecting the location, the number
called, the time of the call, and the length of the conversation.505
The numbers are worth noting. According to the Wall Street
503. Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction at 25, ACLU v. Clapper, No. 13-cv-3994 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 26,
2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/files/assets/2013.10.01_govt_oppn_
to_pi_motion.pdf, [http://perma.cc/4LLN-4L56] (arguing that “[a]ny intrusion on
privacy is minimal . . . because only telephony metadata are collected”).
504. Siobhan Gorman et al., U.S. Collects Vast Data Trove, WALL ST. J., June 7,
2013, http://on.wsj.com/11uDoue, [http://perma.cc/0DAai1LuBvy].
505. Id.
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Journal, Verizon has 98.9 million wireless customers and 22.2
million landline customers; AT&T has 107.3 million wireless
customers and 31.2 million landline customers; and Sprint has
55 million customers in total.506 In short, the program monitors
hundreds of millions of people.
As for the type of information obtained, the FISC order requests that the telephone service providers give the government all “call detail information,” a term that is defined by
regulatory provision as: “Any information that pertains to the
transmission of specific telephone calls, including, for outbound calls, the number called, and the time, location, or duration of any call and, for inbound calls, the number from which
the call was placed, and the time, location, or duration of any
call.”507 The FISC order further directs that the company provide “session identifying information,” such as originating and
terminating number, International Mobile Subscriber Identity
number, and the International Mobile station Equipment Identity number.508 As Edward Felten, a Professor of Computer Science at Princeton University, recently explained to the Senate
Judiciary Committee:
These are unique numbers that identify the user or device
that is making or receiving a call. Although people who
want to evade surveillance can make it difficult to connect
these numbers to their individual identities, for the vast ma-

506. Id.
507. 47 C.F.R. § 64.2003 (2012). Senior intelligence officials have repeatedly asserted that, although they have the authority to collect GPS data, and have in the
past, they are not currently doing so under the Section 215 telephony metadata
program. See, e.g., Joint Statement for the Record of Director of National Intelligence
James Clapper and General Keith Alexander Before the the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
113th Cong. (2013); Siobhan Gorman & Julian E. Barnes, Officials: NSA Doesn’t
Collect
Cellphone-Location Records,
WALL ST. J.,
June
16,
2013,
http://onlwsj.com/13MnSsp, [http://perma.cc/0ogJY4FNywU].
508. In re Application of the FBI for an Order Requiring the Production of Tangible Things from Verizon Bus. Network Svcs., Secondary Order, BR 13-80, at 2 (FISA
Ct. Apr. 25, 2013), available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/
2013/jun/06/verizon-telephone-data-court-order?guni=Article:in%20body%20link,
[http://perma.cc/V9Z6-TZAJ].
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jority of ordinary Americans these numbers can be connected to the specific identity of a person.509

The FISC order also directs the company to provide trunk identifier information. This data traces the route a telephone call
takes, in the process establishing the location of the people taking part in the conversation.510
What can be done with this information is a significantly
deeper intrusion on Americans’ right to privacy than was at
issue in Smith. As Felten explains, “Telephony metadata is easy
to aggregate and analyze because it is, by its nature, structured
data.”511 Sophisticated data-mining and link-analysis programs
can be used to then analyze this information, and it can do so
more quickly, deeply, and cheaply than in the past. Even the
amount of data that can be retained for such analysis is of a
radically different scale than was conceivable in 1979.
From this information, the government can determine patterns
and relationships, such as personal details, habits, and behaviors,
that U.S. citizens had no intention or expectation of sharing.512 The
government can also obtain content. Felten writes:
[C]ertain telephone numbers are used for a single purpose,
such that any contact reveals basic and often sensitive information about the caller. Examples include support hotlines for victims of domestic violence and rape. Similarly,
numerous hotlines exist for people considering suicide, including specific services for first responders, veterans, and
gay and lesbian teenagers. Hotlines exist for sufferers of various forms of addiction, such as alcohol, drugs, and gambling. Similarly, inspectors general at practically every federal agency—including the NSA—have hotlines through
which misconduct, waste, and fraud can be reported, while
numerous state tax agencies have dedicated hotlines for reporting tax fraud. Hotlines have also been established to report hate crimes, arson, illegal firearms and child
abuse . . . . The phone records indicating that someone called
509. Hearing on Continued Oversight of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act
Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. 3 (2013) (written testimony of Edward W. Felten, Professor, Princeton Univ.).
510. Id.
511. Id. at 4 (noting that the numbers are in predictable formats, as is the time
and date information, and contrasting telephony metadata to content).
512. Id. at 5.
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a sexual assault hotline or a tax fraud hotline will of course
not reveal the exact words that were spoken during those
calls, but phone records indicating a 30-minute call to one of
these numbers will still reveal information that virtually
everyone would consider extremely private.513

Even if U.S. citizens wanted to opt out of having this information collected, it would be virtually impossible to do so.
There have, for instance, been advances in encryption. But
these technologies all revolve around content—not metadata.
Although some technologies are focused on metadata, these are
not sufficiently advanced to allow for real-time communication.514 The only option is therefore not to use a telephone. The
cost of doing so, however, would lean towards divesting oneself of a role in the modern world—impacting one’s social relationships, employment, and ability to conduct financial and
personal affairs.
Notably, all of these considerations are focused on telephony
metadata. But the logic of the government’s argument, as applied to metadata generally, has virtually no limit. One could
equally argue that all financial flows, Internet usage, and e-mail
exchanges are relevant to ongoing terrorism investigations under section 215. Almost all forms of metadata could be at stake.
Americans have contractual relationships with myriad corporate entities, to whom they have entrusted parts of their
lives, such as friendships, correspondence, buying patterns,
and financial records. Creating a contractual relationship with
Safeway, however, to gain access to reduced prices for food, is
something different in kind from divulging to the U.S. government that you keep kosher, help to support your mother,
and attend synagogue. Americans reasonably expect that their
movements, decisions, and communications will not be recorded and analyzed by the intelligence agencies.
C.

Judicial Tension: Trespass and Katz’s Reasonable Expectation of
Privacy

In Katz v. United States, the Court replaced the previous trespass doctrine with one based on a reasonable expectation of
513. Id. at 8–9 (internal footnotes omitted).
514. Id. at 7–8.
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privacy. The Court explained, “The fact that the electronic device employed to” record Katz’s conversation “did not happen
to penetrate the wall of the phone booth can have no constitutional significance.”515 For the Court, the Constitution protected
electronic violations, as much as physical intrusions, into space
otherwise protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Katz itself was an effort by the Court to come to terms with
new technologies. Since that time, tension has emerged and
now marks a split on the Court between those who consider
Fourth Amendment incursions in terms of physical trespass,
and those who adopt the reasoning of Katz more broadly. Thus,
a series of cases involving areas such as thermal imaging,516
GPS devices,517 and highly-trained dogs,518 divide along these
lines, with one Justice (Sotomayor) siding alternately with one
side or the other. Regardless of which approach one adopts,
however, the bulk collection of Americans’ metadata runs afoul
of the Fourth Amendment.
In the realm of trespass, the program authorized under Section
215 amounts to a general warrant—which was the very definition
of an unreasonable search and seizure at the time of the founding.
It was to prohibit general warrants, and thereby to gain the support of anti-Federalists for the fledgling Constitution, that James
Madison wrote the Fourth Amendment and introduced it into
Congress in 1789 as part of the Bill of Rights.519 The telephony
metadata program, moreover, amounts to a digital trespass on
citizens’ private lives. The application of Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy test, albeit via a different route, reaches a similar
conclusion: that is, the telephony metadata collection program
falls within Fourth Amendment protections.
1.

The Prohibition on General Warrants

At the time of the founding, English courts rejected general
warrants. A different standard, however, marked the crown’s
515. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).
516. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
517. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
518. Florida v. Jardines, 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013); see also Florida v. Harris, 133 S. Ct.
1050 (2013).
519. See Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH.
L. REV. 547, 693–724 (1999).
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treatment of the American colonies. This angered the colonists, who saw themselves, first and foremost, as Englishmen—and therefore deserving of all the rights and privileges
accorded to English subjects.
Perhaps the most famous case establishing the right of Englishmen to be free of a general writ dates from November 1762,
when King George III’s messengers broke into a man’s home to
execute a warrant issued by the Secretary of State.520 The warrant
empowered the king’s men “to make strict and diligent search
for . . . the author, or one concerned in the writing of several
weekly very seditious papers.”521 The men, who searched John
Entick’s home for four hours without his consent and against his
will, “broke open, and read over, pried into and examined all [of
his] private papers [and] books.” 522 Upon departure, the men
seized Entick’s documents, charts, pamphlets, and other materials.523 Chief Justice of the Common Pleas Charles Pratt, First Earl
Camden, ruled that both the search and the seizure were unlawful. He explained:
520. Entick v. Carrington (1765) 95 Eng. Pep. 807 (K.B.).
521. The full warrant read:
George Montagu Dunk, Earl of Halifax, Viscount Sunbury, and Baron
Halifax one of the Lords of his Majesty’s Honourable Privy Council,
Lieutenant General of His Majesty’s Forces, Lord Lieutenant-General and
General Governor of the kingdom of Ireland, and principal Secretary of
State, etc. these are in His Majesty’s name to authorize and require you,
taking a constable to your assistance, to make strict and diligent search
for John Entick, the author, or one concerned in writing of several weekly
very seditious papers, entitled The Monitor, or British Freeholder, No 357,
358, 360, 373, 376, 378, 379, and 380, London, printed for J. Wilson and J.
Fell in Pater-Noster-Row; which contains gross and scandalous
reflections and invectives upon His Majesty’s Government, and upon
both Houses of Parliament, and him, having found, you are to seize and
apprehend, and to bring, together with his books and papers, in safe
custody before me to be examined concerning the premises, and further
dealt with according to law; in the due execution whereof all mayors,
sheriffs, justices of the peace, constables, and other His Majesty’s officers
civil and military, and all loving subjects whom it may concern, are to be
aiding and assisting to you as there shall be occasion; and for so doing
this shall be your warrant. Given at St. James’s the 6th day of November
1762, in the third year of His Majesty’s reign, Duke Halifax. To Nathan
Carrington, James Watson, Thomas Ardran, and Robert Blackmore, four
of His Majesty’s messengers in ordinary.
Id. at 807.
522. Id. at 814.
523. Id. at 807–08.
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Suppose a warrant which is against law be granted, such as
no justice of peace, or other magistrate high or low whomsoever, has power to issue, whether that magistrate or justice
who grants such warrant, or the officer who executes it, are
within the [statute] 24 Geo. 2, c. 44? To put one
case . . . suppose a justice of peace issues a warrant to search
a house for stolen goods, and directs it to four of his servants, who search and find no stolen goods, but seize all the
books and papers of the owners of the house, whether in
such a case would the justice of peace, his officers or servants, be within the [statute]?524

Two aspects to the case proved particularly troubling: first,
the writ had empowered the crown to seize all documents—
not just those of a criminal nature; and, second, no demonstration had been made prior to the search and seizure establishing
the probability that Entick was engaged in criminal activity:
The warrant in our case was an execution . . . without any
previous summons, examination, hearing the plaintiff, or
proof that he was the author of the supposed libels; a power
claimed by no other magistrate whatever . . . it was left to
the discretion of these defendants to execute the warrant in
the absence or presence of the plaintiff, when he might have
no witness present to see what they did; for they were to
seize all papers, bank bills, or any other valuable papers they
might take away if they were so disposed; there might be
nobody to detect them.525

The court suggested that since the Glorious Revolution and
the restoration of William and Mary to the throne, such powers
had been denied to the crown. It was precisely such aggrandizement of power that had led to revolution in the first place.
The Chief Justice stated, “we can safely say there is no law in
this country to justify the defendants in what they have done; if
there was, it would destroy all the comforts of society; for papers are often the dearest property a man can have.”526 The
court flatly rejected the use of such general warrants.
What was banned in England, however, became commonplace in the colonies. Resultantly, the use of writs of assistance
524. Id. at 814.
525. Id. at 817.
526. Id. at 817–18.
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played a central role in lending speed to the American Revolution. Acting under writs established by Parliamentary statute,
officers of the crown had permission to search the homes, papers, and belongings of any person.527 As early as 1660, legislation empowered magistrates to:
[I]ssue out a Warrant to any person or persons thereby enableing him or them with the assistance of a Sheriffe Justice of
Peace or Constable to enter into any House in the day time
where such Goods are suspected to be concealed, and in case
of resistance to breake [sic] open such Houses, and to seize
and secure the same goods soe [sic] concealed, And All Officers and Ministers of Justice are hereby required to be aiding and assisting thereunto.528

The writs came to be seen as the worst instrument of arbitrary power, turning colonists against the crown. Their use was
part of a general crack-down engineered by British Prime Minister William Pitt, who directed the American colonial governors and royal customs officers to enforce trade and navigation
laws more strictly—specifically, to “make the strictest and most
diligent Enquiry into the State of this dangerous and ignominious Trade.”529 He ordered that every step authorized by law be
taken “to bring all such heinous Offenders to the most exemplary and condign [sic] Punishment.”530
In response to Pitt’s order, the governor of Massachusetts
Bay Colony began making use of the writ, prompting Boston
merchants to hire James Otis to challenge their constitutionality. In what has become one of the most famous examples of
early American legal oration, Otis argued that the writs were

527. Officials could “enter and go into any House, Warehouse, Shop, Cellar, or other
Place” to seize goods. M.H. SMITH, THE WRITS OF ASSISTANCE CASE 1 (1978) (quoting a
1767 measure by Parliament, establishing a new writ of assistance in America).
528. An Act to Prevent Fraudes and Concealments of His Majestyes Customes
and Subsidyes, 12 Car. II, c. 19 (1660); see also Act for Preventing Fraudes and
Regulating Abuses in his Majesties Customes, 14 Car. II, c. 11 (1662). A good discussion of the early writs of assistance is located in JOSEPH R. FRESE, EARLY PARLIAMENTARY LEGISLATION ON WRITS OF ASSISTANCE, PUBLICATIONS OF THE COLONIAL SOCIETY OF MASSACHUSETTS (1959).
529. Horace Gray, Writs of Assistance, in JOSIAH QUINCY, JR., REPORTS OF CASES ARGUED AND ADJUDGED IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF JUDICATURE OF THE PROVINCE OF
MASSACHUSETTS BAY BETWEEN 1761 AND 1772, at 407 (Samuel M. Quincy ed. 1865).
530. Id. at 408.
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contrary to “the fundamental principles of law.”531 Scholars hail
Otis’s argument in the case as helping “to lay the foundation
for the breach between Great Britain and her continental colonies.”532 As A.J. Langguth observed, at the Writs of Assistance
trial, “James Otis stood up to speak, and something profound
changed in America.”533
One of our best accounts of Paxton’s Case comes from John
Adams, who was present at the argument and whose mentor,
Jeremiah Grindley, the most distinguished member of the bar
in Boston, opened the case for the crown. 534 In replying to
Grindley, Otis stated that his efforts were being made “out of
regard to the liberties of the subject.” 535 The rights of British
subjects were under assault, compelling him to oppose “all
such instruments of slavery on the one hand and villainy on
the other as this Writ of Assistance is.”
For Otis, the writ was “the worst instrument of arbitrary
power.”536 He ignored the crown’s claim of necessity—and current practice—noting that “the writ prayed for in this petition,
being general, is illegal.”537 He highlighted four concerns: first,
it was universal—in other words, it could be executed by anyone in possession of it; second, it was perpetual in that it indefinitely allowed the holder of the writ to conduct searches; third,
no prior evidence of wrongdoing need be involved in its execution; and fourth, there was no requirement to swear to suspicion of wrongdoing or, following execution, to inquire into its
exercise. “One of the most essential branches of English liberty

531. NORMAN K. RISJORD, JEFFERSON’S AMERICA 1760–1815, at 75 (2d ed. 2002).
532. LAWRENCE HENRY GIPSON, THE COMING OF THE REVOLUTION, 1763–1777, at
39 (1954).
533. A.J. LANGGUTH, PATRIOTS: THE MEN WHO STARTED THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 22 (1989).
534. James M. Farrell, The Child Independence Is Born: James Otis and Writs of Assistance, in 2 A RHETORICAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES: SIGNIFICANT MOMENTS IN AMERICAN PUBLIC DISCOURSE 16 (Stephen E. Lucas, ed. forthcoming); see
also Paxton’s Case of the Writ of Assistance, in JOSIAH QUINCY, supra note 529.
535. Otis’s speech is taken from 2 THE LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 139–44 (L.
Kinvin Wroth & Hiller B. Zobel, eds. 1965).
536. Id.
537. Id.
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is the freedom of one’s house,” Otis opined. 538 General warrants would annihilate the privilege associated with that right.
Although the court ruled against Otis, John Adams later
wrote that his arguments “breathed into this nation the breath
of life.”539 On June 12, 1776, the Virginia Constitutional Convention adopted the Virginia Declaration of Rights—a document that deeply influenced the Declaration of Independence,
as well as other states’ constitutions, and became the basis for
the Bill of Rights—without which, the Constitution would never have been ratified.
The Virginia Declaration of Rights stated, inter alia, “That
general warrants, whereby an officer or messenger may be
commanded to search suspected places without evidence of a
fact committed, or to seize any person or persons not named, or
whose offense is not particularly described and supported by
evidence, are grievous and oppressive and ought not to be
granted.”540 The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 similarly
objected to the use of general warrants:
Every subject has a right to be secure from all unreasonable
searches and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers,
and all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary
to this right, if the cause or foundation of them be not previously supported by oath or affirmation, and if the order in
the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected
places, or to arrest one or more suspected persons, or to
seize their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure;
and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with the
formalities, prescribed by the laws.541

The New Hampshire Constitution of 1784 lifted the clause
almost verbatim.542 The Virginia ratifying convention of 1788
538. Id.
539. 10 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 276 (Boston,
Little, Brown & Co. 1856).
540. VA. DECL. OF RIGHTS § 10.
541. MASS. CONST. of 1780, pt. 1, art. XIV.
542. N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. XIX (“Every subject hath a right to be secure from
all unreasonable searches and seizures of his person, his houses, his papers, and
all his possessions. All warrants, therefore, are contrary to this right, if the cause
or foundation of them be not previously supported by oath, or affirmation; and if
the order in the warrant to a civil officer, to make search in suspected places, or to
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made a point to ensure that the subsequent Constitution would
include a provision affirming that “every freeman has a right to
be secure from all unreasonable searches and siezures [sic] of
his person, his papers and his property.”543 New York, in turn,
required nearly identical language, as did North Carolina—
even as Virginia, New York, and North Carolina all condemned overbroad warrants as “‘therefore’ unreasonable—
‘grievous,’ ‘oppressive,’ and ‘dangerous.’” 544 Consistent with
these states’ understandings, James Madison’s first draft of the
Fourth Amendment addressed the right of the people “to be
secured in their persons, their houses, their papers, and their other property, from all unreasonable searches and seizures.” 545
Madison understood the clause as a ban against general warrants.546
In 1886 the Supreme Court recognized the importance of the
writs and the Founders’ rejection of the same as encapsulated
in the Fourth Amendment:
In order to ascertain the nature of the proceedings intended
by the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution under the
terms “unreasonable searches and seizures,” it is only necessary to recall the contemporary or then recent history of the
controversies on the subject, both in this country and in England. The practice had obtained in the colonies of issuing
writs of assistance to the revenue officers, empowering
them, in their discretion, to search suspected places for
smuggled goods, which James Otis pronounced “the worst
instrument of arbitrary power, the most destructive of English liberty, and the fundamental principles of law, that ever
arrest one or more suspected persons, or to seize their property, be not accompanied with a special designation of the persons or objects of search, arrest, or seizure; and no warrant ought to be issued but in cases, and with the formalities
prescribed by the laws.”).
543. Akhil Reed Amar, The Fourth Amendment, Boston, and the Writs of Assistance,
30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 53, 68 (1996) (quoting EDWARD DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF
RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 184 (1957)).
544. Id. at 68 (quoting DUMBAULD, supra note 543, at 184, 191, 200–01).
545. Id. (quoting DUMBAULD, supra note 543, at 207 (emphasis added). Note that
the historical antecedent suggests a broad reading of the “persons, houses, papers,
and effects” language of the Fourth Amendment.
546. See Davies, supra note 519, at 555; see also N. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND
DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 103 (1937); Robert M. Bloom, Warrant Requirement – The Burger Court Approach, 53 U. COLO. L. REV. 691, 692 (1982).
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was found in an English law book;” since they placed “the
liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer.”
This was in February, 1761, in Boston, and the famous debate in which it occurred was perhaps the most prominent
event which inaugurated the resistance of the colonies to the
oppressions of the mother country. “Then and there,” said
John Adams, “then and there was the first scene of the first
act of opposition to the arbitrary claims of Great Britain.
Then and there the child Independence was born.547

The Court acknowledged the importance of Lord Camden’s
decision in Entick v. Carrington:
[Camden’s] great judgment on that occasion is considered as
one of the landmarks of English liberty. It was welcomed
and applauded by the lovers of liberty in the colonies as well
as in the mother country. It is regarded as one of the permanent monuments of the British Constitution, and is quoted
as such by the English authorities on that subject down to
the present time.548

It was precisely general warrants that the Framers meant when
referring to unreasonable searches and seizures.549
Throughout U.S. history, the Supreme Court has continued to
recognize the special role played by general warrants and writs
of assistance in shaping the contours of the Fourth Amendment.
In 1980, the Court recognized that it was “familiar history that
indiscriminate searches and seizures conducted under the authority of ‘general warrants’ were the immediate evils that motivated the framing and adoption of the Fourth Amendment.”550
General warrants were presumptively unreasonable.
Consistent with this reading, Professor Akhil Amar, inquiring as to what the warrant clause means—and what the relationship is between it and the earlier reasonableness clause—
suggests that “broad warrants—warrants that fail to meet the
various specifications of clause two—are inherently unreasonable under clause one.”551 Such a general warrant would immunize the officer who carried it out from a subsequent tres547. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624–25 (1886).
548. Id. at 626.
549. Id. at 626–27.
550. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583 (1980).
551. See Amar, supra note 543, at 60.
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pass suit. 552 In the case of Entick v. Carrington, “Armed with
sweeping warrants issued by executive officials, various government henchmen broke into Englishmen’s houses, searched
their papers, arrested their persons, and rummaged through
their effects, in hopes of finding” wrongdoing.553
Professor Thomas Davies similarly recognizes that “[t]he historical statements about search and seizure” in the Fourth
Amendment “focused on condemning general warrants. In
fact, the historical concerns were almost exclusively about the
need to ban house searches under general warrants.” 554 Evidence suggests that “unreasonable searches and seizures” was
a proxy for “the inherent illegality of any searches or seizures
that might be made under general warrants.”555 Davies posits
that the reason the Framers even bothered “to adopt constitutional bans against general warrants in light of the apparent
consensus that the general warrant was illegal at common law”
was because of genuine concern that Congress might endanger
the right in the future.556
The FISC Order authorizing the telephony metadata program
is a general warrant. It authorizes the government to rummage
through our papers and effects in the hope of finding wrongdoing. There is no previous suspicion of criminal activity. Almost
none of the information obtained relates to illegal behavior.
It matters little whether one stores one’s papers in a filing
cabinet in one’s den, or places all financial documents in the
iCloud—the digital equivalent, in modern times, of a filing cabinet. Sheer volume of information requires individuals to arrange for storage of everything from medical records to family
photos. E-mail, in turn, holds our correspondence—papers that
we place on a server with a company with whom we have a
contractual relationship. Banking records may be accessible
over the Internet. These are our modern day equivalents of the
papers and effects held by Entick in his home.

552. Id.
553. Id. at 65.
554. Davies, supra note 519, at 551.
555. Id.
556. Id. at 657.
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In considering the case of Entick v. Carrington, Lord Camden
wrote, “The great end for which men entered into society was
to secure their property.”557 He continued, “By the laws of England, every invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is
a trespass.” Camden added:
Papers are the owner’s goods and chattels; they are his dearest property, and are so far from enduring a seizure that
they will hardly bear an inspection . . . where private papers
are removed and carried away, the secret nature of those
goods will be an aggravation of the trespass, and demand
more considerable damages in that respect.558

Allowing the government to obtain bulk metadata is the
equivalent of a digital trespass on what Justice Brandeis referred to as the “privacies of life.”559 Not only does the government gain penetrating insight into our private affairs, but it
does so to a degree that even those engaged in the activity itself
do not realize. That it is an electronic trespass, and not a physical one, matters naught. Brandeis explained, “It is not the
breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that
constitutes the essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of
his indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and
private property . . . .”560 The digital trespass in which the NSA
is engaging is not supported by probable cause. It is not supported by reasonable suspicion. No suspicion of any wrongdoing whatsoever is contemplated by the collection of records. It
is the equivalent of a general warrant and, as such, is odious to
the Fourth Amendment.
2.

Search of Metadata and the Reasonable Expectation of Privacy

In recent Fourth Amendment cases considering new technologies, a schism has appeared in the Court between adopting an
approach based on traditional concepts of trespass, and examining the facts from the vantage of the reasonable expectation
of privacy—a higher bar adopted in 1967 as a way of augmenting the Court’s previous reliance on physical space.
557. (1765) 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029 (C.P.) 1066.
558. Id.
559. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 473 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
560. Id. at 474–75.
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In United States v. Jones,561 the Court considered a case involving 28-day surveillance.562 The government obtained a search
warrant permitting it to place a Global-Positioning System
(GPS) tracking device on a car registered to the wife of a suspected drug dealer.563 The day after the warrant expired, agents
installed the device and followed the car’s movements for nearly a month.564 Information thus obtained allowed the government to indict Antoine Jones and others on drug trafficking
conspiracy charges.565 The Supreme Court held that attaching
the GPS device to the car and tracing its movements amounted
to a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.566
This case is important for determining the constitutionality
of the telephony metadata program in three important ways.
First, it recognized that Katz’s reasonable expectation of privacy
test did not supplant the rights in existence at the time the
Fourth Amendment was forged. Justice Scalia, writing for the
Court, explained:
It is important to be clear about what occurred in this case:
The government physically occupied private property for
the purpose of obtaining information. We have no doubt
that such a physical intrusion would have been considered a
“search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
when it was adopted.567

Justice Scalia cited Entick v. Carrington, noting that the Court
had described it as a “‘monument of English freedom’ ‘undoubtedly familiar’ to ‘every American statesman’ at the time
the constitution was adopted, and considered to be ‘the true
and ultimate expression of constitutional law’ with regard to
search and seizure.”568 For Justice Scalia, and for the Court, the
reasonable expectation of privacy test was of no consequence:
“At bottom, we must ‘assur[e] preservation of that degree of

561. 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012).
562. Id. at 946.
563. Id.
564. Id.
565. Id.
566. Id. at 949.
567. Id.
568. Id.
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privacy against government that existed when the Fourth
Amendment was adopted.’”569
Just as the Court eschewed Katz v. United States as being inapposite for consideration of the rights that existed when the
Fourth Amendment was adopted, it would be equally inapposite to dismiss the Fourth Amendment’s rejection of general
warrants. “[A]t a minimum,” Justice Scalia wrote, the “18thcentury guarantee against unreasonable searches . . . must provide . . . the degree of protection it afforded when it was adopted.”570 The concept of a general warrant and the Court’s conception of trespass are, as previously noted, historically conconnected. The reason that general warrants were rejected at
the time of the Founding was because they provided a carte
blanche to the government to trespass at will upon one’s property and to search through one’s papers and effects without
any reasonable suspicion.
The second point to draw out of Jones is that what can be considered a shadow majority appears to recognize that changed
circumstances exist, so as to augment the need for new privacy
protections. At least five Justices indicated unease with the intrusiveness of modern technology in light of changed times, offering in the process different aspects of a mosaic theory of privacy. Justice Alito, joined by Justice Ginsburg, Justice Breyer,
and Justice Kagan, suggested that in most criminal investigations, long-term monitoring “impinges on expectations of privacy.”571 The nature of new technologies mattered:
Recent years have seen the emergence of many new devices
that permit the monitoring of a person’s movements. In
some locales, closed-circuit television video monitoring is
becoming ubiquitous. On toll roads, automatic toll collection
systems create a precise record of the movements of motorists who choose to make use of their convenience. Many motorists purchase cars that are equipped with devices that
permit a central station to ascertain the car’s location at any
time so that roadside assistance may be provided if needed
and the car may be found if it is stolen.572
569. Id. at 947.
570. Id. at 953.
571. Id. at 964 (Alito, J., concurring).
572. Id. at 963.
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Unlike in the past, the daily business of living one’s life creates a digital record with privacy implications. “Perhaps most
significant,” Justice Alito added, “cell phones and other wireless devices now permit wireless carriers to track and record
the location of users—and as of June 2011, it has been reported,
there were more than 322 million wireless devices in use in the
United States.”573 Before computers, practicality proved one of
the greatest protectors of individual privacy. It was difficult
and expensive to conduct long-term surveillance. But technology has changed the equation. The government now is more
able to engage in long-term surveillance; but though relatively
short-term monitoring of individuals’ movements in public
space might be consistent with the Fourth Amendment, “the
use of longer term GPS monitoring in investigations of most
offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”574
Justice Sotomayor went one step further, calling into question the entire basis for third party doctrine. Specifically, in
light of the level of intrusiveness represented by modern technology, “it may be necessary to reconsider the premise that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy in information voluntarily disclosed to third parties.” 575 Sotomayor
pointed out:
This approach is ill suited to the digital age, in which people
reveal a great deal of information about themselves to third
parties in the course of carrying out mundane tasks. People
disclose the phone numbers that they dial or text to the cellular providers; the URLs that they visit and the e-mail addresses with which they correspond to their Internet service
providers; and the books, groceries, and medications they
purchase to online retailers.576

She added, “I would not assume that all information voluntarily disclosed to some member of the public for a limited purpose is, for that reason alone, disentitled to Fourth Amendment
protection.”577

573. Id.
574. Id. at 964.
575. Id. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
576. Id.
577. Id.
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The third point to draw from Jones reflects the growing tension between trespass and the Katz test, as applied to new and
emerging technologies—and the increasingly consistent results
reached by the Court, regardless of which approach is adopted.
Thus, although Justice Sotomayor sided with the majority on
trespass grounds, she still embraced the same result as a product of the application of Katz.
Jones was not the first manifestation of this tension in light of
new and emerging technologies. In Kyllo v. United States,578 the
Court considered whether thermal scanning conducted outside
of a target’s home constituted a search within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.579 Agents, having picked up a heat signature that suggested that grow lights were being used inside the
target’s garage, used the information to obtain a search warrant
which, when executed, revealed several marijuana plants. As in
Jones, the concept of trespass figured largely in the decision.580
In Kyllo, the Court held that where the government employed a device, not in general public use, to uncover details
inside a home that otherwise could only be uncovered via
physical intrusion, such surveillance constituted a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment and was thus presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.581 As in Jones, Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court: “It would be
foolish to contend,” he wrote, “that the degree of privacy secured to citizens by the Fourth Amendment has been entirely
unaffected by the advance of technology.”582 The question the
Court confronted was “what limits there are upon this power
of technology to shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy.”583 In
this equation, Scalia suggested, homeowners should not be left
to “the mercy of advancing technology.” 584 The Fourth
Amendment, if nothing else, drew a bright line at the curtilage
of the home.

578. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
579. Id. at 29.
580. Id. at 31–32.
581. Id. at 40.
582. Id. at 33–34.
583. Id.
584. Id. at 35.

No. 3]

Bulk Metadata Collection

889

The dissent, written by Justice Stevens and joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Kennedy, considered the heat signature of the plant to be in the public domain.585 For the dissenters, the case did not turn on the question
of whether there was search or a seizure inside a home without
a warrant, but rather on the application of plain view doctrine:
Indeed, the ordinary use of the senses might enable a neighbor or passerby to notice the heat emanating from a building, particularly if it is vented, as was the case here. Additionally, any member of the public might notice that one
part of a house is warmer than another part or a nearby
building if, for example, rainwater evaporates or snow melts
at different rates across its surfaces. Such use of the senses
would not convert into an unreasonable search if, instead an
adjoining neighbor allowed an officer onto her property to
verify her perceptions with a sensitive thermometer.586

For the dissent, applying Katz, there was no reasonable expectation of privacy in heat emissions located outside of the
home. At the same time, however, the dissent was careful not
to limit Fourth Amendment protections to homes themselves:
“If such equipment did provide its user with the functional
equivalent of access to a private place—such as, for example, the
telephone booth involved in Katz, or an office building—then
the rule should apply to such an area as well as a home.”587 The
collection of telephony metadata can be considered in both
senses—as a digital trespass within the private sphere (and
thus consistent with the majority opinion), as well as a violation of the reasonable expectation of privacy that attends “the
functional equivalent of access to a private place,” such as
one’s filing cabinet or personal telephone records.588
Electronic recordkeeping has become integral to the conduct
of life in the twenty-first century. Electronic communications
have now assumed a vital role with regard to social, political,
economic, and other activity. As a new technology, embedded
in our social structure, it is on a par with the role of the telephone that the Court considered in Katz:
585. Id. at 41 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
586. Id. at 43.
587. Id. at 48–49.
588. Id.
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One who occupies [a phone booth], shuts the door behind
him, and pays the toll that permits him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the
mouthpiece will not be broadcast to the world. To read the
Constitution more narrowly is to ignore the vital role that the public telephone has come to play in private communication.589

Whatever role telephones played in 1967, their integration into society has only deepened in the intervening years. Electronic communications have come to play a vital role not just in social interactions, but in conducting all of one’s private affairs.
That we contract with private companies to ensure careful
treatment of this information, that we use passwords to access
our telephone, banking, and financial records online, and that
we limit access to this information, is the equivalent of shutting
the door of the phone booth.
The courts are beginning to recognize privacy interests in
this new, electronic sphere. In 2010, for instance, in United
States v. Warshak, the Sixth Circuit held that the government
had violated Warshak’s Fourth Amendment rights when it obtained e-mail content from Warshak’s internet service provider,
absent a warrant based on probable cause.590 The court noted
that Warshak had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the email he had stored with an ISP.591
The amount of information that computers can hold makes
them different in kind. In 2011, the Ninth Circuit considered
the search of a computer at the border.592 The dissent noted:
Computers store libraries’ worth of personal information,
including substantial amounts of data that the user never intended to save and of which he is likely completely unaware
(for example, browsing histories and records of deleted files
in unallocated space). Computers offer “windows into [our]
lives far beyond anything that could be, or would be, stuffed
into a suitcase for a trip abroad.”593

589. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967) (emphasis added).
590. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266 (6th Cir. 2010).
591. Id.
592. United States v. Cotterman, 637 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2011) (Fletcher, J.,
dissenting).
593. Id. at 1085–86 (internal citations omitted).
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For the dissent, particularized suspicion was necessary to perform such searches because individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their electronic files.
Most recently, the Supreme Court has confronted cases involving the use of drug-sniffing dogs. In Florida v. Jardines,594
the Court held that the use of a narcotics dog outside a home
was a “search” within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. 595 Once again, Justice Scalia authored the opinion, in
which he resolved the question solely on property rights
grounds.596 The act of placing the dog on the front porch, to
conduct a forensic search of someone’s home, constituted a
search.597 The trespass in question thus proved sufficient to find
the act unconstitutional.598 The majority did not need to reach
the question of whether the sniff also violated the suspect’s
reasonable expectation of privacy.599
Although the Court did not rule on whether the officers had violated Jardines’ expectation of privacy under Katz, Justice Elena
Kagan offered a concurring opinion in which she noted that, instead of under a property rubric, she “could just as happily have
decided [the case] by looking to Jardines’ privacy interests.”600 For
Kagan, law enforcement would have been equally outside the
bounds of the Constitution for standing in a space adjacent to
one’s dwelling and searching for evidence with impunity. Kagan
noted the relationship between the two approaches:
It is not surprising that in a case involving a search of a
home, property concepts and privacy concepts should so
align. The law of property ‘naturally enough influence[s]’
our ‘shared social expectations’ of what places should be
free from governmental incursions.601

Kagan’s concurrence in Jardines, like the dissent’s acknowledgement of Katz in Kyllo, and Justice Sotomayor’s concurrence
in Jones, signals a convergence between Justice Scalia and oth594. 133 S. Ct. 1409 (2013).
595. Id. at 1417–18.
596. Id. at 1415–17.
597. Id. at 1416.
598. Id. at 1417–18.
599. Id. at 1417.
600. Id. at 1418 (Kagan, J., concurring).
601. Id.
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ers on the Court as to the existence of mutually-reinforcing
spheres protecting U.S. citizens—in the face of new technologies—from undue government interference. This is precisely
the space occupied by the bulk collection of U.S. citizens’ telephony records. Under either approach, the program, and similarly situated bulk collections of U.S. citizens’ records, violates
the Fourth Amendment.
D.

The Proverbial Needle in the Haystack

We live in an age in which individual actors have the capability and the intent to harm U.S. national security. Such persons may be tied to state actors, the traditional target of U.S.
intelligence activities, or they may not. They may be acting as
part of a multi-national network, they may be acting on behalf
of a domestic group, or they may simply have a grudge against
the United States or its people. The potential construction, dissemination, and use of weapons of mass destruction—such as
biological weapons, nuclear devices, cyber attack, or conventional force used against critical infrastructure targets—by such
persons changes the equation in terms of how the state must
act to protect its interests. It must try to anticipate aggression
from state actors, of course, but it must also try to anticipate
action from non-state actors and individuals.
With such non-traditional threats in mind, proponents of the
telephony metadata program have argued that to find threats,
intelligence agencies must first obtain, and then mine, all individuals’ data. The analogy that has been suggested is that intelligence agencies must first build a haystack, in order to find the
proverbial needle. The assumptions underlying this model are
that all individuals potentially present a threat, and that the
threat from individuals can only be identified and understood
in the context of all the data.
For constitutional purposes, the argument continues, it is not
a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to build
the haystack. This only occurs once someone starts sifting
through the hay to find the needle. A further nuance in this argument suggests that, to the extent that the creation of the haystack is being accomplished through technology and automation, and no human being is involved, the building of the
haystack—and even the analysis of the data—is outside the
confines of the Fourth Amendment.
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In its 2011 report to Congress, for instance, the Department
of Justice noted two NSA bulk collection programs in existence:
first, the telephony metadata program under Section 215 and,
second, the bulk collection of e-mail envelope information under the pen-trap provisions of FISA. 602 DOJ noted, “Both of
these programs operate on a very large scale [REDACTED
TEXT] However, as described below, only a tiny fraction of
such records are ever viewed by NSA intelligence analysts.”603
There are a number of problems with this argument, the first
being (consistent with the argument above) that it is the collection of information that brings the bulk collection of information within the meaning of a search for Fourth Amendment
purposes—that is, under the reasonable expectation of privacy
test, individuals reasonably assume that their movements
which are recorded by cell phone towers, and their social interactions, placement in social networks, interests, and possible
concerns that emerge from calling records, are not going to be
recorded and transmitted to the NSA to be analyzed, queried,
stored, and shared with other agencies. This is precisely what
sets the NSA surveillance program apart from Smith v. Maryland, in which limited information was provided by the carrier
to the police. It was on these grounds that in December 2013
Judge Richard Leon held that the NSA collection program is
likely unconstitutional.604
The strongest counterargument is that offered by Judge
Pauley of the Southern District of New York, who asserts that
calling data on tens of millions of Americans, and the retention
of this data, represented precisely what was settled in Smith.605
In other words, the data in question is only different in volume,
not kind, from what was at stake in Smith v. Maryland. That it
happens to yield more insight into individuals’ lives matters
naught: the key question, instead, is whether it has been provided to a third party. The problem with this analysis is that it
ignores the point of inquiring into the reasonableness of the
602. Report on the National Security Agency’s Bulk Collection Programs for
USA PATRIOT Act Reauthorization, supra note 349, at 1 (detailing the collection
of business records under Section 215 and the use of pen-trap under Section 402).
603. Id. at 3.
604. Klayman v. Obama, 957 F. Supp. 2d 1, 43–44 (D.D.C. 2013).
605. ACLU v. Clapper, 959 F. Supp. 2d 724, 749–52 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
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search. By including both an objective and a subjective standard, the Court allowed for the context and the evolution of
technology to be taken into account. In Jones, as was considered
above, five Justices questioned whether Smith continues to be
applicable in light of the evolution of technology.
In a recent post arguing against the constitutionality of the
NSA bulk metadata collection program, Professor Geoffrey R.
Stone, who served on the President’s Review Board of the
metadata collection program, added yet a further consideration. The costs traditionally associated with traditional pen registers and trap and trace equipment have, in the past, created a
barrier to the government’s use of the same.606 The use of a pen
register is time-consuming, fact specific, and costly. As a practical matter, the government can use it in only a handful of situations. The knowledge that the government can use a pen register without probable cause and a warrant therefore has
almost no effect on the average person’s expectations of privacy or behavior.607
The decision to make a telephone call (or not) thus does not
turn on the “infinitesimal risk” that the government might
have placed a pen or trap on our number.608 Technology, however, Stone argues, has changed the calculation.609 The government can now do this without any of the efficiency barriers
that, in the past, would have prevented us from being placed
under surveillance.610 This was precisely the point that Justice
Alito brought out in Jones in relation to the use of GPS technologies. 611 Technology should not continually erode our traditional expectations of privacy. Stone observes, “Without that
principle, the evolution of a ‘Big Brother’ government could do
serious damage to the liberty, privacy and dignitary interests of
the individual that are essential to a free society.”612
606. Geoffrey R. Stone, Is the NSA’s Bulk Telephony Meta-Data Program Constitutional:
Part II, HUFFINGTON POST, Jan. 6, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/
geoffrey-r-stone/is-the-nsas-bulk-telephon_b_4549449.html, [perma.cc/T62W-9PCH].
607. Id.
608. Id.
609. Id.
610. Id.
611. Id.
612. Id.
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In the context of the haystack argument, it is important to
note here that the previous absence of technology performed an
important privacy function: It created administrative barriers
to impinging on individuals’ private lives. The very question of
whether or not to build a haystack is a quintessential twentyfirst century question. To suggest that there is no privacy implication in building the haystack ignores the important limiting function that lack of technology and resource constraints
previously played.
A second problem with the haystack approach is that the Supreme Court has not recognized any “automation exception” to
the Fourth Amendment. To the contrary, it is the moment at
which the thermal device picks up the heat signature, when the
GPS device is placed on the car, and when the dog sniffs the marijuana inside the home that the search has occurred. In United
States v. Karo,613 for instance, a case that turned on the use of a
beeper to follow a suspected drug dealer’s car, Justice Stevens
explained: “The expectation of privacy should be measured
from the standpoint of the citizen whose privacy is at stake, not
of the government. It is compromised the moment the invasion
occurs. A bathtub is a less private area when the plumber is present even if his back is turned.”614 It is the collection of the information that thus represents an intrusion into privacy.
A variant of the haystack argument that suggests that no
search occurs until a human being sees the data being collected
ignores the fact that this is a government-centric approach. The
Fourth Amendment, however, protects individual rights from
government intrusion. It is thus from the individual’s perspective
that one must evaluate both the act of trespass and the objective and subjective expectations of privacy (as under Katz). And
from the individual’s perspective, it is at the moment the telephony metadata is collected that the search occurs. It would thus
matter little if the government mounted cameras inside every
American’s home, promising not to actually watch the tapes
until some future point in time. The act of mounting the camera
and recording the information is precisely what constitutes a

613. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
614. Id. at 735.
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search, and thus brings such behavior within the protection of
the Fourth Amendment.
A third problem with the government’s line of reasoning is
that it ignores the intercession of human judgment throughout
the process. It is a human being that decides to collect the information. Human beings submit applications to FISC, grant
applications, and issue primary and secondary orders to collect
the data. Human beings program computers to collect information and to collate it. Human beings write the algorithms,
replete with inbuilt assumptions and biases, and then decide
where the information goes and in what form it will be available for other human beings to see. In short, human beings are
involved throughout the process. To represent it otherwise is to
ignore the extent to which technology is being used at the behest of government and not in its stead.
In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall wrote, “We
must never forget that it is a constitution we are expounding.”615 Just over a century later, Justice Brandeis recognized
that in the intervening time, the Supreme Court had “repeatedly sustained the exercise of power by Congress, under various
clauses of that instrument, over objects of which the Fathers
could not have dreamed.”616
For Brandeis, the purpose of the Fourth Amendment was to
protect the privacies of life:
But “time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes.” Subtler and more far-reaching means
of invading privacy have become available to the government. Discovery and invention have made it possible for the
government, by means far more effective than stretching
upon the rack, to obtain disclosure in court of what is whispered in the closet.617

Justice Brandeis’ words proved prescient:
The progress of science in furnishing the government with
means of espionage is not likely to stop with wire-tapping.
Ways may someday be developed by which the government, without removing papers from secret drawers, can re615. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
616. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 472 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
617. Id. at 473.
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produce them in court, and by which it will be enabled to
expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the home.
Advances in the . . . sciences may bring means of exploring
unexpressed beliefs, thoughts and emotions. “That places
the liberty of every man in the hands of every petty officer”
was said by James Otis of much lesser intrusions than these.
To Lord Camden, a far slighter intrusion seemed “subversive of all the comforts of society.” Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against such invasions of individual security?618

The technologies at issue in the bulk collection program invade U.S. citizens’ privacy to a degree unprecedented in the
past. It was Brandeis that noted, “As a means of espionage,
writs of assistance and general warrants are but puny instruments of tyranny and oppression when compared with wiretapping.”619 Yet the wiretapping of a single individual is but an
equally “puny instrument” when compared with the wholesale
collection and analysis of all communication records.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The 1978 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act sought to empower the NSA and others to take advantage of new technologies and to engage in necessary foreign intelligence gathering,
while preventing the intelligence community from engaging in
sweeping surveillance of U.S. citizens. Congress enacted a series of restrictions, requiring that the target of such surveillance
be a foreign power, or an agent thereof, insisting that probable
cause support such claims, and heightening the protections afforded to the domestic collection of U.S. citizens’ information.
FISA’s expansion gradually brought physical searches, pen registers and trap and trace devices, as well as business records
and tangible goods, within its remit. These new authorities retained much of the structure that defined the statute.
The NSA’s bulk collection of metadata contradicts the general approach Congress adopted in enacting FISA. The FISC
orders lack the particularization required prior to the acquisition of information and the role FISC now plays departs from
618. Id. at 474 (footnotes omitted).
619. Id. at 476.
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that Congressenvisioned. The bulk collection program, moreover, violates the statutory language in at least three ways: it
does not comport with the requirement that the tangible goods
sought “are relevant to an authorized investigation”; it violates
the requirement that the information be otherwise obtainable
via subpoena duces tecum; and it bypasses the statutory provisions governing pen registers and trap and trace devices. Compounding the illegality of the program are serious constitutional concerns. The FISC order governing the telephony metadata
program amounts to a general warrant, which the Fourth
Amendment precludes. The government’s efforts to save the
program on grounds of third party doctrine are unpersuasive
in light of the unique context of Smith v. Maryland, new technologies, and changed circumstances. Growing tension between trespass doctrine and Katz’s reasonable expectation of
privacy, as applied to new technologies, suggests that under
either approach, the telephony metadata program falls outside
constitutional bounds.
There are a number of steps that could be taken as part of a
comprehensive FISA reform, to address the shortcomings noted in this Article. First, and most importantly, to comply with
constitutional demands, the administration, the courts, or Congress needs to bring the bulk collection of U.S. persons’
metadata under Section 215 to an end. Second, to strengthen
FISC’s ability to respond to applications, a number of judicial
reforms could be adopted. Foremost on this list is the introduction of adversarial counsel.
In some sense it is inevitable that FISC opinions would extend
beyond the original role envisioned by the court (i.e., granting
orders), to issuing memorandum opinions. Like all courts, FISC
must interpret statutory language and constitutional requirements, in order to apply the law to particular circumstances.
Although FISC is not exercising jurisdiction over cases and controversies, it is overseeing a judicial process and, as such, exercising judicial power.620 It is a logical extension of this function
that such decisions would then become guidance for similarly
situated requests from the Department of Justice and others.
620. U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1 (allocating the judicial power to federal courts, and
thus requiring the courts to interpret and to apply federal law).
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A high standard of due diligence is recognized and practiced
by DOJ’s National Security Division (NSD)—an entity particularly aware of its responsibilities in light of in camera, ex parte
proceedings.621 It was NSD, for instance, that recognized in
January 2009 that the NSA had only been subjecting approximately ten percent of its queries to RAS inspection—and that
reported this within a week to FISC.
Nevertheless, for reasons that the Founders and numerous
courts in the interim have clearly recognized, the executive
branch is hardly a neutral, disinterested observer when its own
interests are on the line. Justice Powell explained in United
States v. United States District Court that the duties and responsibilities of executive officers are “to enforce the laws, to
investigate, and to prosecute . . . . [T]hose charged with
this . . . duty should not be the sole judges of when to utilize
constitutionally sensitive means in pursuing their tasks.”622
He underscored the problem: “[U]nreviewed executive discretion may yield too readily to pressures to obtain incriminating
evidence and overlook potential invasions of privacy . . . . ”623
Allowing contrary views enables the vigorous prosecution of
narrow interests, in the process providing FISC with a broader
and deeper understanding of the issues at stake. It has taken
many scholars by surprise, for instance, that Judge Eagan’s
August 2013 opinion considers Smith v. Maryland as entirely
dispositive of the Fourth Amendment question. United States
v. Jones garners but a footnote, with the opinion omitting any
sustained discussion of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence. The
importance of adversarial counsel extends beyond merely a
constitutional advocate to the potential use of adversarial
counsel (with subpoena authorities) to represent corporate and
other rights-based interests of U.S. persons. There are a number
of ways in which an adversarial process could be created. This

621. See, e.g., Continued Oversight of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 113th Cong. (2013) (statement of Carrie F.
Cordero, Director of National Security Studies, Georgetown University Law Center), available at http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cong/116, [perma.cc/7UYT5WUT].
622. 407 U.S. 297, 317 (1972).
623. Id.
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is a matter for policy debate. That one is needed, from a legal
and constitutional perspective, is clear.
Another alteration that would strengthen FISC’s hand would
be to provide the court with the technical expertise required to
allow it to ensure that the minimization and other procedures it
requires are actually followed by the executive branch. As the
multiple noncompliance incidents suggest, simply leaving it to
the NSA to self-report creates a gap between what is legally
required and what occurs in practice. Having deeper insight
into the technologies is critical. There is something fundamentally disturbing about FISC simply trusting the executive
branch to police its own operations. History, certainly, has
taught us the danger of proceeding in this manner.
Yet, further alterations that may address some of FISC’s
shortcomings relate to substantive changes to the law. Untying
the court’s hands, for instance, with regard to whether or not
certain orders should be granted would help to respond to the
critique that the court has such a high rate of acceptance of applications. It is Congress, at least in relation to Section 215, that
imposed these limits on FISC. Removing these, and making
other statutory changes, such as restoring the prior targeting
requirement, heightening protections for U.S. persons, adding
“and material” after “relevant,” narrowing the definition of
“foreign intelligence” to exclude “foreign affairs,” and requiring the government to demonstrate past effectiveness prior to
renewal orders, would further strengthen the role that FISC
could play in overseeing foreign intelligence gathering.
In sum, myriad changes could be put into place to allow the
government to take advantage of new technologies, to counter
national security threats, and to ensure that the provisions operate in accordance with the U.S. Constitution.624 In the interim, both Congress and the courts have a role to play in insisting that the executive branch operates within statutory and
constitutional constraints.

624. As a follow-on to this Article, I construct a taxonomy for potential FISA reforms in Laura K. Donohue, FISA Reform, 10 ISJLP (forthcoming 2014), available at
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2327&context=fa
cpub, [perma.cc/NS93-R535].

